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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a reassessment of the political culture of Scotland in the later fifteenth 
century, from c. 1440 to c. 1490, through an examination of communitarian discourses and 
practices. It argues that the current understanding of political relations is limited by too 
great a focus upon personal relationships. While these were undoubtedly important, it is 
necessary also to consider the structures of law and governance which framed political 
interactions, and the common principles and values which underpinned action, in order to 
gain a fuller picture. 
In particular, it is argued that the current model, which assumes a more or less oppositional 
relationship between crown and ‘political community’, ought to be replaced with a public 
domain in which claims to authority were asserted and contested. This approach allows the 
familiar political narrative to be firmly connected to the ideas expressed in contemporary 
advice literature, while also situating political authority spatially, by asking how it was 
experienced as well as how it was projected. The focus upon language and space allows for 
clear parallels to be drawn between different local political cultures, and allows connections 
and contrasts to be made between those cultures and the norms of kingship and lordship.  
It argues that reforms to civil justice made during James III’s reign have played a far more 
important part in the turbulent politics of the time than has been appreciated, that both royal 
and aristocratic authority could be presented as acting both for the common good and for 
the interests of the crown, and that Scotland’s towns not only had a vibrant political culture 
of their own, but were an important part of the politics of the realm. 
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Introduction 
 
It is an exciting time to be making a study of political legitimacy and consent in Scotland, 
and the later fifteenth century, from c. 1440 to c. 1490, is a particularly fruitful period in 
which to explore such questions. Roughly spanning the reigns of James II (1437-1460) and 
James III (1460-1488), this period saw a renegotiation of political authority as the Stewart 
kings sought to expand the royal demesne, prompting an alteration in the relationship of the 
crown to the nobility. Furthermore, it is now forty-three years since the ‘new orthodoxy’ in 
late medieval history burst into life with Jenny Wormald’s article ‘Taming the Magnates?’, 
which upended previous assumptions about fifteenth-century Scotland as a wild and 
lawless place with a weak crown powerless to stop the predations of the nobility.1 Since that 
article was written historical scholarship on this period has flourished. Wormald and 
Alexander Grant developed an overview of late medieval politics, highlighting the close 
degree of co-operation between crown and nobility necessary for the successful governance 
of a relatively decentralised polity such as Scotland.2 Crown governance, they argued, was 
less important than the authority of the local lord, which was bolstered with ties of kinship 
and bonds of manrent and maintenance.3 The king therefore had to rely heavily upon his 
magnates in order to advance his political aims, ensuring that the realm was relatively 
stable, especially compared to England.4 This broad-brush method was later complemented 
by the work of Norman Macdougall and his students, whose forensic approach to the 
                                                          
1 The article was written as Jennifer M. Brown in 1972, and reprinted in 1985 as J. Wormald, ‘Taming 
the Magnates?’, in K. Stringer (ed.), Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1985), pp. 
270-80. 
2 J. M. Brown (later Wormald), ‘The Exercise of Power’, in J. M. Brown (ed.), Scottish Society in the 
Fifteenth Century (London, 1977), pp. 33-65; J. Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland 1470-1625 
(Edinburgh, 1983); A. Grant, ‘Crown and Nobility in Late Medieval Britain’, in R. Mason (ed.), 
Scotland and England, 1286-1815 (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 34-59; A. Grant, Independence and Nationhood 
(Edinburgh, 1984). 
3 Grant’s work has ranged widely over the nature and evolution of lordship and landholding in the 
late medieval period, for example: ‘Earls and Earldoms in Late Medieval Scotland (c.1310-1460)’, in J. 
Bossy and P. Jupp (eds), Essays Presented to Michael Roberts (Belfast, 1976), pp. 24-40; ‘The 
Development of the Scottish Peerage’, SHR, 57 (1978), pp. 1-27; ‘Extinction of Direct Male Lines 
Among the Scottish Noble Families in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries’ in Stringer (ed.), Essays 
on the Nobility, pp. 210-31; ‘Franchises North of the Border: Baronies and Regalities in Medieval 
Scotland’, in M. Prestwich (ed.), Liberties and Identities in the Medieval British Isles (Woodbridge, 1993), 
pp. 155-99; ‘Service and Tenure in Late Medieval Scotland’, in A. Curry and E. Matthew (eds), 
Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 145-79. The definitive 
study of bonding practices is J. Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent 1442-1603 
(Edinburgh, 1985). 
4 This argument is stated most clearly in Grant, ‘Crown and Nobility’, passim. 
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political narrative resulted in detailed studies of the reigns of the Scottish kings from David 
II to James V.5 These monographs explored in depth the relationship between each king and 
his subjects, focusing upon the interpersonal connections within and between the nobility 
and higher clergy, and highlighted the element of competition inherent in the assertion and 
defence of medieval political authority.6 Since then Michael Brown in particular has written 
extensively on fifteenth-century lordship and kingship, drawing upon a wide range of 
source material in order to uncover the important personal relationships so central to 
medieval governance, and situate them within a broader political framework.7 In 1994 
Brown offered an explicit challenge to the narrative of co-operation which the new 
orthodoxy espoused, arguing that the relationship between crown and nobility was far less 
mutually obliging than had been allowed by Grant and Wormald, and that the famous 
political crises, which often resulted in the death of at least one of the protagonists, did not 
occur in isolation.8 This followed on from Steve Boardman’s 1989 thesis, which had 
demonstrated that the professions of love and kinship found within bonds of manrent were 
often made in connection with the settlement of feuds, rather than in order to add to the 
affinities of lords, again placing the emphasis upon confrontation rather than co-operation.9  
Running parallel to this scholarship has been an interest in the intellectual milieu of this 
period. Roger Mason has written on ideas of counsel, consent, empire and resistance in the 
fifteenth century, highlighting what he sees as an ‘ideology of patriotic conservatism’ which 
                                                          
5 M. Penman, David II, 1329-71 (Edinburgh, 2005); S. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and 
Robert III (East Linton, 1996); M. Brown, James I (East Linton, 2000); C. McGladdery, James II (East 
Linton, 1990); N. Macdougall, James III (2nd ed.) (Edinburgh, 2009); N. Macdougall, James IV (East 
Linton, 1997); J. Cameron, James V: The Personal Rule, ed. N. Macdougall (East Linton, 1998). 
6 This dynamic was also highlighted explicitly in N. Macdougall, ‘Crown Versus Nobility: The 
Struggle for the Priory of Coldingham, 1472-1488’, in Stringer (ed.), Essays on the Nobility, pp. 254-69.  
7 M. Brown, The Black Douglases: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 1300-1455 (East Linton, 
1998); ‘“That Old Serpent and Ancient of Evil Days”: Walter, Earl of Atholl and the Death of James I’, 
SHR, 71 (1992), pp. 23-45; ‘“I Have Thus Slain a Tyrant”: The Dethe of the Kynge of Scotis and the 
Right to Resist in Early Fifteenth-Century Scotland’, IR, 47 (1996), pp. 24-44; ‘“Rejoice to Hear of 
Douglas”: The House of Douglas and the Presentation of Magnate Power in Late Medieval Scotland’, 
SHR, 76 (1997), pp. 161-84; ‘“Vile Times”: Walter Bower's Last Book and the Minority of James II’, 
SHR, 74 (2000), pp. 165-88; ‘Public Authority and Factional Conflict: Crown, Parliament and Polity’, in 
K. Brown and R. Tanner (eds), The History of the Scottish Parliament Volume 1: Parliament and Politics in 
Scotland, 1235-1560 (Edinburgh, 2004), pp. 123-44; ‘Introduction’, in M. Brown and R. Tanner (eds), 
Scottish Kingship 1306-1542: Essays in Honour of Norman Macdougall (Edinburgh, 2008), pp. 1-19; ‘The 
Great Rupture: Lordship and Politics in North-East Scotland (1435-1452)’, Northern Scotland, 5 (2014) 
pp. 1-25.  
8 M. Brown, ‘Scotland Tamed? Kings and Magnates in Late Medieval Scotland: A Review of Recent 
Work’, IR, 45 (1994), pp. 120-46. 
9 S. Boardman, ‘Politics and the Feud in Late Medieval Scotland’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of St Andrews, 1989). 
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prevented the nobility from formulating theories of resistance in response to the predations 
of the crown.10 Isla Woodman has recently made a study of the Scottish universities in the 
fifteenth century, demonstrating that the clergy were fully involved in the debates which 
shaped European political thought in the period.11 Sally Mapstone’s 1986 thesis looked at the 
Advice to Princes tradition in Scottish literature, situating various pieces within their literary 
and intellectual context and arguing for a distinctively Scottish inflection of the genre which 
combines an ‘essentially pragmatic’ idea of kingship with a focus upon the ‘practice, 
institutions, and conceptual basis’ of the law.12 Understanding the importance of the law, 
and of the legal changes instituted in this period, has been made considerably easier by the 
work of Hector MacQueen and Mark Godfrey, who have each contributed significantly to 
legal scholarship on the fifteenth century, while Jackson Armstrong’s work is exploring the 
ways in which politics and the law interacted.13  
Over the last twenty years there have been two further major developments in political 
history. The first is Roland Tanner’s work on the medieval parliament.14 This drew heavily 
upon Macdougall’s approach, focusing upon how the personal connections of the nobility 
affected the decisions made in parliament. Tanner thoroughly overturned the earlier claims 
made by Robert Rait, that the Scottish parliament was a weak and ineffective institution 
                                                          
10 R. Mason, ‘Kingship, Tyranny and the Right to Resist in Fifteenth-Century Scotland’, in R. Mason 
(ed.), Kingship and the Commonweal: Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland (East 
Linton, 1998), pp. 8-35; ‘This Realm of Scotland is an Empire? Imperial Ideas and Iconography in 
Early Renaissance Scotland’, in B. E. Crawford (ed.), Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and 
Early Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 1999), pp. 73-91; ‘Beyond the Declaration of Arbroath: 
Kingship, Counsel and Consent in Late Medieval and Early Modern Scotland’, in S. Boardman and J. 
Goodare (eds), Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny 
Wormald (Edinburgh, 2014), pp. 265-82. 
11 I. Woodman, ‘Education and Episcopacy: The Universities of Scotland in the Fifteenth Century’, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of St Andrews, 2010). 
12 S. Mapstone, ‘The Advice to Princes Tradition in Scottish Literature, 1450-1500’, (Unpublished 
D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1986), p. 5. 
13 MacQueen has published widely on Scottish legal history. See in particular his Common Law and 
Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1998). A. M. Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance 
Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court (Leiden, 2009); ‘The Assumption of Jurisdiction: Parliament, the 
King's Council and the College of Justice in Sixteenth-Century Scotland’, Journal of Legal History, 22 
(2001), pp. 21-36; J. W. Armstrong, ‘The Justice Ayre in the Border Sheriffdoms, 1493-1498’, SHR, 92 
(2013), pp. 1-37; ‘The “Fyre of Ire Kyndild” in the Fifteenth-Century Scottish Marches’, in S. A. Throop 
and P. A. Hyams (eds), Vengeance in the Middle Ages: Emotion, Religion and Feud (Farnham, 2010), pp. 
51-84. 
14 R. Tanner, The Late Medieval Scottish Parliament: Politics and the Three Estates, 1424-1488 (East Linton, 
2000); ‘Outside the Acts: Perceptions of the Scottish Parliament in Literary Sources before 1500’, 
Scottish Archives, 6 (2000), pp. 57-70; ‘“I Arest You, Sir, in the Name of the Three Astattes in 
Perlement”: The Scottish Parliament and Resistance to the Crown in the Fifteenth Century’, in T. 
Thornton (ed.), Social Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century (Stroud, 2000), pp. 101-17; 
‘The Lords of the Articles before 1540: A Reassessment’, SHR, 79 (2000), pp. 189-212. 
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which was ‘subservient’ to the king.15 The second development, exemplified by the work of 
Katie Stevenson, has seen a shift in emphasis from the political narrative to the means 
through which politics were shaped by cultural factors, looking in particular at chivalric 
practices, royal iconography and court culture.16 Due to the available records scholarship on 
the fifteenth-century court, and the royal demesne more generally, has traditionally been 
situated in the field of administrative history, although William Hepburn’s recent thesis has 
made use of the greater range of material available for James IV’s reign to make a much-
welcome study of that king’s household.17 
With such a wealth of scholarship now available on the political culture of the fifteenth 
century the time is ripe for a new explanatory framework. This was in fact advocated some 
time ago by Grant who, in 1994, called for a ‘new constitutional history of medieval 
Scotland’ to investigate the ‘underlying mechanisms and principles’ which informed high 
politics.18 Grant’s appeal was inspired by a movement already well underway in the 
historiography of late medieval England, which has since gathered considerable 
momentum. Beginning with Edward Powell in 1989, the ‘new constitutional history’ sought 
to restore institutions, ideologies and structures to the study of political history, replacing a 
model which he saw as being overly reliant upon ‘pragmatism, patronage and personality’ 
for its explanatory power.19 In order to counteract the assumption being made, that the 
nobility were motivated only by ‘economic rationalism expressed in the scramble for place 
and profit’, Powell argued that historians had to understand both the conceptual basis of 
                                                          
15 R. Rait, The Scottish Parliament (London, 1925), p. 47. 
16 K. Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424-1513 (Woodbridge, 2006); ‘The Unicorn, St 
Andrew and the Thistle: Was There an Order of Chivalry in Late Medieval Scotland?’, SHR, 83 (2004), 
pp. 3-22; ‘Contesting Chivalry: James II and the Control of Chivalric Culture in the 1450s’, Journal of 
Medieval History, 32 (2007), pp. 197-214; ‘Chivalry, British Sovereignty and Dynastic Politics: 
Undercurrents of Antagonism in Tudor-Stewart Relations, c.1490−c.1513’, Historical Research, 86 
(2013), pp. 601-18. See also in particular Lucinda Dean’s recent thesis ‘Crowns, Wedding Rings, and 
Processions: Continuity and Change in the Representations of Scottish Royal Authority in State 
Ceremony, c. 1214 – c. 1603’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Stirling, 2013) and A. Thomas, 
Glory and Honour: The Renaissance in Scotland (Edinburgh, 2013). 
17 A. R. Borthwick, ‘The King, Council and Councillors in Scotland, c.1430-1460’, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989); T. M. Chalmers, ‘The King’s Council, Patronage and the 
Governance of Scotland’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1982); C. Madden, ‘The 
Finances of the Scottish Crown in the Later Middle Ages’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Glasgow, 1975); A. L. Murray, ‘The Exchequer and Crown Revenue of Scotland, 1437-1542’, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1961); W. Hepburn, ‘The Household of James IV, 
1488-1513’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2013). 
18 A. Grant, ‘To the Medieval Foundations’, SHR, 73 (1994), pp. 4-24. 
19 E. Powell, Kingship, Law and Society (Oxford, 1989), p. 4; ‘After "After McFarlane": the Poverty of 
Patronage and the Case for Constitutional History’, in D. J. Clayton, R. J. Davies and P. McNiven 
(eds), Trade, Devotion and Governance: Papers in Later Medieval History (Stroud, 1994), pp. 1-16. 
5 
 
kingship and the administrative processes though which the crown exercised authority.20 
This call was taken up by Christine Carpenter and John Watts in particular, who have each 
argued explicitly for a more rounded political history imbued with ideas, values and 
principles.21 
Such thinking has yet to penetrate the study of late medieval Scotland, and there are several 
reasons why this is the case. The first relates to the sources which do not, at first glance, 
suggest that the politics of the fifteenth century were overly infused with principles of any 
sort. This is in part due to the fact that the material is very patchy, particularly for the period 
under discussion. There survives no original, full-length chronicle between the completion 
of Walter Bower’s Scotichronicon in the 1440s, and John Mair’s History of Greater Britain, 
written in 1521.22 The full parliamentary register is extant only from 1466, although much 
material survives from before this date, and there are no records of the King’s Council prior 
to its constitution as a formal judicial body, and then only in fragmentary form between 1478 
and 1496.23 The Treasurer’s Accounts survive only for six short months in 1473-4 before the 
run begins in earnest in 1488, the Exchequer Rolls are voluminous, although not 
comprehensive, and the same can be said for the Register of the Great Seal, which was never 
intended as a complete record.24 These sources have been used extensively and creatively by 
historians both to reconstruct the political narrative and to excavate information on royal 
expenditure, facilitating much of the scholarship outlined above. They do not, however, 
tend to contain explicit statements regarding the values which underpinned royal 
governance, instead being concerned solely with the day-to-day running of the realm.  
The second reason is that the political culture of Scotland and England are very different in 
this period. It is worth stating this point quite baldly, as Scotland has often been 
characterised as ‘relatively undeveloped’ compared to her southern neighbour.25 This is due 
                                                          
20 Powell, Kingship, Law and Society, pp. 5-6. 
21 C. Carpenter, The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c. 1437-1509 (Cambridge, 
1997); ‘Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane’, in R. H. Britnell and A. J. 
Pollard (eds), The McFarlane Legacy: Studies in Late Medieval Politics and Society (New York, 1995), pp. 
175-98; ‘Introduction: Political Culture, Politics and Cultural History’, in L. Clark and C. Carpenter 
(eds), Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 1-19; J. Watts, Henry VI and the 
Politics of Kingship (Cambridge, 1996); ‘Ideas, Principles and Politics’ in A. J. Pollard (ed.), The Wars of 
the Roses (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 110-33; The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500 (Cambridge, 2009). 
22 Chron. Bower; John Mair, A History of Greater Britain, ed. and trans. A Constable (Edinburgh, 1892). 
23 RPS. See the editorial introduction by G. H. Mackintosh, A. J. Mann and R. J. Tanner. ADC, ii. 
24 TA, i; ER, v-x; RMS, i-ii.  
25 There are many examples of this thinking. Rait’s study of the Scottish parliament, n. 15, is 
predicated upon them, and see R. L. C. Hunter’s comments on Scottish ideas of incorporation, below, 
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to the fact that discussions of medieval law and governance tend, unsurprisingly, to be 
heavily inflected with the discourse of legal history, which is still framed with more or less 
teleological narratives about the development of institutions. When these narratives are 
coupled with the clear discrepancy in the volume of scholarship relating to each medieval 
kingdom is it easy, although not acceptable, to make the assumption that where gaps exist in 
our knowledge of Scotland the practices in question were probably similar to those in 
England, but less refined. If this is presupposed the search for political principle becomes 
slightly absurd. Unsurprisingly the present work rejects all such inferences, starting from the 
position that if certain practices were adopted there was probably a good reason for it, and 
that the kings of Scotland were more concerned with governing their own polity 
successfully than with fretting over the extent to which they were perceived as inferior to 
the kings of England, or indeed any others.  
The third reason is that Scottish political history more generally has, for many years now, 
been preoccupied with questions of national identity. In the medieval context this has been 
particularly evident in discussions of the Wars of Independence in the late thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries.26 While the emergence and shaping of Scotland as a political 
entity is certainly an important subject identity is not a straightforward analytical tool, 
particularly when applied to the pre-modern world.27 For the fifteenth century the formation 
of national identity appears to be somewhat less pressing a concern, but it nevertheless 
underpins two important subjects. The first of these relates to the medieval historiographical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
p. 51. More recent statements derive from Brown, ‘The Exercise of Power’, p. 33, in which the entire 
first paragraph of the essay is devoted to underlining this point. To this can be added, for example, D. 
M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland (3 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1990), ii, p. 12, which states that 
‘Whichever view is accepted, Scotland was a long way behind England in development and had by 
1286 reached a stage of development reached by England roughly a century earlier’ and S. Reynolds, 
Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300 (Oxford, 1984), p. 273, which argues that 
‘Intermittent pressure from England [upon Scotland] probably helped to explain the regnal solidarity 
which, despite a relatively weak and undeveloped central government, had begun to grow even 
before Edward I mounted his great attack at the end of the thirteenth century.’ 
26 The foundational work is G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland 
(4th edition) (Edinburgh, 2005), although see also, for example, G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the 
Scottish Identity (Edinburgh, 1984); B. Webster, Medieval Scotland: The Making of an Identity 
(Basingstoke, 1997); D. Broun, R. J. Finlay and M. Lynch (eds), Image and Identity: The Making and 
Remaking of Scotland Through the Ages (Edinburgh, 1998); E. J. Cowan, For Freedom Alone: The 
Declaration of Arbroath, 1320 (East Linton, 2003); W. Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation: An 
Historic Quest (Edinburgh, 1998); M. P. Bruce and K. H. Terrell (eds), The Anglo-Scottish Border and the 
Shaping of Identity, 1300-1600 (Basingstoke, 2012).  
27 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society, 29 (2000), pp. 1-47 explores the 
many ways in which the term is employed in analysis, arguing that this lack of specificity renders it 
unable to do the work for which it is used. This problem is not considered by historians nearly as 
often as it ought to be. 
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tradition which developed, in part, as a response to the claims of overlordship periodically 
revived by the English crown, and offered a distinctively Scottish origin myth that was 
drawn upon throughout the middle ages.28 These narratives were undoubtedly important, 
yet they speak more to the king’s duty to defend the realm than his equally crucial duty to 
ensure justice within it. A focus upon such traditions necessarily gives primacy to the very 
potent ideas which mediated the relationship with England, obscuring those which 
underpinned political relationships within Scotland. The second issue is both more 
problematic and more complex, and concerns the current model of fifteenth-century 
governance in which the ‘political community’ is assumed to have acted as a counterbalance 
to the worst excesses of the crown.29 This political community draws part of its appeal from 
the highly influential Barrovian model of the ‘Community of the Realm of Scotland’, which 
supported Robert I in his struggles to unite the kingdom against the threat of English 
overlordship in the early fourteenth century, and draws the other part from its ability to 
seamlessly dovetail with the Aristotelian ideas of the common good which formed an 
integral part of political discourse by the 1440s.30 In his response to Grant’s 1994 paper, 
Macdougall highlighted in passing the dangers of attributing agency to this community and 
allowing it to ‘take on the character of a hugely influential organ of government’, and yet the 
term remains in regular use by historians of this period.31 Much of what follows explores the 
problems which this situation presents, and posits an alternative model which owes a 
significant debt to the new constitutional historians of medieval England.32  
                                                          
28 R. J. Goldstein, The Matter of Scotland: Historical Narrative in Medieval Scotland (Lincoln, 1993); M. P. 
McDiarmid, ‘The Kingship of the Scots in their Writers’, SLJ, 6 (1979), pp. 5-18; S. Boardman, ‘Late 
Medieval Scotland and the Matter of Britain’, in E. J. Cowan and R. J. Finlay (eds), Scottish History: The 
Power of the Past (Edinburgh, 2002), pp. 47-72; R. Mason, ‘Chivalry and Citizenship: Aspects of 
National Identity in Renaissance Scotland’, in Kingship and the Commonweal, pp. 78-103; J. Wormald, 
‘National Pride, Decentralised Nation: The Political Culture of Fifteenth-Century Scotland’, in Clark 
and Carpenter (eds), Political Culture, pp. 181-94. On this tradition more broadly, S. Reynolds, 
‘Medieval Origines Gentium and the Community of the Realm’, History, 68 (1983), pp. 375-90. 
29 K. Stevenson, Power and Propaganda: Scotland 1306-1488 (Edinburgh, 2014), p. 53; Grant, Independence 
and Nationhood p. 147; Macdougall, ‘Crown Versus Nobility’, p. 254. The term ‘political community’ 
has also been employed by K. Hunt, ‘The Governorship of the Duke of Albany (1406-1424)’, p. 135; C. 
McGladdery, ‘James II’, p. 179; F. Downie, ‘Queenship in Late Medieval Scotland’, p. 234 and R. 
Mason, ‘Renaissance Monarchy? Stewart Kingship (1469-1542)’, p. 265, all in Brown and Tanner (eds), 
Scottish Kingship. Both Brown and Tanner themselves also use it, albeit within inverted commas, at 
pp. 3, 213. 
30 Barrow, Robert Bruce, passim. On the latter, A. Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450 
(Cambridge, 1992), pp. 14-41. 
31 N. Macdougall, ‘At the Medieval Bedrock’, SHR, 73 (1994), pp. 25-29, at p. 26. 
32 J. Watts, ‘The Pressure of the Public on Later Medieval Politics’, in L. Clark and C. Carpenter (eds.), 
Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 159-79 and ‘Public or Plebs: The 
Changing Meaning of “The Commons”, 1381-1549’, in H. Pryce and J. Watts (eds), Power and Identity 
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In place of the political community the first chapter argues for a new model of political 
relations based around the public domain, giving primacy to the generation and application 
of common knowledge. Chapter two examines the discourses of community which 
permeated urban political culture, suggesting that the town could be positioned as a 
physical location, a group of people or a legal corporation, allowing for a great degree of 
flexibility in the legitimisation of authority. The third chapter offers a reinterpretation of the 
relationship between the king and his lords, both by questioning the terms in which it is 
currently discussed and by prioritising some important structural changes which recent 
historiography has minimised. It also highlights similarities between the customary ideas 
which underpinned aristocratic bonding practices and those used by guilds, suggesting a 
shared political vocabulary. Chapter four argues that more attention ought to be given to the 
crown, rather than simply the king, when thinking about the growth of royal authority and 
offers a reconsideration of the relationship between crown and parliament, which is 
currently construed as highly oppositional. The final chapter contextualises some of these 
arguments within the much-discussed periods of crisis which punctuated the politics of 
fifteenth-century Scotland, highlighting the role of the public domain, discourses of counsel 
and consent, and urban political spaces in each. Finally, in addition to considering the 
broader points arising, the conclusion will briefly explore the implications of this research 
for the ways in which political poetry is currently discussed.  
 
Problems of Community 
In 1994 Christine Carpenter opened an article on ‘Gentry and Community in Medieval 
England’ by stating that ‘There is now a strong case for banning the word "community" from 
all academic writing and an even stronger one for banning it from the vocabulary of 
politics.’33 She argued, very convincingly, that the ‘sense of belonging’ which the term 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Rees Davies (Oxford, 2007), pp. 242-60 have been particularly 
influential in formulating many of the questions posed. 
33 C. Carpenter, ‘Gentry and Community in Medieval England’, Journal of British Studies, 33 (1994), pp. 
340-80, at p. 340. The literature on community is vast, although very little of it relates to Scotland 
specifically. Much of it can be found cited in Carpenter’s article, and the bibliographies of Reynolds, 
Kingdoms and Communities and P. Withington, ‘Introduction’, in P. Withington and A. Shepard (eds), 
Communities in Early Modern England: Network, Place, Rhetoric (Manchester, 2000), pp. 1-14. A. P. 
Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London, 1985) was particularly useful in thinking 
through some of the big questions of this thesis, as were some lively discussions with modernist 
colleagues on the relationship of B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London, 1991) to medieval Scotland. B. Kümin, The Communal Age in Western 
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conjures had been used, consciously or otherwise, to posit a common identity within English 
counties which had never been subjected to proper scrutiny.34 This intersection of 
community and identity is indeed problematic. If we designate a group of people as a 
community then almost by default we must argue that its members identified with the 
group, and that actions of individuals were therefore motivated by common interests. This 
argument becomes circular rather quickly, however; if it is decided that these people had 
common interests there is a convincing case for grouping them together as a community. 
Better, as Carpenter suggests, not to use the term at all.35 That is not to say that the study of 
community should be abandoned completely. The work of Susan Reynolds has clearly 
demonstrated that communal ideas and collective action were central to medieval life across 
a wide range of contexts, and much of what follows here builds upon her arguments.36 It is 
telling that Reynolds avoids the idea of identity completely, preferring the more 
straightforward ‘solidarity’ to describe the feeling generated by common endeavour.37 While 
it is acknowledged that such feelings were, and still are, an important part of any action 
undertaken collectively, they are more than a little resistant to rigorous historical analysis, 
particularly when using the source material available to a historian of late medieval 
Scotland. As Phil Withington has argued, however, the significance of the term ‘community’ 
is in its ‘polyvalence, appropriability and capacity for synonymy’ rather than any particular 
set of values.38 Instead of asking how people related to the communities to which we assume 
they felt that they belonged, therefore, this thesis proposes to investigate how the idea itself 
was formulated in Scottish political discourse, and how it was put to use in practical politics, 
shifting the focus firmly from identity to utility. 
Discourses of community have been investigated by several other late medieval and early 
modern historians. Mason has explored the change in the vocabulary of Scottish political 
thought over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, from medieval conceptions of the 
common good to early modern notions of the commonweal.39 Watts has examined how the 
idea of ‘the commons’ developed over the late medieval period in England, how the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Europe, c.1100-1800 (Basingstoke, 2013) offers an accessible introduction to the topic, and another large 
bibliography. 
34 Carpenter, ‘Gentry and Community’, p. 341. 
35 Carpenter instead advocates social network analysis as a tool to explore local relationships, and 
argues for a focus upon the investigation of identities, ‘Gentry and Community’, p. 365-80. 
36 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, passim.  
37 See her collection of essays, S. Reynolds, Ideas and Solidarities of the Medieval Laity: England and 
Western Europe (Aldershot, 1995). 
38 Withington, ‘Introduction’, p. 2.  
39 R. Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal, passim. 
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discourse of the ‘community of the realm’ could be appropriated to support the popular 
uprisings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and how Ciceronian ideas of res publica 
structured the change in the political vocabulary of renaissance England, from ‘common 
weal’ to ‘commonwealth’.40 The Early Modern Research Group, comprising historians of late 
medieval and early modern England, and headed by Mark Knights, has also explored 
changes in the concept of commonwealth through an examination of the contexts in which it 
is found.41 This focus upon language and its uses is ultimately derived from intellectual 
history.42 Such methodologies have also been applied very productively to urban settings, 
where discourses of community are often particularly prevalent. Withington, writing on 
early modern England, and Jan Dumolyn and Jelle Haemers, writing on late medieval 
Flanders, have all made important connections between political rhetoric and urban spaces, 
providing another source of inspiration for the current work.43 
                                                          
40 Watts, ‘Public or Plebs’, pp. 242-60; ‘The Pressure of the Public’, p. 170; ‘“Commonweal” and 
“Commonwealth”: England's Monarchical Republic in the Making, c.1450-1530’, in A. Gamberini, J.-
Ph. Genet and A. Zorzi (eds), The Languages of Political Society: Western Europe, 14th-17th Centuries 
(Milan, 2011), pp. 147-63. On late medieval England, see also C. Fletcher, ‘De la Communauté du 
Royaume au Common Weal: Les Requêtes et Leurs Stratégies au XIVe Siècle’, Revue Française 
d'Histoire des Idées Politiques, 32 (2010), pp. 359-72. 
41 M. Knights, ‘Towards a Social and Cultural History of Keywords and Concepts by the Early 
Modern Research Group’, History of Political Thought, 31 (2010), pp. 427-48; G. Burgess and M. 
Knights, et al., ‘Commonwealth: The Social, Cultural, and Conceptual Contexts of an Early Modern 
Keyword’, The Historical Journal, 54 (2011), pp. 659-87.  
42 There is a large literature on this subject, and the following gives only an overview. The work of the 
Cambridge School has influenced several of the arguments advanced in this thesis. See Q. Skinner 
(ed.), Visions of Politics Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002) and J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The 
Concept of a Language and the Metier d’Historien: Some Considerations on Practice’, in A. Pagden 
(ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 19-38. For a 
discussion of political languages in the context of medieval Europe, see A. Black, ‘Political Languages 
in Later Medieval Europe’, in D. Wood (ed.), The Church and Sovereignty c. 590-1918: Essays in Honour 
of Michael Wilks (Oxford, 1991), pp. 313-28. Jan Dumolyn’s approach to political language, which is 
drawn upon in various places here, owes much to the discourse analysis technique of the social 
sciences, as advanced in N. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research 
(London, 2003).  R. Williams, Keywords (London, 1976) informed many later approaches. For the 
school of conceptual history the classic work is R. Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing 
History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford, 2002), but see also M. Richter, The History of Political and Social 
Concepts: A Critical Introduction (New York, 1995).  
43 P. Withington, The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2005); ‘Public Discourse, Corporate Citizenship and State Formation in Early Modern 
England’, The American Historical Review, 112 (2007), pp. 1016-38; ‘Citizens, Community and Political 
Culture in Restoration England’, in Withington and Shepard (eds), Communities in Early Modern 
England, pp. 134-55. For an explicit discussion of Dumolyn’s linguistic methodology see  his ‘Urban 
Ideologies in Later Medieval Flanders: Towards a Methodological Framework’, in Gamberini, Genet 
and Zorzi (eds), The Languages of Political Society, pp. 69-96; J. Dumolyn, ‘Privileges and Novelties: the 
Political Discourse of the Flemish Cities and Rural Districts in their Negotiations with the Dukes of 
Burgundy (1384-1506)’, Urban History, 35 (2008), pp. 5-23; J. Dumolyn and J. Haemers, ‘“A Bad 
Chicken was Brooding”: Subversive Speech in Late Medieval Flanders’, Past and Present, 214 (2002), 
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That communitarian ideas were prevalent in later fifteenth-century Scotland is therefore not 
in doubt; the problem is one of excavation. In thinking about the sources of such ideas, and 
their circulation, it has been helpful to make use of the five ‘political languages’ which 
Antony Black argues can be found permeating late medieval political thought.44 These are: 
Roman law, or jurisprudence; ‘customary’ law, which expressed ideas relating to oaths, 
lordship, contracts and privileges; ‘theological’ language, drawn from the Bible and the 
church Fathers; the language of Aristotelian thought; and the Ciceronian language of the 
humanists.45 Ideas of community were nuanced by each of these in the later fifteenth 
century, the emphasis shifting with time, place and contingencies.46 This thesis makes no 
claim to be a work either of intellectual or legal history, and in particular will not attempt to 
trace each language through the records; the extent to which they overlap and influence 
each other would render such an attempt futile. The fact that ideas of community were 
drawn from these different languages, however, means that it is possible to discern 
rhetorical, legal, spatial and institutional aspects of the concept of community which 
interacted in various ways, and which could be used in different circumstances. It is these 
interactions, and their implications for everyday politics, which is the main concern of this 
work.47 To further complicate matters, as will become evident, the concepts and practices 
which were employed to promote communal ideas and facilitate collective action were not 
exclusively denoted by the term community.48 This work therefore moves between 
community as ‘a group of people’, and community as ‘that which people had in common’ in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pp. 45-86; ‘Patterns of Urban Rebellion in Medieval Flanders’, Journal of Medieval History, 31 (2005), 
pp. 369-93.  
44 Black, ‘Political Languages’, pp. 317-18. 
45 Ibid., pp. 317-18. 
46 The subject of community in political thought is an expansive one. In thinking about how the idea 
can be put to use I have drawn in particular upon: J. Quillet, ‘Community, Counsel and 
Representation’, in J. H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350-c. 1450 
(Cambridge, 1988), pp. 520-72; A. Black, ‘Political Thought’, passim; A. Black, Guilds and Civil Society in 
European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present (London, 1984); J. P. Canning, ‘Law, 
Sovereignty and Corporation Theory’, in Burns (ed.), Medieval Political Thought, pp. 454-76; E. 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957); B. Tierney, 
Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought (Cambridge, 1982); M. S. Kempshall, The Common 
Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford, 1999).  
47 This relates very closely to the arguments expressed in Withington, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-14. 
48 The flexibility of medieval language in relation to collectivities is noted by almost all who study 
them, for example Quillet, ‘Community’, pp. 521-22; Black, ‘Political Thought’, p. 14; J. Canning, ‘The 
Corporation in the Political Thought of the Italian Jurists of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, 
History of Political Thought, 1 (1980), pp. 9-32, at p. 9. 
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order to assess as full a range as possible of the political activity to which these ideas 
applied.49 
There are two insights, gained from the work of Quentin Skinner, which underpin much of 
the argument which follows. The first concerns the relationship between the ideas which 
were used to legitimise political actions and the range of political actions which could be 
considered legitimate. As Skinner argues, ‘To recover the nature of the normative 
vocabulary available to us for the description and appraisal of our conduct is at the same 
time to identify one of the constraints on our conduct itself’.50 Anyone claiming to rule for 
the benefit of the governed must be able to demonstrate, over time, that they are in fact 
doing this in order for the claims to remain relevant and credible. If such claims cease to be 
relevant or credible there is no longer any point in making them. This is not the same as 
suggesting that every political action to which such concepts are attached is necessarily 
altruistic; quite the reverse. The language of the common good, for example, can be used to 
justify an extremely broad range of actions, as will be discussed in detail in later chapters.51 
Instead it suggests that such concepts were not merely acting as lip service to the prevailing 
norms of the time, ‘tacked on’ to the real business of government, but that they shaped 
practical politics at a basic level. The second insight concerns the intention of authors.52 
Skinner argues that we should be concerned to understand not only what an author is 
saying, but what he is doing in saying it, for which an appreciation of the linguistic context 
in which he is writing is essential.53 This has a particular relevance for the work of authors 
such as John Ireland, who is known to have lifted whole passages verbatim from other 
scholarly works and inserted them into his Meroure of Wyssdome, or Sir Gilbert Hay, who 
copied the Buke of the Gouernaunce of Princis from a French manuscript, interspersing it with 
unknown quantities of his own material, or indeed for the legal treatise Regiam majestatem, in 
circulation from the fourteenth century, which was compiled in large part from English 
                                                          
49 OED community, n. II. 
50 Q. Skinner, ‘The Idea of a Cultural Lexicon’, in Skinner (ed.), Visions of Politics, pp. 158-74, at p. 174. 
51 This argument is laid out in detail in ‘The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of 
Bolingbroke vs. Walpole’, in N. McKendrick (ed.), Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and 
Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb (London, 1974), pp. 93-128. John Watts makes the same case, in the 
context of fifteenth-century politics, in ‘Ideas, Principles and Politics’, p. 117. I am very grateful to 
Prof. Watts for drawing my attention to Skinner’s article. 
52 Skinner’s arguments concern the illocutionary force of language, which was first described in J. 
Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1975).  
53 Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in Visions of Politics, pp. 57-89, at 
p. 82 and passim. See also ‘Motives, Intentions and Interpretations’, pp. 90-102 and ‘Interpretation and 
the Understanding of Speech Acts’, pp. 103-127 in the same volume. 
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texts. Such practices may render these works of little value for those concerned with 
originality of thought.54 If, however, it is assumed that the authors were doing something 
specific in composing their material in this way - that is, drawing from the work of others in 
order to advise, persuade, educate and assist those who governed the realm - then we can 
study the texts for their contributions to Scottish political culture without being overly 
concerned about their contributions to European political thought. 
 
The Sources 
This thesis draws its evidence from six broad groups of sources. The first is the Records of 
the Parliaments of Scotland.55 The Scottish Parliament project, completed at the University of 
St Andrews in 2007, collated, transcribed and translated all records relating to the institution 
until its dissolution in 1707, and made them available online in a searchable database. This 
has greatly aided research into political discourse, not only by making it possible to search 
the records for key words and phrases but also by substantially reducing the amount of time 
necessary for a researcher to become familiar with the acts themselves. The pre-1466 
material is, by necessity, a collation by the editors of surviving versions of the acts from 
different manuscripts, although this presents very few difficulties in practice.  
The second group is the urban records. The most important of these is the run of burgh 
council registers from Aberdeen, which cover the period between 1440 and 1490 in five full 
volumes.56 These registers comprise the burgh council minutes, records of the guild court 
and records of the bailie court. Edinburgh is the only other burgh with council records from 
the period, in later copies, although the seals of cause of the Edinburgh craft guilds, which 
proliferate from the early 1470s, are also extremely valuable for studying ideas of 
community.57  There are two other sets of guild records which fall within the period: the 
                                                          
54 Mason, ‘Kingship, Tyranny and the Right to Resist’, p. 12. 
55 The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, ed. K. M. Brown et al. (St Andrews, 2007-15), 
www.rps.ac.uk. 
56 A project recently undertaken between Aberdeen City and Aberdeenshire Archives and the 
University of Aberdeen has led to the digitisation of the pre-Reformation council register and the 
manuscripts covering the period up to 1511 can now be found online at 
http://www.scotlandsplaces.gov.uk/digital-volumes/burgh-records/aberdeen-burgh-registers, 
accessed 26/5/2014. Some of the records for this period can be found in Abdn Counc., i; Abdn Guild 
Recs. 
57 Edin. Recs, pp. 26-34, 47-49, 54-58;  Edin. Chrs. 
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Gild Book of Dunfermline, the earliest such book extant, and the Perth Guildry Book.58 
While by later standards this selection is still fairly small, nevertheless the Aberdeen records 
are voluminous enough that a fifty year period yields well over two thousand manuscript 
pages. Use has therefore been made of the various edited extracts, which have been checked 
against the original volumes. With the material from the other burghs this provides more 
than enough to begin a discussion on urban political discourse.  
The third group of sources is what might be termed ‘political literature’, and consists of: 
Walter Bower’s Scotichronicon (c.1440) and the anonymous Liber Pluscardensis (c. 1461) which 
both adds to and abridges Bower’s work; Sir Gilbert Hay’s translation of the Secreta 
Secretorum, known as the Buke of the Gouernaunce of Princes (1456) and the ‘Regiment off 
Princis’ within Hay’s Buik of Alexander the Conquerour (c. 1460); the ‘Auchinleck chronicle’, a 
narrative fragment which covers the years 1428-1461; and John Ireland’s Meroure of 
Wyssdome (1490), in particular Book VII.59 Some of these texts are chronicles, and others are 
usually placed within the Advice to Princes genre, although the offering of counsel to the 
king is certainly not confined to the latter. Regiam majestatem and Quoniam attachimenta, 
while not political in the same sense, could be added to this group as they also had a formal 
didactic function related to governance and were still being copied and used in the later 
fifteenth century.60 The chronological scope of the thesis, which is broadly focused upon the 
period between 1440 and 1490 was, in part, dictated by this range of texts, with the decision 
being made to rely upon earlier or later works as little as possible. Many of the manuscripts 
containing these works were copied in the later part of this period. The Scotichronicon had 
been copied four times in full and twice in abbreviated form before James IV’s reign.61 The 
three earliest surviving copies of the Liber Pluscardensis date from the period 1478-1500.62 The 
sole surviving copy of Hay’s prose works, written for William Sinclair, earl of Orkney, was 
made for his son, Sir Oliver Sinclair, probably c. 1485-90.63 Ireland’s Meroure, although 
                                                          
58 Dunfermline Gild Bk; Perth Guild Bk. 
59 Chron. Bower; Chron. Pluscarden; Hay, Gouernaunce; Hay, Knychthede; Sir Gilbert Hay, The Buik of King 
Alexander the Conquerour, ed. J. Cartwright (Aberdeen, 1990), pp. 6-33; ‘The Auchinleck Chronicle’ in 
C. McGladdery, James II, pp. 160-73; Ireland, Meroure. 
60 Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta, ed. Lord Cooper (Edinburgh, 1947). 
61 Chron. Bower, xi, pp. 186-98; S. Mapstone, ‘The Scotichronicon’s First Readers’, in Crawford (ed.), 
Church, Chronicle and Learning, pp. 31-55.  
62 Chron. Pluscarden, i, pp. x-xviii; R. J. Lyall, ‘Books and Book Owners in Fifteenth-Century Scotland’, 
in J. Griffiths and D Pearsall (eds), Book Production and Publishing in Britain, 1375-1475 (Cambridge, 
1989), pp. 239-56, at p. 247. 
63 Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, p. 47. On Hay’s use of the Scotichronicon, see Mapstone, ‘The 
Scotichronicon’s First Readers’, pp. 32-35. 
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written for James III, was presented to his son instead, in 1490, and also survives in a single 
copy.64 
The fourth group of sources is closely related to the third, and could be termed ‘political 
poetry’. It encompasses: Richard Holland’s Buke of the Howlat (1440s); some of Robert 
Henryson’s work (fl. 1470s and 1480s); an anonymous advice poem known as ‘The Harp’, 
attached to certain copies of the Liber Pluscardensis and recently dated to the mid-1470s; The 
Thre Prestis of Peblis and Lancelot of the Laik which are also anonymous, and The Wallace by 
‘Blind Hary’, the latter three all being dated to the 1470s, some more confidently than 
others.65 These sources, some of which also contain some advisory elements, have been 
grouped separately on the basis of their genre, which necessitates that questions of audience, 
purpose and authorial intention be considered rather differently. 
The fifth group of sources comprises the indentures and bonds of manrent extant for the 
fifteenth century. Wormald’s study has made tracking down these documents very 
straightforward, and this has been aided by the fact that so many of them have been 
included in printed collections. A small selection of legal sources, such as petitions, 
summonses and charters, has also been drawn upon, although constraints of time have not 
allowed an exhaustive study of all such documents.  
The final source group is a small but important selection of royal letters. These survive 
mostly as copies in other records, and often deal only with routine business, but they 
occasionally shed important light upon the employment of communitarian discourse by the 
crown.  
This choice of source material means that this work is concerned mainly with the secular 
sphere. This may seem rather arbitrary, particularly given the importance not only of 
Christian theology to the idea of community, but also of the Conciliarist debates to the 
political culture of the fifteenth century, and the limitations which such exclusions place 
                                                          
64 Johannes de Irlandia, The Meroure of Wyssdome, vol. I, ed. C. MacPherson (Edinburgh and London, 
1926), pp. ix, xi; Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, p. 357; J. H. Burns, ‘John Ireland and the “Meroure of 
Wyssdome”, IR, 6 (1955), pp. 77-98; ‘John Ireland: Theology and Public Affairs in the Late Fifteenth 
Century’, IR, 41 (1990), pp. 151-81.  
65 Richard Holland, The Buke of the Howlat, ed. R. Hanna (Woodbridge, 2014); The Poems of Robert 
Henryson, ed. D. Fox (Oxford, 1981); ‘The Harp’ in Chron. Pluscarden, i, pp. 392-400; The Thre Prestis of 
Peblis: How Thai Tald Thar Talis, ed. T. D. Robb (Edinburgh, 1920); Lancelot of the Laik, ed. M. M. Gray 
(Edinburgh, 1912); Blind Harry, The Wallace, ed. A. McKim (Edinburgh, 2003). 
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upon the arguments here are fully acknowledged.66 There is no question that a scholarly 
study of the ecclesiastical politics of fifteenth-century Scotland would make an extremely 
important contribution to our understanding of the politics of the realm. This would require 
an engagement both with theology and with the structures of church governance which 
would increase the scope of this work beyond that which is manageable, however, while the 
lack of explicit discussion of Conciliarism within most of the sources stated above means 
that its inclusion would also require an adaptation of the methodology used throughout. It 
is instead hoped that this thesis might prove to be a useful starting point for such a study in 
the future. Ecclesiastical politics aside, the sources chosen allow this research to make three 
connections which have not yet been explored for fifteenth-century Scotland. It enables the 
political theory which underpinned discussions of kingship in chronicles and advice texts to 
be linked very directly to political practice as evidenced in the record sources.67 While it uses 
linguistic analysis to trace discourses across different contexts it also situates them spatially, 
within local political cultures. Finally, it argues for Scotland’s towns to be considered not 
exclusively in terms of their social and economic importance, but as inherently political 
entities with an important place in the governance of the kingdom.  
 
 
                                                          
66 There is a large literature on Conciliarism. For an introduction see A. Black, Council and Commune: 
The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth-Century Heritage (London, 1979) and A. Black, ‘The Conciliar 
Movement’, in Burns (ed.), Medieval Political Thought, pp. 573-87. For Scotland, see J. H. Burns, Scottish 
Churchmen and the Council of Basle (Glasgow, 1962); ‘The Conciliarist Tradition in Scotland’, SHR, 42 
(1963), pp. 89-104; Mason, ‘Kingship, Counsel and Consent’, pp. 268-72; Woodman, ‘Education and 
Episcopacy’, pp. 64-75. 
67 As advocated in Watts, Henry VI, p. 15. 
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Chapter One: Common Knowledge and the Public Domain 
 
Any political culture without mass literacy must rely heavily upon that which people know 
about each other in order to function.1 Lay literacy certainly became more common in 
Scotland during the fifteenth century. From the start of James I’s personal rule, in 1424, 
much government business was recorded in the vernacular. Bonds and indentures between 
laymen, also written in Scots, proliferate from the 1440s, while by 1496 the Education Act 
had enshrined in law the need for noblemen to educate formally their eldest sons ‘sua that 
thai may have knawlege and understanding of the lawis, throw the quhilkis justice may 
reigne universalie throw all the realme’.2 Add to this the recent scholarly focus upon the 
growth of a distinctively Scottish Renaissance literary culture and it is easy to overlook the 
centrality of common knowledge to the functioning of politics in this period.3 In order for 
any law to have been effective, whether drawn from local custom or dictated from above, 
people would have had to have understood what was required of them if they were to 
conform, and to have understood the consequences if they did not. As John Ireland put it, 
‘gif you spere [ask] at me, quid est lex, quhat is law, I say that it is a tekin [token] be the 
quhilk a man may knaw the thing that his lord and souverane oblisis him to.’4 Conversely, 
ensuring that justice was carried out in accordance with legal norms was of the utmost 
importance to any monarch wishing to avoid accusations of tyranny. As Michael Brown has 
noted, Walter Bower was particularly concerned with the jura publica which he saw as an 
integral part of royal authority constituted for the protection of the poor and the weak.5 The 
idea that the king must ensure justice in the realm was a staple of the Advice to Princes 
genre, but it was no mere commonplace; a monarch who failed to staunch feuds, deal with 
rebellious subjects or ensure that his people received fair treatment from local judges would 
                                                          
1 On literacy in late medieval Scotland, see Stevenson, Power and Propaganda, pp. 149-51; Grant, 
Independence and Nationhood, pp. 103-6; Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, pp. 68-71; S. Mapstone, 
‘Was there a Court Literature in Fifteenth-Century Scotland?’, SSL, 26 (1991), pp. 410-22, at p. 413; R. J. 
Lyall, ‘Books and Book Owners’, pp. 239-56; S. Mapstone, ‘The Scotichronicon’s First Readers’, pp. 31-
56; J. Durkan and A. Ross, ‘Early Scottish Libraries’, IR, 9 (1958), pp. 5-167; J. Higgit, Scottish Libraries 
(London, 2006). 
2 Wormald, Lords and Men, passim.; RPS A1496/6/4. 
3 Chris Wickham’s discussions of the construction, attributes and importance of common knowledge, 
and of the role of gossip in political resistance, have been very helpful in formulating the arguments 
in this chapter. See C. Wickham, ‘Fama and the Law in Twelfth-Century Tuscany’, in T. Fenster and D. 
Lord Smail (eds), Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 15-26; 
‘Gossip and Resistance Among the Medieval Peasantry’, Past and Present, 160 (1998), pp. 3-24. 
4 Ireland, Meroure, p. 107. 
5 Brown, ‘Public Authority’, p. 138. 
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find himself open to criticism, as James III discovered to his cost. The means by which the 
crown demonstrated that justice had been done was therefore integral both to theoretical 
notions of good kingship and to the peace and prosperity which such kingship purported to 
ensure for the people living within the realm. Expectations had to be clear, decisions had to 
be publicised and sanctions had to be consistently applied. 
A monarch did not govern well simply by ensuring the rule of law, however; he also had to 
act in accordance with virtue. Given the very limited options available to subjects who 
wished legitimately to challenge the king’s rule, it was imperative that his political choices 
benefited the whole realm and not merely himself.6 How this worked in practice was, of 
course, a highly complex and contested matter, and much of the rest of this thesis engages 
with questions related to it. As far as the writers of the mirrors were concerned, however, 
one of the best ways to ensure that the king acted for the common good was to instil within 
him the appropriate virtues, after which he would naturally be inclined to put the interests 
of others before his own.7 They therefore devoted a large amount of their time to describing 
what those virtues were, and to providing examples of virtuous rulers from history and 
from classical literature, as exemplars.8 The extent to which a king lived up to these high 
expectations was not simply a matter of personal pride but of general interest, and it was 
through knowledge of a king’s reputation that others were able to judge the extent to which 
he accomplished this. 
As will become clear from what follows, it was not only kings who had to maintain a good 
reputation and ensure that justice was done. These concerns were central to politics at all 
levels, whether those of a great lord, lesser baron, burgh council or guild. In each case it was 
the generation of common knowledge which allowed both reputation and justice to work as 
political processes. In thinking about the ways in which common knowledge was generated, 
and how it interacted with political authority, it has been helpful to draw upon scholarship 
on the public sphere. This construct was posited by sociologist Jürgen Habermas, who 
argued that the public sphere first ‘emerged’ in later seventeenth-century England, 
describing it as ‘a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, 
                                                          
6 Watts, Henry VI, p. 22. On the debate regarding the legitimacy of resistance to monarchy see Brown, 
‘I Have Thus Slain a Tyrant’; Mason, ‘Kingship, Tyranny and the Right to Resist’; Tanner, ‘I Arest 
You’. 
7 Watts, Henry VI, p. 25. 
8 Gilbert Hay’s Buik of King Alexander the Conquerour is an obvious example, discussed in Mapstone, 
‘Advice to Princes’, pp. 101-142. 
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readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion’.9 
This ‘public opinion’, he argued, was formed through the medium of rational-critical debate, 
which developed in literary salons before broadening out to other locations of sociability, 
such as coffee houses, where engagement with political questions occurred.10  New forms of 
commodity exchange were crucial to the emergence of the public sphere, as was the rapid 
growth of print culture, which allowed the flow of ideas at a level and volume which could 
influence government policy.11 Because the ability to participate in the discussions which 
shaped public opinion was decided only by one’s ability to take part in rational debate, 
rather than one’s social rank, the public sphere was, in theory, accessible to anyone.12 
Habermas’s agenda was not that of the historian, however. His aim was to critique what he 
saw as the degraded public discourse of the time in which he was writing, the 1960s, by 
using an ideal model which he located in a specific time and place.13 As various scholars 
have acknowledged, Habermas was greatly influenced by Marxist theory, and his public 
sphere is bourgeois in character, providing a means through which that particular class 
gained political power.14 Nevertheless, it has been extremely influential. For historians, this 
is in part because it creates a space in which political and social practices can be considered 
together, connecting, for example, reading, voting, domesticity, ritual, rumour, humour and 
commerce.15 As a result, Habermas’s model has been modified in a number of important 
ways by scholars who wish to harness its benefits for their own period and purposes.16 
Some critics have pointed out that Habermas’s ideal of universal access is incompatible with 
the realities of contemporary politics; being literate, having access to certain locations and by 
implication owning property were all de facto conditions for participation in the bourgeois 
                                                          
9 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 25-26. C. Calhoun, ‘Introduction’, in C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the 
Public Sphere (London, 1992), pp. 1-50 provides a useful overview. 
10 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 51-56. 
11 Ibid., pp. 14-26. 
12 Ibid., p. 85. 
13 See A. Raffe, The Culture of Controversy: Religious Arguments in Scotland, 1660-1714 (Woodbridge, 
2012), pp. 3-12 for a very helpful overview of some of the problems in using the Habermasian public 
sphere as a point of departure. Raffe also highlights the numerous difficulties for a student of 
Scotland in drawing upon scholarship which relates solely to England. K. Bowie, Scottish Public 
Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union, 1699-1707 (Woodbridge, 2007), argues for a public sphere in 
early eighteenth-century Scotland. 
14 J. V. H. Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2001), p. 12; J. A. Downie, 
‘Public and Private: The Myth of the Bourgeois Public Sphere’, in C. Wall (ed.), A Concise Companion to 
the Restoration and Eighteenth Century (Malden, 2006), pp. 58-79, at pp. 65-68. 
15 Melton, Rise of the Public, p. 10. 
16 For an overview of its use by historians of early modern England see Withington, ‘Public 
Discourse’, pp. 1021-22. 
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public sphere.17 Others have suggested that the rational-critical nature of the debate which 
characterised the public sphere was never a historical reality.18 Others still have pointed out 
that the nobility were just as likely as the bourgeoisie to engage in such debates and shape 
public opinion, increasing the distance between the bourgeoisie and the rest of the 
population rather than liberating everyone to engage in political discourse.19 Many of these 
modifications and criticisms have been concerned with who was able to use the public 
sphere and where it could be found. Modernist historians and theorists have argued that a 
number of different ‘subaltern counter-publics’ are necessary to accommodate the greater 
political participation which characterises their period.20 By detaching the public sphere 
from public opinion, Natalie Mears has argued both for situated public spheres and an 
unsituated political discourse, which characterised political relations in the reign of 
Elizabeth I.21 More recently, it has been argued that in England there existed the potential for 
episodic, post-Reformation public spheres, in which publics could be mobilised both by 
those who opposed the regime of Elizabeth I, and by the regime itself.22  
Central to all of these arguments is the relationship between the state as public authority, 
and the groups of private individuals with which it interacted.23 Habermas argued that in 
the Middle Ages this relationship was qualitatively different, due to the fact that there was 
no distinction between the public and private spheres. Instead, kings and lords publicly 
represented their authority to their people, through ritual, display and repertoire, while the 
people passively observed it.24 While this ‘representative publicness’ certainly was an 
important feature of political authority in fifteenth-century Scotland Habermas’s model does 
not give a complete picture. Although the distinction made between public and private 
                                                          
17 E.g. Downie, ‘Public and Private’, pp. 69-70; M. P. Ryan, ‘Gender and Public Access: Women’s 
Politics in Nineteenth-Century America’, in Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 259-88. 
18 E.g. S. Susen, ‘Critical Notes on Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere’, Sociological Analysis, 5 
(2011), pp. 37-62, at p. 54; Melton, Rise of the Public, pp. 8-9; Downie, ‘Public and Private’, p. 73. 
19 Melton, Rise of the Public, p. 11. 
20 The phrase is Nancy Fraser’s, in ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy’, in Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 109-142, at p. 123. 
See also G. Eley, ‘Nations, Publics and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth 
Century’, pp. 289-339, in the same volume. 
21 N. Mears, Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms (Cambridge, 2005), p. 10-11, pp. 
181-203. 
22 P. Lake and S. Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England’, in P. Lake and S. 
Pincus (ed.), The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England (Manchester, 2007), pp. 1-30, at pp. 
3-9.  
23 Some of these arguments are helpfully laid out in Susen, ‘Critical Notes’, pp. 37-62. 
24 Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 5-14. 
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authority is indeed problematic, the imperative to exercise authority for the common profit 
meant that a dialogue with the governed was inevitable.25  
Harold Mah, writing on the eighteenth century, has highlighted an aspect of the public 
sphere which he suggests has not been given enough attention by historians: its function.26 
He argues that historians have ‘rhetorically spatialized’ the public sphere, thinking of it as a 
‘domain of free expression and argument that is accessible to any social group’.27 Instead, he 
suggests, its purpose was ‘to fuse persons into a unitary, collective subject: no longer a 
‘public’ sphere, but now ‘the public’.28 It was this public which had political authority, rather 
than any particular group who expressed themselves within the public sphere. In fact, Mah 
argues, the public sphere functioned by rendering the particularity of a group invisible, 
allowing it to construe itself as abstract, and hence universal.29 This was why an idealised 
rational-critical debate was necessary; it allowed the ‘abstract universality’ of those who 
participated to supersede personal interests.30 The public sphere was not a location or an 
institution, therefore, but a fiction. Emphasising group particularity through public 
participation in politics would, by necessity, cause that group to appear as a ‘special 
interest’, rather than ‘the public’ itself.31 The problem facing historians, as Mah sees it, is ‘to 
work out how certain groups are able to render their social particularity invisible and 
therefore make viable claims to universality, while others are consigned to public 
performances which end up proclaiming their social particularity.’32 If representative 
publicness was a state which could co-exist with the public sphere in the modern period, as 
Mah suggests, it seems reasonable to ask whether this was also true in the later fifteenth 
century. 
Claiming any such thing is rendered immediately rash by the fact that the word ‘public’, as a 
noun, does not enter the Scots language until well into the seventeenth century.33 No group, 
therefore, could possibly have aspired to construe itself as ‘the public’ even before 
                                                          
25 Watts, ‘Pressure of the Public’, p. 172, which argues that ‘a government which subjected everyone 
to its supposedly communitarian rule…would in return have to deal with a community comprising 
everyone.’ 
26 H. Mah, ‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians’, Journal of Modern 
History, 72 (2000), pp. 153-82. 
27 Ibid., p. 154. Mah connects this to an interest in the politics of identity. 
28 Ibid., p. 155. 
29 Ibid., p. 168. 
30 Habermas, Structural Transformation, p. 54; Mah, ‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere’, p. 168. 
31 Mah, ‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere’, p. 166. 
32 Ibid., p. 168. 
33 DSL, public, n. 
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capitalism, coffee houses or the rise of the nation-state are considered. Nevertheless, as is 
well known to scholars working on the later Middle Ages, claims to universality were far 
from absent; in fact they were ubiquitous.34 Two are particularly important in the context of 
the current work. The first is the equivalence between the king counselled, the crown, the 
kingdom and the people.35  In Scotland, as in England, this was given a particular inflection 
by the relationship of the king to parliament, although this was certainly not the only 
important dynamic. The second is the relationship between the urban communitas, the 
council and officers who ran it, and the members who comprised it.36 Both of these were 
underpinned by ideas from Roman law, customary law and Aristotelian thought. They also 
overlapped and interacted with each other. The rest of the thesis will set out these 
arguments in detail. Here it is important to note that ‘the crown’ and ‘the realm’, or in the 
urban context ‘the community’, were used in much the same way as was ‘the public’ in later 
periods. These concepts were imbued with political authority in their respective contexts, 
could be appropriated by particular groups seeking to construe themselves as universal, and 
could not be successfully claimed by those who did not already have a fairly large amount 
of political power. While the ideal of rational debate was essential for the Habermasian 
public sphere, its function was to generate consensus. Consensus was already the medieval 
ideal, and so political arguments centred not on ‘public opinion’, but on who could most 
convincingly act for the common good of the group.37 The prevailing political circumstances 
and the social status of the participants were undoubtedly very different in each case, but 
the underlying mechanism arguably remained the same; it allowed a group of individuals to 
act as the whole political body. While this argument should logically lead to a regnal sphere 
relating to the kingdom, and a corporate sphere relating to the towns, this quickly becomes 
needlessly convoluted, particularly once the relationship between town and crown is 
considered. Instead it is better to think in terms of a public domain which comprised both 
mechanisms. This is in keeping with a political discourse which did not draw a distinction 
between the public and private realms and which could, on occasion, employ the res publica 
                                                          
34 Withington, ‘Public Discourse’, pp. 1020-27, makes the case that ‘medieval ideas of political 
corporeality’ survived into the seventeenth century in England, and were integral to the development 
of public discourse. 
35 This relationship is explored in detail in Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies. 
36 A third is certainly the relationship of pope, council and church which formed the subject of the 
Conciliarist debates in the earlier part of the fifteenth century, but those arguments fall outside the 
scope of the current work.  
37 This is not to say that medieval people were any less rational than modern people in practice. In a 
world where weapons were omnipresent and legal restraints relatively limited placing consensus at 
the heart of politics was rational indeed.  
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as a structure complementary to the kingdom. While this designation risks increasing the 
level of rhetorical spatialization highlighted by Mah, it is suggested that such spatialization 
is less inappropriate to the fifteenth century, when representative publicness was still a 
central feature of political authority, than would be the case in later periods, and will work 
well as long as the function of the public domain is borne in mind. 
 
Common Knowledge and the Law 
As in the modern period political authority relied upon the generation of common 
knowledge in order to function effectively. There were two different ways in which common 
knowledge could be generated in fifteenth-century Scotland, and while the distinction will 
not be dwelt upon overmuch throughout the thesis it is helpful to make it here. The first was 
the ‘performance’ of politics.38 This encompasses ritual, ceremony and other political actions 
undertaken as part of the process of legitimising political authority, and relates closely to the 
Habermasian idea of representative publicness.39 The use of space was central to these 
actions, and their meaning and audience will shortly be discussed.40 The second way 
common knowledge could be generated was discursively, through that which people 
communicated to each other.41 This is, of course, trickier to track through the available 
sources, but it was nevertheless absolutely central to the smooth running of politics in the 
                                                          
38 A related, and very interesting, discussion on the ‘public scene’ can be found in J. McGavin, 
Theatricality and Narrative in Medieval and Early Modern Scotland (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 15-40. It is 
discussed further below, p. 167. 
39 Ritual has long been an important subject for the study of medieval political culture, for example G. 
Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favour: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France (Ithaca, 1992); P. 
Arnade, ‘City, State and Public Ritual in the Late-Medieval Burgundian Netherlands’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 39 (1997), pp. 300-19; D. Ditchburn, ‘Ritual, Space and the Marriage of 
James II and Mary of Guelders, 1449’, in F. Andrews (ed.), Ritual and Space in the Middle Ages 
(Donington, 2011), pp. 179-96. Very little attention is given here to royal ceremonies, which are the 
subject of Lucinda Dean’s recent thesis, ‘Crowns, Wedding Rings and Processions’. 
40 The theory of space as an analytical tool can be found in M. De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life 
(Berkeley, 1984). In thinking about its use I have found helpful S. Gunn, ‘The Spatial Turn: Changing 
Histories of Space and Place’, in S. J. Gunn and R. J. Morris (eds), Identities in Space: Contested Terrains 
in the Western City since 1850 (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 1-14. L. O. Fradenburg, City, Marriage, Tournament: 
Arts of Rule in Late Medieval Scotland (Madison, 1991) emphasises space, and foregrounds theoretical 
perspectives. 
41 Relating to the discursive dimension of publics see, for example, G. A. Hauser, Vernacular Voices: 
The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia, 1999); G. Baldwin, ‘The Public as a Rhetorical 
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later fifteenth century. These two methods were not discrete, but interacted in a number of 
different ways. 
It first must be established that common knowledge was indeed an idea with utility in the 
political practice of later fifteenth-century Scotland, and this can be done through 
examination of three key words found within the records of parliament and the records of 
Aberdeen Burgh Council: ‘notourlie’, ‘opinly’ and ‘public’. The first of these is an adverb 
meaning ‘openly, publicly, as a matter of common knowledge’.42 It can also be found in the 
adjectives ‘notour’ and ‘notorious’ which describe that which is commonly known, but with 
stronger connotations of wrongdoing.43 ‘Opinly’ is an adverb describing that which is done 
‘in public; without concealment or secrecy’ or that which is known to all.44 It is worth taking 
some time to note some of the different senses of the word ‘public’ as an adjective.45 The first 
is ‘Of, pertaining or belonging to, or a charge on, the community or nation as a whole’. 
Closely related is ‘Of a functionary: Authorized by, serving, or representing the community 
as a whole’. Notaries public are an obvious example of this, and their importance is 
discussed below. A second definition suggests a spatial dimension to the word: ‘Open to the 
attendance, access or use of the community as a whole; generally accessible, visible or 
available; also, publicly frequented’, while another pair of ideas can be found in the 
following definitions: ‘Of writings, records, edicts, and the like: Accessible to public 
knowledge, by publication or official promulgation’ and ‘Of announcements, readings or the 
like: Delivered to or before the whole community or in public’. Finally, ‘Of misconduct or 
misfortune: That which is done or happens without concealment or that is generally known; 
‘open’ or notorious’. These definitions all suggest a group of people, or an entity, to which 
the adjective ‘public’ applies, providing an alternative notional entity to the early modern 
‘public’. The composition and boundaries of any such entity would, in concrete terms, have 
varied with the circumstances, and in most of the following examples it is implied rather 
than stated. Together these definitions show, however, that ‘that which was commonly 
known’, or common knowledge, was a construct central to fifteenth-century justice, and 
therefore to the exercise of legitimate authority. 
There are many references within the records of parliament to ideas of notoriety. In 1443 it 
was decided that ‘na persone the quhilk is notour spulyear, distrubillar or invasar of haly 
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kirk, no nane agaynis quhom process beis led of cursing, be ressaifit in the kingis castellis 
nor placis nor in his presence, no admittit to consal or parliament’, suggesting that the fact 
the previous behaviour was known was enough to forbid entry.46 Likewise, in 1458, an act of 
parliament decreed that  
gif ony of [the king’s] officiaris as schirefis, maris, bailyeis, crownaris, serjandis, 
provestis of burowis and thar ministeris, baith to lande ande burghe, be fundyn 
negligent or fautyce in the execucione of thar office, and it may be lauchfully provit 
on him or notourly kende, gif the saide office pertenys to him in fee and heritage he 
sall tyne his office and the profettis tharof for ane yer and a day, ande be punyst be 
the king in his persone and gudis efir the quantite of his trespass…47 
It can be inferred from this example that a formal legal process was not necessary to 
establish the guilt of the accused if the argument could be successfully made that his 
misdeeds were common knowledge. This holds true for an example in Aberdeen in 1484. In 
resolving a dispute between Sir Andrew Gray and Walter Young, a chaplain, ‘anent the 
debate movit apon the alterage of Sanct Michale’, the council decided that Young was to be 
made secure in a chaplaincy worth ‘ten merkis or above’ and, listing other conditions, 
stipulated that he was to 
Remain and mak service in the quere daily…and sall nocht absent himself thairfra 
without ane lachful or sufficient excusacion that salbe sene resonable to the alderman 
and consale of the toun. And gif he at ony tyme wilfully absentis himself fra his 
service, as said is, without license of the toune and resonabil excusation that be 
notourlie knawin be the toune, than the said pensiounis sal vaik and be at the 
disposicion of the giffaris.48 
Again, it was required that any reason given for Young’s absence should be a matter of 
common knowledge within the town, and in particular, one suspects, known to those who 
comprised the council, rather than taking him at his word. 
In 1455 a raft of legislation was enacted in advance of James II’s English campaign. Much of 
it was intended to establish the actions that would be considered treasonous, and the 
consequences which would follow, and so the acts unsurprisingly invoke the idea of 
common knowledge in much of their business: 
Item gif ony Scottis man dois ony tresone, that is to say warnys of the riding of ane 
hoist or ony Scottis man to do harme in Inglande or to Inglismen and it may be 
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opinly knawyne apon him, he sall furthwithe haif the common law ande be hangyt 
and drawyn and his gudis eschet.49 
Item gif ony persone or personis be sklandirit or suspect of tresone thai salbe tane 
and remane in firmance and thar gudis undir sikkir borowis quhill the tyme that he 
haif sufferyt law or maide ane assise quyt or foule.50 
Item it is ordanyt that quhaso ony radis ar maide in Inglande that thir saide statutis 
be deliviryt to the hedis men and at opinly thai ger thame be maide knawin till all 
thame that passis with thame that nane of thame excuse or assonye th[rough] 
necligensse, etc.51 
In the first example it is stated that if it is openly known that a man commits treason this is 
sufficient grounds for punishment and execution, raising some interesting questions about 
how this knowledge is produced and verified. This was intended to have a deterrent effect 
in order to maintain order in the ranks, but it also shows the importance of ensuring that 
well-known misdeeds did not remain unpunished. The second example demonstrates the 
difference between common knowledge and slander. While common knowledge was 
sufficient for action to be taken, slander here suggests the accusation of a very small number 
of people, possibly just one, and the matter would therefore require further investigation 
before it could be settled. The final act gives responsibility to the ‘hedis men’ of the raiding 
parties to ensure that all of their soldiers were aware of the statutes, by making them 
publicly known, so that no treason laws would be broken though ignorance. By implication, 
the legislation also safeguarded against raiders claiming ignorance if caught in the act. 
Together these acts show how important it was for the men concerned to be aware of what 
was expected, and for royal commands to become established as common knowledge, so 
that action could be taken against individuals who were found to have broken them. 
The need for openness is also evident in burgh politics. In 1448, when John Voket, bailie of 
Aberdeen ‘avisetly oute of courte yheide [went as the leader] to the merkate corss and 
opynly proclamyt the land that quhilun Roger Williamson dwelt in…to be sald as movable 
gude til ony that wald by [it]…and this was done before the hale multitude in the merkate as 
for the first dai of this processe.’52 This is again a legal process, and was required to be made 
public for two reasons; firstly in order to transmit the information regarding Williamson’s 
property to the burgh inhabitants, but also, and just as importantly, to make the legal 
process legitimate. The act of proclamation was integral to the legality of the action, and the 
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location in which it was carried out was an important constituent part. The legitimacy of 
Voket’s action rested not only on his authority as bailie, but also on the fact that he exercised 
that authority in a way which conformed to common expectations of what a bailie ought to 
do. There would be no point in leading people to the back of a burgage plot in order to make 
the proclamation; even though the information given would be exactly the same, and Voket 
himself would retain all the authority of his office, the location of the market cross bestowed 
legitimacy upon the announcement in a way that was lacking from other locations. While 
the dissemination of the legislative content of public proclamations was certainly the reason 
that they were made, they just as certainly contained a symbolic element which was 
arguably equally important. It was the use of the market cross which allowed the content of 
a proclamation to be recognised as common knowledge, and this claim could not be made 
without the ritual having taken place, and having taken place in that location.  
Legitimate authority and its public enactment were therefore inextricably linked. 
Contemporary ideas of good governance stated that rulers should not exercise their 
authority arbitrarily, and those who did so left themselves open to accusations of tyranny.53 
The enactment of authority through public performance can be clearly seen in the legal 
process of forfeiture, recorded in the parliament records. There are many examples to be 
found in the fifteenth-century records, but arguably one of the most politically important, 
and dramatic, was the attempted forfeiture, by James III, of his brother Alexander, duke of 
Albany in 1479.54 Albany was hostile towards the king’s policy of alliance with England, and 
he became something of a focus for resistance to James’s deeply unpopular kingship 
throughout the 1470s.55 This culminated in a failed coup in 1482, led by Albany.56 In March 
1479, after Albany failed to attend parliament, James took the field and besieged the castle of 
Dunbar which Albany was holding against him. At some point during the siege Albany 
escaped and fled to France. In October 1479 parliament was called and Albany indicted 
there for treason. Although the process of forfeiture was carried out, the estates would not 
agree to sanction the decision, and the business was continued until the following January.57 
It is the process itself that is relevant here. 
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The record is in seven parts. It begins by noting that ‘oure said souveraine lord enterit in his 
tolbuthe of Edinburghe, sitting in his estate riale and his thre estatis gaderit and 
assemlit…Hector of Meldru[m], masare, schiref of Edinburghe, Berwic and Dru[m]fres 
present and gert reide in jugement lettres of summondis under the testimoniale of oure 
souveraine lordis gret sele’. The mace-bearer, or macer, was an officer of arms who 
delivered royal commands and summonses and uttered public proclamations.58 The letter 
itself follows. In it, Albany is accused of various treasonable activities carried out ‘against 
our majesty and royal authority’ and ‘against the public good [res publica] of the realm’, 
linking the two together.59 The officers of arms are instructed to summon Albany to appear 
before parliament ‘by apprehending him personally if you are able to come upon him, 
otherwise at the castle of Dunbar and the castle of Lochmaben by public proclamation [and] 
at our burghs of Edinburgh, Dunbar, Berwick and Dumfries, so that this summons can likely 
come to his notice’.60 This is particularly interesting because Albany was known to have 
been in France at the time of the summons, and so there could have been no expectation, in 
this instance, that the enactment of the legal process was going to have the stated effect. It is 
also relevant that there are so many locations in which the proclamation was to be 
performed; part of the purpose of the proclamation was to make public the fact that Albany 
had been summoned, presumably to deter any who sought to aid his cause. The summons is 
carried out both in front of the duke’s residence, Dunbar castle, and at Dunbar market cross, 
in the administrative centre of his regality jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine, however, 
that the only way Albany’s allies might have been made aware of the forfeiture proceedings 
brought against him was by royal proclamation; a development of this magnitude would 
undoubtedly have become common knowledge through men discussing it with each other. 
It is suggested that this was not the main purpose of making such a process public in this 
way. Instead, once the proclamations had been made correctly, the crown could claim that 
the action was common knowledge, and could therefore implement sanctions if individuals, 
in this case Albany or his supporters, refused to comply with the law. The letter continues 
by listing Albany’s offences and warning that if he does not compear, the king will 
‘nevertheless proceed with the administration of justice in the aforesaid matters’, showing 
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that Albany’s presence was not necessary for any part of the legal process.61 Finally, the 
officers are instructed to return with evidence of having carried out their duties. 
This evidence takes the form of a statement by Meldrum. On the twenty-fifth day of May 
Meldrum rode to the castle of Dunbar 
and thar at the yettis of the sammyn, and at the market croice of Dunbar the sammyn 
day, and at the market croice of Edinburghe and Southberwik the xxiiijti day and the 
xxvjti day be oppin proclamacioune, I summonde peremptourly Alexander Steuart, 
duk of Albany…to compere personaly at Edinburghe in [the] parliament…before thar 
witnesis Schir William of Knollis, commandoure of Torfichin, Johne Steuart of Cragy, 
James of Crechtone of Felde, Ross herrald, Alexander Bonkle, Thomas Swift, Robert 
Vaus, Thomas Hannay and Andro Harwod', notare, with uthir divise, and for the 
maire witnesis I haf affixt my sele.62 
A similar statement by Unicorn Pursuivant confirms that the same procedure took place in 
Lochmaben and Dumfries. This is followed by three public instruments, made by the 
notaries named, attesting to the fact that they witnessed the proclamations. The third 
instrument begins thus: 
By this present public instrument let it be plainly known to all that in the year from 
the Lord's incarnation 1479…on 24 May…in the presence of me, a notary public, and 
the subscribed witnesses, personally appeared a provident man, Unicorn, our 
aforementioned supreme lord the king's pursuivant and sheriff of Dumfries…at the 
market cross of the burgh of Lochmaben, and similarly at the castle of Lochmaben, 
and there, by virtue and tenor of a certain royal letter of summons…at the market 
cross of the said burgh, by public proclamation, and similarly beneath the gates of the 
said castle, publicly, in a loud and intelligible voice, lawfully and peremptorily 
summoned an illustrious and distinguished man Alexander Stewart, duke of 
Albany… - granted it was not possible to obtain his presence - to compear in person 
at Edinburgh before our aforesaid supreme lord the king in his next parliament.63 
It concludes by stating the place, date and time of the proclamation, and listing the 
witnesses, and is followed by the subscription of the notary, which confirms that he 
was present in person…[and] saw, understood and heard all and sundry the 
aforesaid things to happen, and took down a note of them, and from it I have drawn 
up the present public instrument, written by my own hand, [and,] as requested, I 
have signed with my usual and customary sign and name, in faith and witness to all 
and sundry the aforesaid things.64 
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Finally, it is recorded that since Albany had been summoned but had not appeared James, 
‘with full consent of his thre estatis and at the gret raquest, instance and supplicacioune of 
thame’, continued the proceedings until January next. 
Quite clearly, it was not enough for the officers simply to read out the proclamation. They 
had to confirm their actions in writing, and the proclamations had to be both witnessed and 
documented independently by notaries public. Conversely, it was also insufficient simply to 
record a private recitation of the charges. The public performance of the summons was 
integral to the legitimacy of the forfeiture process, and it was the enactment of the process 
which allowed the crown to claim that knowledge of the summons could have been 
expected from everyone henceforth.  
In fact, it appears that it was not necessary, from a legal point of view, to ensure that the lord 
being forfeited had knowledge of the summons. In 1475 James III forfeited John MacDonald, 
lord of the Isles, depriving him of the earldom of Ross.65 The process is almost identical to 
that enacted for Albany, with the difference that MacDonald was indeed forfeited by 
parliament and this final part of the procedure is also recorded.66 There was also an 
important difference in one other respect; MacDonald had not fled the king’s wrath, but was 
firmly ensconced in his castle at Dingwall, at the heart of the earldom. As a result, the letter 
of summons instructing Unicorn pursuivant is phrased somewhat differently to that which 
ordered Albany’s summons: 
We commission you and order that you summon lawfully, and peremptorily, before 
witnesses, John, earl of Ross and lord of the Isles - by apprehending him personally if 
you are able to come upon him, or by public proclamation at the castle of Dingwall, if 
a safe approach to him may be made, otherwise at the cross and marketplace of our 
burgh of Inverness, so that this summons can likely come to his notice.67 
Presumably the summons would be much more likely to come to MacDonald’s notice if it 
were made in front of his castle. Dingwall and Inverness are over fourteen miles apart, and 
so summoning the lord at the latter could hardly be claimed to have the same effect in 
practical terms. Symbolically, however, it was almost identical and this letter represents a 
tacit acknowledgement that the proclamation of the Unicorn pursuivant was not likely to be 
the method by which a lord had first knowledge of the instigation of forfeiture proceedings 
against him. As long as it was enacted correctly at a market cross or outside a castle it could 
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be considered common knowledge for legal purposes, and the action was legitimate. As it 
happened, the proclamation was made outside Dingwall castle, although interestingly 
Unicorn’s statement and the notary’s instrument differ as to which of them actually read it 
out.68  
For the purposes of substantiating crown claims to common knowledge it was the notarial 
instruments which provided the vital evidence. In the unlikely event that either magnate 
should have chosen to contest his summons on the basis that he had no knowledge of it, the 
crown would presumably produce the relevant instrument and refute his claim, based on 
the record of the proclamation. This is surely the reasoning behind the oft-quoted statute of 
1469, passed in the first parliament of James III’s majority, which stated that 
it is thocht expedient that, sen oure soverane lord has ful jurisdictioune and fre 
impire within his realme, that his hienes may mak notaris and tabellionis, quhais 
instrumentis sal have ful faith in all contractis civile within the realme. And in tyme 
cummyn that na notaris maid nor tobe maid be the imperouris autorite have faith in 
contractis civile within the realme les than he be examinyt be the ordinare and 
apprevit be the kingis hienes….And atoure [further] that the notaris tobe maid be 
oure soverane lorde be examinit before thair ordinaris bischopis and have 
certificatioune of thame that thai ar of faith, gude fame, science and lawte according 
for the said office.69 
As Mason has argued this claim to ‘fre impire’ was one of several measures undertaken by 
the crown in the early part of James III’s majority as part of a political strategy to enhance 
the Scottish kingship with ideas of imperial authority.70 This strategy has been much 
discussed by historians in the context of the tense relations between James III and his 
nobility, but less so in the context of the legislation itself.71 One reason why it was so 
important for the crown to remove imperial authority from notaries public was that their 
legal instruments represented the final word in claiming political legitimacy in the public 
domain, and this was an integral part of asserting the authority of the crown. Allowing the 
notaries who produced these instruments within the kingdom to be subject to a higher 
temporal authority than the king would be wholly incompatible with claims to imperial 
kingship and even if, on a practical level, the work of the notaries remained broadly similar 
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after the enactment of the legislation, control of the public domain would now rest with the 
crown.72 The act is recognition by the crown that legal jurisdiction over that which was 
common knowledge was essential for political authority, particularly that with imperial 
pretensions. This appears to be borne out by the only prosecution attempted as a result of 
the legislation. In 1478 Alexander Rait was  
summond and callit till answere to ouer souveraine lorde the king for the tresonable 
usurpaciouune uppone his hienes in the pretendit legittinacioune of James Egir, 
bastarde, in the name and autorite of the emperoure, contrare to oure souverain 
lordis croune and majeste riale…73 
The rhetoric of usurpation of royal authority will be discussed further in chapter four, but it 
is clear that an action such as ‘pretendit legittinacioune’ could be regarded as a direct affront 
to the crown. This is further reinforced by another statute regarding false notaries, from 
1504. It purported to address the ‘diverse and greit complentis maid be oure soverane lordis 
liegis that thair is sa mony fals notaris in the realme that it is dred throu thair falset [deceit] 
that trew men sall nocht be sicker of thair heretage nor clerkis of thair benifices’.74 The 
solution presented was that 
all bischopis and ordinaris mak all the notaris within thair dioceis tobe callit at a 
convenient day and place befoir thame and mak thame be examynate upoune thair 
sufficience and knawlege, and als tak inquisitioune how thai have demanit 
[conducted] thame and of thair fame; and the personis that thai find culpable that 
thai deprive thame of thair offices and punyse thame for thair faltis according to thar 
demeritis, and the personis that thai find acceptable that thai send thame with thair 
writtingis to the kingis hienes, quhilk sall depute certane personis to examyn thame, 
and gif thai be ganand [suitable] to mak thame regale, gif thai be nocht maid regale of 
befoir.75  
The importance of the public documents of the notaries to the smooth functioning of 
political relations is evident. On the one hand, there were very practical reasons why 
notaries should be of sufficient knowledge and of good reputation to carry out their duties. 
On the other, both James III and James IV saw fit to tie the work of the notaries to royal 
authority as closely as possible, whether by embedding a proclamation of royalist ideology 
within a statute governing their activity, or by granting ‘regale’ status to those found to be 
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acceptable. In this way, the crown had an administrative interest in the documents by which 
common knowledge of transactions regarding ‘heretage’ or ‘benifices’ was proven. 
Another particularly important example of how the public domain could be used to 
structure common knowledge can be found in the practice of horning. According to the Ordo 
Justiciarie, which rehearses the process for putting to the horn those who do not compear at 
the justice ayre, 
The justice sall at the market cross gare blaw out on him thris with a blawing horne 
and tharefter say We do you to wit that A de B is at oure soverane lord the kingis 
horne and at his landis and gudis ar eschaet to the king les than he cum within xl 
dayis etc.76  
In 1450, legislation regarding ‘oppyne reffis and spulyeis’, or violent robberies and theft 
committed publicly, specified that if the guilty parties, having been tracked down by the 
sheriff, refused to make restitution, the sheriff would ‘blaw out on thaim the kingis horne as 
rebellouris and punice thaim as sic rebellouris opinly to the lord luftennande’.77 The act 
further records that ‘giff sic trespassouris put to the kingis horne makis na restitutioun na 
fulfilling of the actis…that fra thyne furthe thay persounis be notourly cryit rebellouris to the 
kinge be the officiaris and as sic men suld be demanyt [dealt with harshly as a rebel]’.78 This 
process has obvious parallels with that of forfeiture, in effect changing the status of the 
guilty party in relation to the king’s authority, and ensuring that common knowledge of this 
change can be claimed by the crown. A similar piece of legislation, this time addressing 
slaughter, states that if the guilty party flees, the sheriff will ‘putt his gudis under arrest, and 
than pas or send his deputt to the hede burgh of the schire quhar the slauchter is committit 
and be oppin proclamatioune at the market croce warne and charge the slaar, ane or ma as 
thai be, that thai cum to him within vj dais nixt tharefter’.79 If this produces no result, the 
sheriff is to ‘putt thaim to the horne ande denunce thaim the kingis rebellis and tak and 
eschete thare gudis, and mak warning to the nixt schireffis that sic persounis ar putt to the 
horne be him and charge thaim in oure souveran lordis name to do the samyn or ellis to tak 
and arrest thare personis, gif thai ma be apprehendit, and bring thaim to the law’.80 While 
making public the search for a known murderer has evident utility in increasing the chances 
of tracking him down, the parallel benefit of proclamation, for the crown, is ensuring the 
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legitimacy of the action through the symbolism of the horning ritual. Only then can the 
sheriff take the goods of the accused. The process is recorded from the other side, in 1491, 
when the ‘crewele slauchter of Robert Malysoun’ was committed by four men of Edinburgh. 
As they could not be apprehended, the sheriffs 
denunceit the said persouns our Soverane Lordis rebellis at the mercat croce of the 
said burgh and putt thame to the horne because thai ar fugitive fra his lawes for the 
said cryme, and chargeit thairfore all and sundry our Soverane Lordis lieges that 
nane of thame suld howse, herbery [harbour], resset, supple or intermet with the 
saidis persounes under the payne of deid.81 
Having carried out the process, the sheriffs knew that all had been warned - even those who 
were not there to hear the proclamation - and so punishments could be legitimately enacted 
upon anyone who harboured the fugitives.  
While it was certainly important for the wider population to be aware of fugitives, it was 
just as important that people who had committed certain offences be allowed to atone for 
them, and this also had to be done in public. There are several examples, within the 
Aberdeen council register, of this kind of ritual penance. In 1463 Davy Patrikson was 
remanded in the tolbooth ‘for rebellione done be him to the altherman’, and then, on the 
following Sunday he was obliged to ‘cum bar fute, with his gowne louse, and a candill of a 
punde of wax in his hande, to Saint Nicholace kirk in the tyme of the hee messe, and offir 
that candill thar to the altar and aske the altherman and his consaile forgifnes.’82 The record 
then states that he had to give a pint of wine to the kirk every week for a year and swear an 
oath that he would do no such rebellion again.83 This ritual not only acted as a deterrent to 
others, but allowed the transgressor’s repentance and punishment to be publicly 
acknowledged, so that the episode could be brought to an end. A similar enactment is 
recorded in 1467 when, after ‘debatis and strublance betuix William Vokat and Thomas 
Quelp’, Quelp was ordered to ‘syt done on his kne and tak the nakit knyff that he hurt the 
said William with in his hande, and opynly knaw that he has offendit til him, and deliver 
him the said kynf to do with it that he will.’84 It was the insistence on Quelp’s public 
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acknowledgement of his crime which, along with several other conditions of restitution, 
allowed the matter to be resolved. While the actions of these men were highly symbolic, the 
community itself was not; it was the inhabitants of the burgh assembled in the church. This 
reflected the personal nature of the wrongdoing, and the need for the repentance and 
resolution to become common knowledge within the town. 
All of these examples suggest that the power to generate common knowledge regarding 
justice was, unsurprisingly, the preserve of those in authority, whether at the level of burgh 
or realm. This right, to carry out matters of justice and to publicise decisions relating to it, 
was one of the most important components of political authority. The very fact that such 
performances required to be discussed, shared and repeated in order to be effective, 
however, created a space in which common knowledge could be generated and modified by 
others. Such knowledge was therefore not simply a symbolic construct, performed by those 
in authority to claim legitimacy, but had an active role in shaping the range of legitimate 
actions available. Asserting power over what became common knowledge was therefore not 
always a straightforward matter. 
 
Reputation and Slander 
Given the lack of both chronicle evidence and petitions for the later fifteenth century it is 
unfortunately very rare that speech acts are reported directly. The notable exception is the 
anonymous fragments found within the Asloan manuscript, known as the Auchinleck 
chronicle, which has an immediacy of tone and a familiarity with contemporary events 
which has led scholars to argue that it was written by someone with first-hand knowledge of 
the events it describes.85 The chronicle will be discussed more fully in the final chapter, but 
there are two ways in which the chronicler draws upon common knowledge in his work. 
The first is by citing ‘what men say’.  In 1450, for example, a preserved corpse was found 
hidden within a wall in Dunfermline, along with a stone chest and silk clothes.86 Having 
related the details, the chronicler adds that ‘men demyt that it was a barne or cosing of sanct 
margaretis’ due to the fact that the wall seemed to be older than the corpse.87 The second 
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way the chronicler engages with common knowledge is by commenting on the reputation of 
various men. He states that Alexander, earl of Crawford ‘was callit a rigorous man and ane 
felloun’, while Sir Willam Keith ‘was callit ane gentill knycht and a vertuos’.88 Reputation 
was of almost unparalleled significance in the fifteenth century, in terms of practical politics, 
and is worth exploring in some detail.  
Gilbert Hay, in the Buke of the Gouernaunce of Princis, outlines several reasons why the 
maintenance of a good reputation is important to a king. On the subject of reputation in 
general, Hay states that ‘thare is na richess that may be comperit to gude fame and gude 
renoune, the quhilk quhen a king or prince has tynt [lost] throu mysgovernaunce he may 
nocht by it agayne for na richess.’89 Princes ought to ‘sett all thair besy cure and travail thaim 
to wyn honour and gude renoune in this warld’ because ‘gude renoune and gude fame is the 
beginning of wisdome and of understanding of gude wit’, which leads to good 
government.90 Having established the importance of reputation, Hay goes on to suggest two 
contexts in which a prince ought to be particularly proactive. ‘It efferis to grete princis and 
grete lordis that thair gude renoune be wyde sawin and publist our all realmes and quhair 
thai ar knawin, sa that thai be lovit and prisit with all men tobe of hye witt and of grete 
sapience’, Hay advises.91 One method by which this might occur is also later suggested:  
all noble princis, kingis and lordis [should] nuris marchandis and labouris and men 
of craftis, for that is the ryching of all realmes, and then bere thai the princis name 
evin as heraulds our all contreis of the warlde, quhilkis makis princis to have outhir 
gude los [renown] and honour or lak and dishonoure efter thair desertis.92  
These examples suggest not only that a good reputation could be advantageous in dealing 
with royal counterparts in other realms, but also that word was definitely capable of getting 
around. The second context in which Hay sees reputation as vital to a prince is closer to 
home: 
It efferis nocht till a prince and namely till a king tobe our [over] familiare na have 
our mekle hantying [association] na communication with his lauly subiectis and 
namely of villaine [low-born] na dispisand men that sone wald copy his maneris and 
fynd lak to him in his communicacioun and speke thar of till otheris that war nocht 
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spedefull, for our mekle syk hamelynes engenderis lichtlynes [arrogance toward] and 
vilipensioun [contempt] of princis.93 
While emphasising what the prince ought to do, Hay reveals the public domain in action, 
through which subjects can comment upon royal authority, thereby subtly altering it. The 
only solution to the problem of lowborn gossip, Hay advises, perhaps somewhat 
unrealistically, lies in the conduct of the king himself: 
Understande wele that peple will speke lichtly of lytill evyn [subject matter], and 
tharfore kepe the wele that thou mak na caus that suld geve thame mater na 
occasioun to speke agaynis the ony thing. And sa may thai say rycht [truthfully] 
nocht that may greve thy magestee, na yit nocht wirk na do agaynis the quhen thare 
is na caus.94 
While Hay is undoubtedly discussing an ideal, and one which has been established long 
enough to be considered a commonplace, it presumably remains both of these things 
precisely because a good reputation was so important. It does not require a very great leap 
of the imagination to believe that merchants would boast or complain about their king while 
abroad, or that ‘lauly’ subjects were happy to gossip to each other about any perceived 
shortcomings in their monarch, and Hay implies that such things could have very real 
consequences. This is suggested by an act of parliament from 1425, regarding ‘learis [liars] 
and tellaris of thaim’, which ordered that ‘all tayltellaris and lesingmakaris and tellaris of 
thaim the quhilk may engennyr dyscorcord be tuix the kyng and his pepill, quhar evir thai 
may be gottin, sall be challangit be thaim that poware hass and tyne lyff and gudis to the 
kyng’.95 A lesing-makar was one who uttered false or slanderous accusations with the 
specific intent to prejudice the relationship between the sovereign and his lieges.96 
John Ireland, writing in 1490, takes a rather more scholarly approach to advising the king 
than does Hay, yet also maintains the importance of reputation. He argues that the king 
ought to ‘gar wisly tak tent to thi heritage and to thi realme and lyf honourably thar upone, 
that this name, vertu and glor may be knawin and magnifiit in thi realme and in all partis’.97 
Ireland goes on to state another reason why good renown reflects well on a king: 
The king and prince suld be vertuus to governe his awne persoune for an he can 
nocht do that he is nocht lik that he can vertuislie, eftir his office, governe a gret 
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multitud and the hail peple…[he] suld be of sa honest conversacioun [conduct] that 
he suld be reput worthi to be preferrit to the laif [rest] of the peple.98 
By this account the people have a vested interest in the reputation of their king; it is one of 
the ways in which his suitability to govern can be assessed. While the options open to the 
‘gret multitud’ for addressing the problem of a king who does not value his reputation are 
undoubtedly limited, the idea that the king’s conduct has a real effect on the lives of the 
governed makes their propensity to comment upon it all the more understandable. 
James III was a king who might justifiably be said to have had difficulties in maintaining a 
good reputation, and in 1473 the estates attempted to convince the king not to go on 
campaign by arguing that self-restraint would enhance his good renown.99 In one of several 
advisements, the prelates argue that the king should 
tak part of labour apone his persone and travel throw his realme and put sic justice 
and polycy in his awne realme, that the brute [report] and the fame of him mycht pas 
in uthiris contreis and that he mycht optene the name of sa just a prince and sa 
vertewsis and sa wele reuland his awne realm in justice, policy and peax, that uthiris 
princis mycht tak exemple of him and gif him credence in sic thingis as he sulde 
schew to thame tuiching the reuling and governing of thare realmz in peax and 
policy in the samyne, throw the quhilk name he mycht be grace of God be callit to 
gretare thingis thane is yit expremit [expressed].100 
Such advice could only be presented as a plausible alternative to the king’s wishes if two 
things are assumed. Firstly, that ensuring justice within his realm would earn the king a 
good reputation abroad, and secondly that such a reputation would give the king more 
influence in his dealings with other monarchs. While following such advice may have 
yielded little in practice, it is clearly not so implausible that it could not be used by the first 
estate of the realm, in parliament, in a matter of such importance.101 The extent to which the 
prelates expected their argument to affect their aims is another matter, although in the end 
James did not, in fact go on campaign.102 What is important here is that the rhetoric of 
                                                          
98 Ireland, Meroure, pp. 135. 
99 RPS 1474/7/4-13. These acts, and their political context, will be discussed in greater depth in 
chapter four. 
100 RPS 1473/7/9. 
101 Brendan Bradshaw argues that a concern for ‘civil affairs, not foreign wars of aggrandisement’ was 
one characteristic attributable to the prince more familiar to humanist discourse, who represented ‘an 
embodiment of the values of Utopian respublica’. B. Bradshaw, ‘Transalpine Humanism’, in J. H. 
Burns (ed.), with M. Goldie, The Cambridge History of Political Thought (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 126-27. 
102 James III’s foreign policy in this period was multifarious and complex. See Macdougall, James III, p. 
110-119, which argues that it was likely never the king’s intention to see through his plans for 
invasion.  
39 
 
reputation was not simply a device of the mirrors but an idea with real utility, which had 
real consequences for the practice of politics. 
This could also be said of the high level of importance placed upon reputation within 
chivalric culture. Katie Stevenson goes as far as to suggest that ‘the most important 
possession a knight could have was a good reputation’, and provides examples throughout 
Scottish literature from the fourteenth century to the sixteenth.103 Within the period under 
discussion, the most prominent author is again Gilbert Hay, whose translation of Ramon 
Llull’s work he entitled The Buke of the Ordre of Knychthede.104 Although a large amount of 
this work is taken up with discussion of knightly reputation, much of it is done so implicitly, 
by reference to virtues and good conduct. Hay does, however, give the example of 
Alexander the Great, who despised avarice and covetousness, ‘throu the quhilk renoune of 
fredome the souldiouris of his inymyes that ware avaricious and covatous come fra thame 
till hym and gert his company grow’, showing how a good reputation could, in an ideal 
world, have real practical advantages.105 Hay is also at pains to prevent knights from 
attempting to mar the reputation of others, stating that 
thai that ar thus envious takis fra othir men the gude that is nocht, na may nocht be, 
thairis, for thai wald pres thame [attempt] to reve thame thair honoure quhilk, quhen 
thai had gert them tyne, throu murmuracioune and envious langage of bakbyting 
[slander], that honour that thai tak fra thame may nocht cum to thame self. And by 
syk envy he dois mony thingis that ar discordaunt til his ordre.106 
Of the fifteenth-century chroniclers, it is Andrew Wyntoun whom Stevenson identifies as 
being most concerned with matters of chivalry, evident in his praising of knightly attributes 
and deeds of valour, Walter Bower being more attuned to his clerical audience.107 
Nevertheless, Stevenson notes that Bower did consider reputation to be crucial to those 
engaged in chivalric pursuits, and he recorded this in relation to several knights, such as Sir 
David Lindsay and Sir John Gordon.108 Bower even noted that Patrick Hepburn of Hailes 
‘desired an extension of the [fame of his name]’, although Bower attributes this to his being a 
‘man of lofty spirit’.109 This, if anything, underlines even more strongly how important such 
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a reputation was to contemporary chivalric culture; the prouder the knight the greater the 
value placed by him upon his own renown. This is reflected in the Auchinleck chronicler’s 
careful recording of reputation for posterity. 
Reputation was not only important to kings and noblemen. As has been shown, the 1469 
legislation on notaries public specified the importance of ‘faith, gude fame, science and 
lawte’ for those approved for the position. While this was in part due to their importance for 
crown authority, in most cases reputation was the only guarantee contemporaries had that a 
person was suitable to undertake a particular task or duty. In 1488, in order to attempt to 
address the ongoing problem of the coinage, an act of parliament decreed that the king 
‘deput a persoune that his hienes traistis be of lawte ande knawlage to be maister of his 
monye and bere the hale charge thareof, ande als that his hienes deput a trew wiseman of 
gude fame to be wardane of his cunye’.110 Selecting on the basis of reputation not only meant 
that the most suitable man filled the position, it also ensured a means of redress if the duties 
were not discharged adequately. In 1458 it was decided in parliament, regarding sailor 
merchants, that ‘thar saill na persounis bot hable and of gud fame and at he haif at the lest 
thre serplaris of his awne gudis or ellis committyt till him or the awaill tharof, and at the 
saylaris in merchandice be fre men of burowis, induellaris within the burghe’.111 This again 
underlines Hay’s advice, suggesting that merchants were a real conduit for the transmission 
of information between countries, in this case by reflecting the king’s reputation through 
their own conduct, rather than speaking of him to others. The condition of burgess status 
again provided both a likelihood of good conduct, and a means of redress by the crown if 
that conduct fell short of expectations. 
This approach can be seen throughout burgh politics also, when councils had to choose men 
for positions of particular responsibility.112 In Aberdeen, in 1441, the burgh council decided 
that there should be chosen ‘twa men of gude cunnyng [skill] and knawledge [as] masteres 
of the commoune werk of the toune’.113 This was a position of some responsibility, involving 
the overseeing of men and control of a budget.114 In 1442, the council ordained that ‘four 
discrete persounes’ should be chosen ‘to falk [deduct] the tax of men that has tholit skaith 
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[endured financial loss] oft, as thai think speidful’, something that might require more 
sensitivity than skill.115 And in 1452 it was decided that the alderman would choose ‘certane 
weel set [appropriately serious] persounes to passe with him aboute the toune and devise 
quhat maner of strynthning sal be made [to the fortifications of the town], and in quhat 
places, and how the coste sal be tane and made’.116 It can be seen that different qualities were 
required for different positions, and that reputation would be the primary method of 
making judgments about who might be most appropriate for each. The merchant guild of 
Perth likewise decided, in 1483, that David Elder, because he ruined the goods he obtained 
for William Ker before Ker took possession of them, ‘throw his negligens and scleuth’, had 
to ‘refund and recompense the said William thairof the scaith of the said gudis at the seich 
[sight] of lele, trew and unsuspect merchand men.’117 This again shows how positions of 
responsibility were only entrusted to those who were known to be worthy of them. While it 
could be argued that the status which these positions presumably conferred would make 
them more likely to be given out to friends and family of the burgh or guild officers, it is 
equally as likely that there would have been a genuine desire on the part of the council in 
question to ensure these tasks were undertaken effectively, and so getting the right man for 
the job would have taken priority.  
For different reasons again, reputation was perhaps most important to members of the craft 
guilds. A reputation for quality products was essential not only for guilds to charge the 
maximum amount for their goods, but also to sell them abroad. Generating and protecting 
this reputation was therefore one of the reasons for their existence.118 This is discussed 
further in chapter two, but here it is sufficient to note that when the Edinburgh craft guilds 
began to proliferate, in the 1470s and ‘80s, the importance of maintaining the guild’s 
reputation was often mentioned in the crafts’ seals of cause, the documents of incorporation 
which granted rights and privileges to the guilds. The Edinburgh Hammermen, for example, 
petitioned for the right to have ‘tua or thre of the worthiest maisters and maist of knawledge 
of the saidis craftis, quhilk sall haif powar, with an officiar with thame, to pas, serch and se 
all mennis work of the saidis craftis, gif it be sufficient in stuff and workmanschip, gude 
worth and hable work to serve the kingis lieges with.’119 Only the worthiest masters would 
                                                          
115 Abdn Counc., i, p. 8. 
116 Ibid., p. 20. 
117 Perth Guild Bk, p. 70. 
118 G. Richardson, ‘Craft Guilds and Christianity in Late Medieval England: A Rational Choice 
Analysis’, Rationality and Society, 17 (2005), pp. 139-89, at pp. 143-44. 
119 Edin. Recs, p. 48. 
42 
 
be in a position to undertake this responsibility, and presumably only they could command 
enough respect from the craftsmen for their judgments to carry weight. This level of 
oversight would ensure that the craft’s reputation for quality remained intact. 
The public domain was therefore of vital importance across a variety of legal and political 
contexts. Contemporaries relied upon the common knowledge generated within it for 
persuading kings, choosing officers, demonstrating knightly virtue and promoting both 
group and individual interests. Indeed, these things would have been impossible to achieve 
without such a space, in which the value of an individual’s reputation could be gauged 
according to past actions. It stands to reason, therefore, that any attempt to tarnish one’s 
reputation had to be addressed quickly, robustly and publicly. The Gild Book of 
Dunfermline gives many examples of the regulation of speech, although it is sometimes 
difficult to tell from the record whether the speech would be considered slanderous. In 1435 
it is recorded that ‘Thom Bray [was] in amerciament for wrang saying betuyx hym and John 
Yung’ and that ‘ilke day John Yung [was] in amerciment for wrang spech betuyx him and 
Thom of Bra.’120 ‘Wrangwys spekyn’ is recorded again in 1436, this time coupled with 
‘wrangwys strykyn’.121 In 1446, Andro Hog and Johne Wricht’s wife were each put in 
amerciament ‘for thar ill langage ilkan till othir’, with it being further recorded that Hog’s 
punishment was also for ‘his strublyn of John Wricht be word.’122 ‘Foule spech’ was 
punished by the guild court, with examples in 1435, 1454 and 1479, although this may not 
necessarily have been directed at an individual.123 The merchants of Perth were no less 
susceptible to such behaviour. In 1460 William West was ‘amerced in court ½ mk. for 
slander at the order of the dean’, and in the same year Robert Barbour and Murdo 
Henrisoune were each escheated for slandering the other.124 Back in Aberdeen, in 1490, it 
was decided that Christane Lilburne should ‘cum in presence of the alderman, balyeis and 
the haile court and on her kneis ask Schir John Streweling forgifnes for the strublance of him 
under silence of nycht, openly glammerand him, saiand scho sald ger banys the said Schir 
John oute of this toune’.125 While strublance ‘under silence of nycht’ suggests Christian 
attempting to be furtive, ‘openly glammerand’ is describing very public defamation, and the 
record even notes the gist of what she said. Like Davy Patrikson above, Lilburne is ordered 
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to present a wax candle to Sir John at the high altar of St Nicholas’ kirk ‘in presons of the 
haill pepill’.126 She is further warned that if she repeats her offence with Sir John ‘or of ony 
utheris famouse personis’, that is, persons of good repute, she will also be fined. It was 
essential that slander be answered publicly, so that common knowledge of the person’s 
status as ‘famouse’ could be retained. 
Having forfeited John MacDonald of the earldom of Ross in 1475, James III restored him to 
the king’s peace, although not the earldom, in 1476: 
notwithstanding certain processes and judgements of forfeiture on and against our 
cousin John of Islay, formerly earl of Ross and lord of the Isles…for his treasonable 
crimes, demerits and offences perpetrated and committed against our royal majesty 
and our realm - we have nevertheless granted, decreed…[and] by our special grace 
restored…our cousin to his worldly honours and dignities, and the good repute of his 
person, thoroughly removing from him all repute of infamy which occurred on 
account of the aforesaid things.127 
The importance of restoring reputation as well as ‘worldly honours and dignities’ is 
apparent, and it was also conducted within the public forum of parliament, where the 
assembled estates could bear witness to the change of status in relation to the king’s 
authority. Concern for the reputation of the Lords of the Isles was not restricted to the reign 
of James III. A letter written to the earl of Ross from Aberdeen burgh council in 1444 shows a 
similar preoccupation, with Alexander MacDonald, John’s father. The earl had taken English 
prisoners, and James II had ordered him to deliver them to Aberdeen, which he was 
apparently refusing to do. The council had therefore written to the earl in order to persuade 
him to act according to the king’s wishes: 
we counsaile and beseikis humeli yhour lordschip with al instance that, for the 
worschipe of the king and the gud of the realme, yhe witsaufe to louse and deliver 
frely the said Inglismen, for and [if] ye suld nocht deliver thame at the kingis instance 
and charge, it war great lak and sclaundre to the king and the realme, and lessing of 
yhour worship, the quhile God averte…God forbid that yhe suld, for a litil monee 
that thir Inglismen has promissit yhou, warpiss your gude name, and the reward and 
thank that yhe have deservide and wonnyn of the king.128 
Several things are assumed by the burgh in this attempt to persuade the earl of Ross, in 
much the same way that parliament attempted to persuade James III in the earlier example. 
‘Lak and sclaundre to the king and the realme and lessing of yhour worship’ would be the 
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result of failing to take the appropriate action, here presented not only as an undesirable 
consequence, but an unarguable fact. The suggestion is that the actions of the nobility have 
repercussions beyond personal interest, that there was a public dimension to the earl’s 
behaviour, and that his actions would certainly become common knowledge. In fact, there is 
a danger that the earl could ‘warpiss’ his good name, this again presented as something to 
be avoided at all costs. Whether or not this persuasion technique actually worked on the earl 
is secondary to the fact that concern for one’s reputation was clearly thought to be 
something with which a man of such status ought to concern himself, if he were to do his 
duty effectively.  
This was undoubtedly the case for Alexander Cunningham, lord of Kilmaurs who, in 1464, 
presented himself to parliament which had been ‘publicly gathered for the utility of the 
kingdom and the res publica’.129 His spokesman Robert, lord Lyle, ‘dolefully relating’, 
explained how the same Alexander, lord Kilmaurs, by several of his enemies, and also by 
diverse others, ‘ha[d] by envious rumour been reproached of giving assistance and favour to 
the traitor James de Douglas’, despite having a letter from the king which exonerated him of 
all wrongdoing.130 This letter is copied into the record, and states that  
Notwithstanding the rumour and voice occurring…it is clear to us that the said 
Alexander Cunningham, lord Kilmaurs, is innocent of, and free and exempt from, the 
aforesaid treasonable charges…Wherefore we strictly order and command all and 
sundry our lieges and subjects whom it concerns or may concern that no-one 
murmur about or reproach the said Alexander on account of the aforesaid things in 
whatever time to come, under all pains than may be appropriate in this respect.131 
After which, ‘to avoid the infamy of the said rumour circulating’, Kilmaurs offered three 
separate purgations: ‘firstly, an assise of unsuspect lords, his peers, to submit to the king's 
will; secondly, a purgation to provide a hundred knights and esquires; thirdly, to defend 
himself against the said charge according to the laws of arms with his own hands against 
whomsoever challenges him’.132 The lords of parliament deliberated on the matter, and 
decided that ‘they hold the said declaration sufficient to exonerate the said Alexander, lord 
Kilmaurs of the said allegation and rumour’.133 
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The power of such rumours can be inferred from the extent of the measures taken to 
counteract them. Having a letter of exoneration from the king was of no value if the rumours 
persisted; it was imperative to Kilmaurs that his name be cleared within the public domain. 
The preservation of his good reputation was important enough that he was prepared to 
present himself to parliament to have the decision publicly confirmed, in the hope that he 
would no longer be held, by common knowledge, to be complicit in Douglas’s treachery. 
Hay was apparently quite correct in his assertion that  ‘the renoune that [men] get first in 
thaire begynnyng is ever full hard to get away quhill thai lyve in this warlde’.134  
 
Conclusion 
Common knowledge was essential to the exercise of political authority. It could be used to 
limit privileges based on previous behaviour, work as a mechanism for verifying the claims 
of individuals and act as an alternative to legal process in certain situations. Legislation had 
to be made common knowledge and known wrongdoing had to be punished publicly in 
order to ensure that justice was not only done, but seen to be done. Common knowledge 
could be generated in two ways. Political authority was asserted through due legal process, 
which required to be enacted publicly. As long as the action was performed in the correct 
spaces common knowledge could be attached to it, allowing the status of an individual to be 
changed in relation to crown authority. This meant appropriate sanctions could be 
legitimately enforced, where necessary. This process was essential if accusations of tyranny 
were to be avoided, and so use of the public domain separated legitimate sanctions from 
arbitrary ones. Because it was not essential to inform people directly, notarial instruments 
were used in order to confirm that the enactment of the proclamation (for example) had 
been carried out correctly and in accordance with the procedure which bestowed legitimacy. 
Where this was not appropriate, such as in matters of personal repentance for wrongdoing, 
common knowledge was generated by ensuring that the whole community actually was 
physically present, in the parish church.  
Common knowledge could also be generated by people talking to each other, and it was by 
this method that reputations were made and lost. It was a commonplace of political 
literature that a good reputation was essential to good governance, but it can be shown that 
                                                          
134 Hay, Gouernaunce, pp. 66-67. 
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such concerns also structured practical politics in several important ways. The king’s 
character was thought to reflect his ability to govern others, and so was a worthy subject of 
discussion, heightening the need for the king to ensure his good name was maintained. The 
nobility were expected to be concerned with their own ‘renoun’, and this was a central 
concern of the chivalric ideal. For commercial reasons, a good reputation was also important 
to those in the burghs who wished to sell goods. It is unsurprising that men of good 
character would be preferred for positions of responsibility generally, and reputation was 
one of the few ways in which this could be determined. Maintenance of good reputation was 
therefore essential for political authority, and those who found themselves slandered were 
forced to clear their names in an appropriate public forum. 
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Chapter Two: Incorporation and the Urban Community1 
 
Having established the public domain as essential for the exercise of political authority in 
general, the following investigates how communitarian language was used to legitimise the 
authority of urban elites in particular. In 1982 Susan Reynolds argued that urban historians 
ought to be concerned with political thought as a matter of course, in order to understand 
the ideas and values which infused the social and economic activity of town inhabitants.2 
There has so far been very little discussion of the Scottish medieval burgh as a political 
entity, with even Roland Tanner’s groundbreaking study of the Scottish parliament arguing 
that the burgesses were the ‘least obviously political’ estate of the three.3 In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the work of historical societies such as the Spalding 
Club and the Scottish Burgh Records Society provided edited collections of numerous town 
records from across Scotland, generating work with a focus upon constitutional and 
administrative history. More recently, scholars have explored Scottish burghs by 
interrogating not only their records, but also a rich variety of material evidence, giving fresh 
insights into the economic and social history of town life, as well as the relationships 
cultivated by burghs both within Scotland and without.4 While work by Boardman and 
Booton has gone some way to positioning the burgh of Aberdeen within the broader politics 
of the realm, the political culture of Scotland’s towns remains an under-researched area.5 
Such a culture is difficult to discern for Scotland’s early towns. It is known that King David I 
(1124-53) was instrumental in the creation of the burghs.6 His policy of bringing settlers from 
                                                          
1 Sections of this chapter have been submitted for publication in an article as part of a research project 
on The Burgh in the North, c. 1400-c. 1800, at the University of Aberdeen. 
2 S. Reynolds, ‘Medieval Urban History and the History of Political Thought’, Urban History Yearbook, 
9 (1982), pp. 14-23. 
3 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 268.  
4 An excellent starting point is M. Lynch, M. Spearman and G. Stell (eds), The Scottish Medieval Town 
(Edinburgh, 1988). See also the work of Elizabeth Ewan, in particular Townlife in Fourteenth-Century 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990); E. J. Cowan and L. Henderson, A History of Everyday Life in Medieval 
Scotland, 1000-1600 (Edinburgh, 2010); RCAHMS, Tolbooths and Town-Houses: Civic Architecture in 
Scotland to 1833 (Edinburgh, 1996); E. P. Dennison, D. Ditchburn and M. Lynch (eds), Aberdeen Before 
1800: A New History (East Linton, 2002); D. Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe: the Medieval Kingdom and its 
Contacts with Christendom, 1215-1545, vol. 1: Religion, Commerce and Culture, c.1215-1545 (East Linton, 
2001). 
5 S. Boardman, ‘The Burgh and the Realm’, in Dennison, Ditchburn and Lynch (eds), Aberdeen Before 
1800,  pp. 203-23; H. Booton, ‘Burgesses and Landed Men in North-East Scotland in the Later Middle 
Ages: A Study in Social Interaction’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1987). 
6 David began this process even before he took the throne. R. Oram, David I: The King who Made 
Scotland (Stroud, 2004), p. 265. 
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Flanders to assist in planning the towns, establishing the crafts within them and creating 
trading links unleashed the economic potential of many pre-existing settlements.7 The 
earliest charters granting burgh privileges date from the reign of William I (1165-1214), 
however, and only from the late fourteenth century does the earliest burgh council register 
survive, that of Aberdeen.8 While this important twelfth-century phase of urban expansion 
was therefore certainly part of the broader European pattern outlined by Reynolds, in which 
collective action gradually became more institutionalised, in Scotland this process was from 
the beginning directed by the crown.9 ‘Burgh’ and ‘burgess’ were essentially legal concepts, 
with privileges which were enforceable in law, and the towns were subject to royal 
legislation which applied equally to all of them.10 This is not to suggest that Scotland was in 
any way a special case. The Leges Burgorum, which probably dates from the end of the 
thirteenth century, articulates a framework of customary ideas which formed the basis of 
contemporary urban administration across Europe, and in fact was probably an augmented 
version of a similar custumal produced for Newcastle in the mid twelfth century.11  The 
surviving evidence does not permit us to discover whether such customs arrived with the 
Flemish settlers, were an elaboration of English traditions or were shaped by the norms of 
Scottish lordship  - most likely all three were influential - but they were, by the later fifteenth 
century, firmly integrated into Scottish urban political culture. By then burghs were not 
exclusively royal foundations, with many ecclesiastical burghs and burghs of barony having 
been granted privileges also. 
The relationship between town and crown also underwent an alteration during the late 
medieval period.12 Whereas the administration of royal burghs had come under the 
jurisdiction of the sheriff, and the crown had retained the right to appoint officers within the 
town, this had given way, by the fourteenth century, to a process of election whereby the 
burgesses chose an alderman or provost and (usually) four bailies from their own ranks.13 
The fifteenth-century burgh council therefore enjoyed a relatively higher degree of 
autonomy than its predecessors, although this was far from absolute. The king could, and 
                                                          
7 Oram, David I,  pp. 265-94. 
8 Ancient Burgh Laws, i, p. xxxv. 
9 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, pp. 155-218 discusses the urban context specifically.  
10 H. L. MacQueen and W. J. Windram, ‘Laws and Courts in the Burgh’, in Lynch, Spearman and Stell 
(eds), The Scottish Medieval Town, pp. 208-27, at p. 208-9. 
11 Ibid., pp. 209-11. The Leges Burgorum can be found in Ancient Burgh Laws, i, pp. 4-58. 
12 For a recent study of this relationship in England see E. Hartrich, ‘Town, Crown and Urban System: 
The Position of Towns in the English Polity, 1413-71’, (Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of 
Oxford, 2014).  
13 On town governance see Ewan, Townlife, pp. 40-63. 
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did, make his feelings clear on particular matters if moved, or indeed invited, to do so. Even 
so, as long as the burghs continued to generate revenue royal oversight appears to have 
been limited, and the crown took little interest in the day-to-day affairs of the council. The 
exception was the Chamberlain ayre, probably introduced to compensate for the diminished 
influence of the sheriffs, at which each town’s officers presented their accounts to the 
crown.14 From early in their history burghs were entitled to hold their own courts, headed 
by the bailies, and a burgess could be ‘repledged’ from a court with parallel jurisdiction in 
order to be tried by a jury of his peers.15 Decisions could be appealed to the court of the 
chamberlain, and from there to the court of the Four Burghs in a jurisdictional hierarchy that 
closely paralleled that of sheriff, justiciar and parliament pertaining outside the burghs. It is 
likely that this court naturally grew from the practice of burgh councils consulting with each 
other on points of law, and it was formally constituted as the Convention of Royal Burghs in 
1487.16 As well as being a judicial body, the Four  Burghs provided a forum in which the 
burghs could discuss matters of common concern, and formulate counsel to give to the 
king.17  
Within many towns the burgesses formed a guild.18 This process was independent of the 
crown. The Statuta Gilde, which originally related to Berwick, have been dated to the 
thirteenth century, and at least thirteen towns had such guilds by 1400.19 It is not until the 
later fifteenth century that a clear distinction between merchant and craft guilds emerged in 
Scotland, however, and then only in certain burghs.20 As with guilds across Europe, Scottish 
guilds were not merely mercantile associations. Their activities encompassed religious 
observance and patronage, various forms of pageantry, sociability and display, and what 
might be termed ‘social security’ for their members, such as looking after the injured, or 
widows and orphans, or meeting funeral costs and praying for the souls of the dead.21 Given 
the high level of collective activity which characterised late medieval urban politics it is not 
                                                          
14 MacQueen and Windram, ‘Laws and Courts’, p. 214. 
15 Ibid., p. 215. 
16 RPS 1487/10/21; Ewan, Townlife, p. 146; MacQueen and Windram, ‘Laws and Courts’, p. 219, n. 85.  
17 Ewan, Townlife, p. 147. 
18 The three surviving fifteenth-century guild books have been edited. Dunfermline Gild Bk; Perth Guild 
Bk; Abdn Guild Recs. The introductions to these volumes provide the best overview of the topic. See 
also E. Torrie, ‘The Guild in Fifteenth-Century Dunfermline’, in The Scottish Medieval Town, pp. 245-60. 
Some material also survives for Stirling and Ayr. See Torrie, ‘The Guild in Dunfermline’, p. 246, n. 8. 
19 Ewan, Townlife, p. 58. 
20 Ibid., pp. 58-63. Elizabeth Torrie highlights social diversity in ‘The Guild in Dunfermline’, pp. 247-
48. 
21 Torrie, ‘The Guild in Dunfermline’, p. 245; Richardson, ‘Craft Guilds and Christianity’, pp. 139-89. 
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surprising to find the idea of community at the heart of political discourse. The following 
will examine how this discourse was used. 
 
The Urban Community 
Historians have differed as to the nature of the urban community in Scotland. In her earlier 
work Elizabeth Ewan argued for a sense of community within the burghs which was 
characteristic of medieval life, enhanced by the exercise of communal rights and privileges 
and which remained unaffected by social inequality.22 Whilst acknowledging that towns 
were clearly physically demarcated from their surrounding countryside, and that the 
overlap with the spiritual communities of the parishes would have done much to aid a sense 
of ‘oneness’, Patricia Dennison has instead chosen to emphasise exclusion, and argues that 
medieval society was too stratified and hierarchical for any true communal feeling to take 
hold across social groups.23 Rather than asking who was part of the community, the 
following will investigate how the idea could be employed, by drawing upon the council 
minutes from Aberdeen and Edinburgh. It will be argued that the burgh community could 
be thought of as a legal concept, a physical location and a group of people, so that the 
overlap between these aspects created a conceptual space which could be appropriated by 
those in authority in order to legitimise political decisions and actions. 
The Latin term communitas was one of several words which, by the later middle ages, could 
be used to designate a legal corporation which held particular rights and privileges.24 This 
idea took its power from the fact that a corporation, such as a burgh, could simultaneously 
be both a legal entity distinct from its members and the group of men who comprised it.25 
This legal entity, as an abstraction, could not give consent; this had to be done by those who 
comprised it on any given occasion. The corporeal aspect of the communitas was therefore 
only ‘apparent and operative’ after the members had come together in congregation, hence 
the need for the burgh council to consent to decisions affecting the whole community.26 The 
importance of the distinction between the burgesses themselves and the communitas can be 
                                                          
22 Ewan, Townlife, pp. 136-40.  
23 E. P. Dennison, ‘Power to the People? The Myth of the Medieval Burgh Community’, in S. Foster, A. 
Macinnes and R. MacInnes (eds), Scottish Power Centres (Glasgow, 1998), pp. 100-31. 
24 Canning, ‘The Corporation’, p. 9; Black, Political Thought in Europe, pp. 14- 41. Canning lists corpus, 
respublica, populus, civitas, collegium, societas and universitas as possible alternatives. 
25 Canning, ‘The Corporation’, pp. 10-14. 
26 Ibid., p. 14. 
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seen in the charter evidence from Edinburgh. The standard formula used by the crown in its 
grants to the burgh, from the reign of David II onwards, was, as in a charter of 1364, ‘Sciatis 
nos dedisse concessisse et hac presenti carta nostra confirmasse Burgensibus et Communitati 
Burgi de Edynburgh…’.27 The clear distinction made by the crown between burgesses and 
community recognises the town both as a group of men and as a legal entity. In effect, the 
king is granting land to the town as embodied by the particular burgesses who constitute it 
at any given time. He grants both to the men who are presently there to receive it and to 
those who will make up the communitas in the future. A charter from 1367, which prohibits 
fairs being held in Newbattle, draws a similar distinction in referring to ‘preiudicium ac 
grauamen Burgi nostri de Edynburgh ac Burgensium nostrorum eiusdem loci’, instead 
placing the emphasis on the burgh as a physical location and as a group of men.28  
R. L. C. Hunter, in one of the very few pieces of work which directly addresses the idea of 
legal incorporation in relation to the Scottish burghs, suggests that this developed very 
differently in Scotland to England.29 He argues that in England, by the mid-fifteenth century, 
the law relating to corporate personality had ‘crystallised’ into the five ‘classic incidents’ of 
incorporation, which could only be granted explicitly by royal charter.30 In contrast, Hunter 
argues, a high degree of imprecision characterised the language of the Scottish records, 
which he attributes to a ‘lack of legal refinement’.31 Hunter’s observations on the fluidity of 
nomenclature in relation to the town and its representatives are undoubtedly correct, and 
yet the rigidity of terminology which he argues characterised England was not typical of 
medieval towns generally.32 The imprecision of the language in which it was expressed was 
one factor which allowed collective governance to be reproduced across Europe and, as 
Reynolds argues, by the thirteenth century the various words which described these entities 
                                                          
27 Edin. Chrs, p. 25. ‘Know ye that we have given, granted and by this our present charter have 
confirmed to the Burgesses and Community of the Burgh of Edinburgh…’. 
28 Edin. Chrs, pp. 26-7. ‘the prejudice and hurt of our Burgh of Edinburgh and of our Burgesses of the 
same place…’. 
29 R. L. C. Hunter, ‘Corporate Personality and the Scottish Burgh: An Historical Note’, in G. W. S. 
Barrow (ed.), The Scottish Tradition: Essays in Honour of Ronald Gordon Cant (Edinburgh, 1974), pp. 223-
42, at p. 232. 
30 Ibid., p. 231; p. 237. These incidents are listed as ‘the power to sue and liability to be sued as a 
body…[the] power to hold landed property, the privilege of using and the power legally to act by a 
common seal, perpetual succession…and the power to make by-laws.’ 
31 Ibid., p. 232. 
32 As noted by Canning, above, n. 24. See also Black, Political Thought, pp. 118-21. Cf. S. Reynolds, ‘The 
History of the Idea of Incorporation or Legal Personality: A Case of Fallacious Teleology’, in Reynolds 
(ed.), Ideas and Solidarities, pp. 1-20 which, although it does not cite Hunter’s work, argues that this 
approach is based on modern assumptions about legal incorporation which cannot be applied to the 
medieval period. 
52 
 
could be used in reference to ‘the whole community of government and people together, or 
just the government, or just the community of people whom the government governed’.33 If 
this still pertained in Scotland by the later fifteenth century it is surely because, as in other 
places, it still worked very well. Rather than a judgment on the degree of legal 
‘sophistication’ relative to England, what is required is a closer analysis of the linguistic and 
political contexts and circumstances in which such variations appear, in order to assess the 
utility of a particular choice of term. 
One of the most noticeable attributes of communitarian terminology found within the 
minutes of the burgh councils of Aberdeen and Edinburgh is its diversity. Even when 
simply discussing the burgh as a group of men, there is a range of possible terms which can 
be employed. ‘Burgesis’ is the clearest, as it denotes those men who have been admitted to 
burgess-ship.34 An ‘outeburges’ was a burgess who lived outside the town boundary, 
drawing a clear spatial distinction. Another collective term is ‘nyghbouris’, which often 
suggests the burgesses as a group, as it is commonly found within decisions which concern 
either trading privileges or burgess obligations. Occasionally, the word ‘commons’ can be 
found performing the same functions as community, also eliding the distinction between the 
burgesses and the whole population of the town. ‘Indwellaris’ or ‘inhabitantis’, can both 
usually be taken to mean those non-burgesses who live within the geographical area of the 
burgh. These terms had the advantage of being easily contrastable with ‘outdwellaris’, who 
could be invoked in order to underline the importance of performing designated duties. An 
act of 1484, in Aberdeen, ordered that  
all nichtburis and inhabitantis of this burgh sal…haf thare wauppinins…redy beside 
thaim in thair  buthis and houssis and cum with thaim to the alderman, bailies or 
seriands incontinent quhen thai see or heris thaim…myster [in need of] helpe or 
supple in thare office, doing for the attaching and correctioun of tresspassouris, and 
[they will] abstrach thaim not fra thair nichtburis quhen thai se thaim…in point of 
suppression and namely be out duellaris [of] the burgh.35  
The language makes very clear what is expected from members of the burgh community, 
and positions them directly against those who are not members. The fact that such a 
measure had to be enacted at all suggests that the danger from ‘outdwellaris’ was not 
imminent enough for people to keep their weapons ready as a matter of course, and so this 
language was perhaps employed to reinforce the plea for people to assist the officers and 
                                                          
33 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, p. 182. See also Watts, The Making of Polities, pp. 98-99. 
34 For the conditions and processes which relate to this see Ewan, Townlife, passim. 
35 ACA CA/1/1/6, pp. 824-5; Abdn Counc., i, p. 40. 
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each other. It could, in fact, have arisen from a single incident which the council wished to 
avoid being replicated. Another Aberdeen act, from 1479, records a grant to Sandy Cowtis of 
a penny from each house in the town, for mending streets and gates, stating that he should 
collect ‘fra each fyre house [house with a fireplace] a penny and of al utheris, outeburges 
and inburgessis and indwellaris havand chaumer or house a penny’, showing that one did 
not necessarily have to belong to the exclusive group of burgesses in order to be asked to 
contribute to an enterprise one was likely to benefit from.36  
A letter from James III to the ‘Burges and Communite of Edinburgh’ in 1472 underlines how 
intertwined was membership of the community with the status and nature of property 
ownership. The letter is a licence to fortify the town ‘in case our ald ennemyis of England 
address thaim to invade’.37 The king charges ‘al and sindry the burges nychtbouris and 
indwellaris the said toune and alsa thaim that has landis annuellis or possessiouns withyn it’ 
to contribute to the cost of the fortifications ‘and that alswele the outeburges and occupiaris 
of the fredome of the said Burgh and personis having landis or annuellis within it contribut 
as indwellaris and inhabitantis thareof’.38 The freedom of the burgh was the area over which 
its privileges extended and there is a clear sense that those who had something to protect 
had to contribute towards the cost of protecting it, regardless of their status in relation to the 
community. This demonstrates how the idea of community could expand to include people 
beyond the physical boundaries of the town when the situation required. The distinction 
made between burgesses and community would, in this instance, have worked to ensure 
that any ‘occupiaris of the fredome’ who might have disagreed with the idea that they were 
part of the community would nevertheless have had to make a contribution.  
The burgesses could also be described as ‘fremen’ which again could be contrasted with 
‘unfremen’. The idea of urban freedom in medieval Scotland is also capable of encompassing 
the spatial, the legal and the rhetorical and would certainly repay further exploration. Here 
it is sufficient to note that it could also be used to frame the community in a way appropriate 
to the circumstances.39 In Aberdeen, in 1442, it was ordained that ‘al the comunytee alsweile 
unfree as free men be sworne to rise with the alderman in the defence of the toune and of the 
                                                          
36 ACA CA/1/1/6, p. 599; Abdn Counc., i, p. 37. 
37 Edin. Chrs, p. 134. 
38 Ibid., pp. 134-5. 
39 For its use in early modern England see J. Barry, ‘Civility and Civic Culture in Early Modern 
England: The Meanings of Urban Freedom’, in P. Burke, B. Harrison and P. Slack (eds), Civil Histories: 
Essays Presented to Sir Keith Thomas (Oxford, 2000), pp. 181-96. I am very grateful to Professor Phil 
Withington for this reference. 
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nychbourez of the toune and quhasa will noght riise and absentis him wilfully he sal tyne 
[lose] his fredome and be bannysit oute of the ton’, indicating that the unfree could be 
included within the community if it was thought necessary by the council.40 Freedom could 
also be employed to reinforce the boundaries of the community through the inclusion or 
exclusion of particular individuals. In Aberdeen being accepted into the freedom of the 
burgh was part of the standard formulation in the recording of the admission of all new 
guild members, and this phrase undoubtedly evoked both the conceptual and jurisdictional 
senses of the word.41 In 1447, the ‘haile counsaile’ of Aberdeen granted ‘license and fredome 
to Johne the Vaus burges of this burgh for his gude meritis done in tyme bigane’, while in 
Dunfermline, in 1434, John Wilson ‘tretit witht the nychtbouris for fredome to by hides 
utuith [outwith] the fredome for j yer’ nicely exemplifying both the dual meaning of the 
term, and its importance in the maintenance of privileges.42  
Aberdeen burgh council met to enact all manner of legislation for the good of the town, from 
dealing with rent arrears to the defence of the burgh, to matters of trade and commerce. 
Gaining the consent of the community was an integral part of the proceedings of such 
meetings, and this was very often recorded in the council register. At first glance this 
appears to be merely formulaic; an unthinking use of standard contemporary terminology. 
A closer look reveals the fact that the formulations used for recording this consent varied 
considerably, reflecting subtle, but clearly relevant, differences in the composition of the 
community present on any given occasion. In 1479 the ‘alderman, consal and communite’ 
granted payment for mending the pavements of the town.43 In 1452 ‘the maste parte of the 
hale communitee of this burgh deliverit and consentit all with ane assent’ that the town 
should be fortified with ditches due to ‘perile apparand’.44 In 1475 ‘the alderman and certane 
persons of counsale’ decided that offerings from the altar should be divided equally, while 
in 1480 it was ‘concludit and ordanit be the consale and diuerse of the comunite’ that the 
cost of ditches was to be borne by those who refused to help dig them.45 These distinctions, 
while imprecise, do suggest that the number in attendance was not irrelevant. The extent to 
                                                          
40 Abdn Guild Recs, p. 67. 
41 E.g. Abdn Guild Recs, p. 72. The standard formulation was ‘receptus fuit in liberum burgensem et 
confratrem gilde’. 
42 Abdn Guild Recs, p. 115; Dunfermline Guild Bk, p. 2. 
43 ACA CA/1/1/6, p. 599; Abdn Counc., i, p. 37. 
44 ACA CA/1/1/5(2), p. 766; Abdn Counc., p. 19. The ‘perile’ in question was likely that which 
resulted in the Battle of Brechin, between the earls of Huntly and Crawford, around a month later. See 
Brown, The Black Douglases, p. 296. 
45 ACA CA/1/1/6, p. 361; Abdn Counc., i, pp. 33, 37. 
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which the burgh council could legitimately speak for the entire community of burgesses, or 
indeed the whole town, must have been a question central to the effective functioning of 
urban politics, not to mention the maintenance of civic harmony. There is also the implicit 
idea that if a member of the community did not take part then he could not reasonably 
expect to have a say in the matter being decided. Attendance of the whole community, 
however defined, was not necessary to legitimise all decisions.  
Once taken, such decisions of the council had to be publicised, and it was the town bellman 
who served this function. In 1490 Edinburgh’s council recorded that they would ‘caus the 
bellman with the handbell pas throw the towne wairnand all the nichtbouris that sic vittallis 
and tymmer ar to sell of sic a pryce’, and in 1479 the bellman was ordered to ‘warne all the 
nichtbouris thairto in the tolbuith and in na uther place’ to notify them of goods coming into 
the city via the port of Leith.46 In 1481 a new bellman was appointed by the burgh council in 
Aberdeen: 
because that the office of belmanschip of this burgh was vacand, the alderman gerd 
Johne Sclater pas with the bel throu the towne to charge the comunite to cum to the 
tolbuthe for the chesing of a belman that war maist habit and proffitable for the 
toune. And with the consent of the alderman, balzeis, consail and comunite of the 
toune that war present in the tyme efter the passing of the bel, Androw Murray, 
masowne, com in presence of thaim al and profferit to gif for that office of 
belmanschip, for his tyme, yerly, to the common profit of the toune, fyve markis, and 
to do all uthir deuties and service to the toune that ony uthir belman did of before; 
the alderman in the tyme inquirand gif ony uthir man wald gif mare, and fand na ma 
that wald gif samekil. And furthwith, that beand done, the alderman in the name of 
the toune and of the communite deliuerit til the said Andro the bel and chesit him for 
all the daies of his life common belman, with the consent of the balyeis, consale and 
communite, beand present for the tyme as saidis.47 
The entry is replete with the language of community and consent, and records in detail both 
the process by which the community is summoned to choose the bellman, and the process 
necessary for the office to be conferred upon Murray. It is clear that the tolbooth is the 
correct location for this to occur, and that convening the council there is necessary for the 
legitimate bestowal of authority. It is twice recorded that the alderman, bailies, council and 
community consented to the appointment, although the scribe is careful to record that, in 
this instance, the community comprised those who were present after being summoned. 
This public appointment to the office of ‘bellmanschip’ has the sense of a purely ceremonial 
occasion. Perhaps, as no-one else came forward for the position, Murray’s acceptance was 
                                                          
46 NLS Adv.MS.31.4.9, p. 132; Edin. Recs, p. 59, p. 37.  
47 ACA CA/1/1/7, pp. 724-5; Abdn Counc., i, pp. 30-1, which erroneously dates this entry to 1471. 
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something of a foregone conclusion. While the summoning of the community adds 
legitimacy, and possibly a festive air, to the proceedings, it may be that the number of 
people who actually attended was not particularly relevant to the business at hand. 
Although the consent of the community was required for the appointment to be official, this 
could potentially be achieved with any number of people physically present. It was, after all, 
the alderman in the name of the community who had the authority to appoint Murray to the 
position. 
This example can be usefully contrasted with another, from 1487, when James III wrote to 
‘the consaile and communitie’ of Aberdeen regarding a complaint made against the 
alderman, Sir John Rutherford of Terlane, by Gilbert Menzies.48 The letter is long and is 
copied into the record in full, again preceded by a description of the bellman passing 
through the town, ‘chargeand the haile consale and communite to comper within thair 
tolbuitht to heir our soverane lordis letteris and gif ther ansuer theirupon’.49 In the letter, the 
king relates how Menzies complained to him ‘on behalf of…the haile body of the toune’ that 
Rutherford, described by the king as ‘our lovet fameliar servitour’, was being a ‘masterfull 
oppressour’ of the king’s lieges, that due to Rutherford’s oppression ‘nay marcheante may 
live within [the] said burgh’ and that ‘he has nocht the said office with [the burgesses’] 
consent, bot be electioun of a few simpill personis, his kynnismen’.50  
In response, the king commands the burgesses to 
Pass togidder to your tolbuitht and avisitly havande E [eye] to the commone profit of 
oure said burgh, consider and tak knowledge of the saide informacioune maide apon 
oure said servitoure your alderman, with utheris informaciounis as salbe schawin be 
him to you, [and decide] gif thai be maid of verite and of your mynd and will, or 
nocht, and thereftir send your mynde til us… Be informatione maid til us be our 
servitour an knicht forsaide, upone diverse thingis that are done contrar the 
commone profit of oure said burghe, we will mak the samyn to be reformit…and in 
the mene tyme ye and ilk ane of you answer and obey to oure said servitour as your 
alderman in all thingis…51 
While James is ostensibly commanding the burgh council to investigate the matter 
themselves it is perfectly clear that he expects them to exonerate Rutherford of any 
wrongdoing. He makes his personal connection to the knight explicit in his repeated uses of 
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the word ‘servitour’, and calls him ‘your alderman’ on two occasions. If there were any 
doubt remaining, the letter carries the implicit threat that the king will be asking Rutherford 
directly about what has been happening, and that if he finds it to be ‘contrar to the commone 
profit’, by which he almost certainly means his own wishes, then he will take measures to 
‘mak the same be reformit’. It is recorded underneath the letter that after it was ‘oppinly red, 
herde, seyne and understandyne’, the undersigned members of the council  
avisitly deliverit…that thai gaf nevere power, command, nor commissione to David 
Menzies, na to nane utheris, to gif ony bill of complaint, nor to mak sic senister 
informatioune in thair name til our soverane lord…apone the said Schir Jhone 
Ruderfurde, declarand the said relatione nocht trew. And attour [moreover] thai 
declarit and schew that the said Schir Johne maid nane oppression within the said 
burghe apone nay man.52 
There are ninety-nine names attached to this declaration. 
Although the burgh community is summoned in the same way to the same location, this 
dispute is evidently an entirely different matter to the election of a bellman. Whatever the 
events which led to Menzies’s accusation, and however the king had become involved, a 
swift and united reaction was called for from the burgesses. A great many members of the 
community not only came to the tolbooth to attest to Rutherford’s version of the story, but 
were understandably keen that they should have been recorded as having done so. In this 
instance, the consent of the community was granted not simply symbolically, through the 
alderman, but by a very large proportion indeed of the actual persons who comprised it.53 
The community was, in effect, represented by whoever was present in the tolbooth when a 
particular decision was taken. 
The town itself could also function in this way, as a clearly-defined space in which the 
communitas existed. In 1461, an Aberdeen statute recorded that  
ony man, quhat ever he be, of state heyar or lawer, duelland within this burch at 
payis nocht his male [rent]…quarthrocht it may ryn to hendryng or preiudice to the 
toune; at that man, of quhatsumever degree he be, he sal not…be chosin in tyme to 
cum to beir ony offices within this burch quhill the time at he freith hym self and 
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kepe the toune unscathit anentis the kyng and all other men of all dettis and chargis 
acht [owed] be hym.54  
Here can be seen the association of the actual town with the collective financial interests of 
the men within it. It is prejudice to the town which was to be avoided and the town which 
was to remain in the king’s good graces by ensuring that people paid their dues. It can be 
inferred from the penalty of loss of office that those who were considered to comprise the 
town were burgesses only, as it was only they who were entitled to hold office within the 
burgh. As it was likely to be the other burgesses who had to make up any shortfall to avoid 
royal displeasure, attaching the payment of rent to the good of the town demonstrates not 
only the deft employment of communitarian language to reinforce the decision, but also the 
need to be seen to place a high value on the communal defence of shared interests, and to 
attach importance to participation in the governance of the burgh. An even more strident 
example of this requirement can be found in an Aberdeen statute of 1444. It states that  
for the commoune gude and quiete of this toune, and for the stancheing of 
trespassours and rebellours agayne the law, all the indwellaris and inhabitantes of 
this burgh sall assist to the alderman and officiaris of this burgh to manteigne the law 
and punyce trespassouris but favour and quhasa dois the contrar sall be haldin rebell 
agayne the toune and that the gudemen of the toun sal write to the king under the 
commoune seell to be punyst be him, and all sic rebellours sal be excludit fra al takes, 
profites, office and worschip of this toun.55  
The idea of the burgh as a legal entity was one which had a high degree of utility in this 
context; detrimental actions could be cast as rebellion against the town itself, rather than as 
contrary to the interests of particular individuals. The role and exercise of royal authority 
within the burghs remains an underexplored area, but the threat of punishment by the king 
is unusual, and is suggestive of an ability on the part of the burgh community to appeal 
directly to the king’s judgment. That the language of rebellion is harnessed to this purpose is 
perhaps not accidental.  
 
The Common Good 
The urban community could also find expression in the notion of the common good.56 Jan 
Dumolyn has argued that legal and theological concepts from princely discourse ‘trickled 
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down’ into the late medieval Flemish towns, shaping what he calls a ‘practical theory of 
political action’, and informing contemporary ideologies which were then used by ‘lay 
actors’ in urban politics.57 Eliza Hartrich has argued that in mid-fifteenth-century England 
the merchants were ‘a well-connected and highly educated group, on the forefront of 
political language’, who adopted the humanist discourse of common weal and res publica 
both as an indicator of their social cohesion, and of their contribution to the realm as a 
whole.58 Again, it is difficult to trace such developments in any detail for Scotland. The 
bonum commune certainly permeated Scottish princely discourse, although the concept of 
‘commonweal’ would not be assimilated until the sixteenth century.59 As will be discussed 
in later chapters, however, the idea of community evolved rather differently in Scotland to 
England; by the later fifteenth century the term communitas appears to have been applied 
regularly to the burghs, and very rarely indeed to the kingdom as a whole. In England, as 
Watts has shown, the discourse of ‘the commons’, which was closely related to the idea of 
the communitas regni, was used to support the popular uprisings of the fourteenth and mid-
fifteenth centuries.60 There is no evidence that such uprisings occurred in Scotland. While 
the absence of revolt means that such ideas were differently inflected in Scotland to either 
England or Flanders, the Scottish burghs maintained close links to both throughout the 
medieval period. As with the customary practices noted above, therefore, it is likely that the 
discourses of the common good employed in Scotland’s towns were reinforced from 
multiple directions. 
As elsewhere, this ubiquitous political idea proved to be easily adaptable to the 
requirements of urban politics, and in particular guild politics.61 In a culture which relied for 
its status upon economic success, and in which that success was achieved through collective 
action, a concept which conveyed both the Aristotelian sense of group benefit or advantage 
and the sense of financial profit could be used to position a variety of political actions within 
the context of the good of the community, and gave a particular legitimacy to those that 
generated revenue for the community concerned. This dual sense can be found conveyed by 
a range of keywords based around good, profit, utility and welfare, and connected to the 
common financial resources of the town, although ‘profit’ is by far the most frequently used. 
In Dunfermline, in 1464, the guild court stated that ‘for plesaur of God Allmichti and 
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commone profit of the said burgh that in tym cumming for evir mare thar mercate day to be 
on Settirday and that na marcate be haldin within the said burgh upone Sonday na yet on na 
festvalle day’.62 This parallels a similar statute in Perth, from 1462, which stated that ‘in the 
honoure of God, oure Lady and St John and for the welfaire of merchandis that na 
merchandman nor uthir man by woll, hid nor skyn upone the Sunday’.63 While these 
examples clearly suggest a preoccupation with the spiritual welfare of the guild members 
the decisions were made, at least in part, to prevent some of them from profiting at the 
expense of others by trading illegally. An Edinburgh statute from 1490 states that the 
council’s decision to order the ‘thesaurer of the towne’ to buy victuals and timber coming 
into the harbour is, on the one hand ‘for the commoun proffeitt of the towne and inhabiteris 
therirof’ and, on the other, ‘for the behuif, utility and proffeitt of the nichtbouris of the 
towne’, suggesting that these things were considered to be closely aligned.64 
A raft of measures to protect the concerns of the burgh can be found in the Aberdeen guild 
records of 1441. For the ‘commoune profite’ of the town it was ‘ordanit and decretit…be the 
aldermane…and the hale commoune counsaile that might be gottyn present in the toune’ 
that no ‘gentil men of the cuntreth’ were to have ‘watterez or takis’ [income from the rental 
of fishings or property] of the town unless they ‘cum to duel within the burgh’.65 The same 
year, another entry recorded that  
be the avise of the hale counsaile for the commoune gude of the hale communyte of 
this burgh, it is statute concludit and ordanit that na fleschewaris na nane other man 
nyghbor nor unfreman by ony maner of fische quhill thai cum to the merkat and at 
naman by to tap agayne at a derth to the commownys ony maner of fische quhill the 
light of the dai be passit under the payne of viij s unforgiffin and eschete of the fische 
but [without] favour.66 
To ‘tap agayne’ was to re-sell, a proscribed activity which the council had to deal with 
regularly.67 Highlighting the ‘derth to the commownys’, whether this is taken to mean the 
burgess community or the whole population, puts transgressors firmly outside the group.  
In each example the common good is being used to reinforce the importance of the economic 
measures enacted, and renders the interests of the council as synonymous with the interests 
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of the burgesses, or even the town, as a whole. The jurisdiction of the council extended over 
everyone within the burgh, whether unfreemen, inhabitants, neighbours or noblemen.  
A further example, from Edinburgh in 1478, shows that the common good could also refer to 
the burgh’s financial resources. The statute states that ‘all the persouns that hes any of the 
common guid in their handis…cum to the tolbuith on Tysday nixttocum in presens of the 
hail toun…and heir the compt of the towne’.68 Another example can be found in 1445, when 
Aberdeen guild members were warned that ‘give [if] ony freemen of this ton sellis to…men 
of Dundee or of Perth…thai sal pay xl s unforgiffin to the commoune profite of this ton.’69 
Both Aberdeen and Edinburgh had (and still have) a Common Good fund, which is referred 
to throughout the records, and in the contexts in which it is mentioned the distinction 
between the money itself and the welfare of the town can become blurred. The subsequent 
entry in the Edinburgh records states that ‘the same tyme, it is fund quhair the provest, the 
greitt dusane [council] of the towne and dyvers uther nichtbouris, all with ane consent 
thinkis it speidfull for the common proffeitt of the haill town that the burrow mail be 
ungadderit of the nichtbouris, considering it is payet to the chakker of the common purs’.70 
Here, the use of ‘common proffeit’, while indistinguishable from the many similar examples 
invoking the good of the community, could easily be taken to refer to the town’s finances. In 
Aberdeen, in 1444, it was ordained by the council and many of the guild that three men were 
to have ‘ful poware to by to the commoune profite of this [burgh] al maner of gudez of 
aventure that cummys be see to this burgh and til dispone thaim to the nyghborez of the ton 
as afferis’.71 While this reference is invoking the benefit of the town, it is firmly within the 
context of commerce that it does so, demonstrating from the opposite perspective the utility 
of linking the two.  
The communal nature of the town’s resources comes through strongly throughout the 
Aberdeen council minutes, where references can be found to the common rental, common 
work and common purse, as well as the common good and common profit.72 Designating 
funds as communal was useful when managing the assets of a corporation, as it allowed the 
council to claim legitimate action very easily indeed, and to pursue debts with the moral 
force of the community behind them. These examples represent only a small selection of the 
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contexts in which such language can be found, but it is clear that the idea of the common 
good was malleable enough to be used for connecting trading sanctions to Christian 
practice, in the defence of burgh privileges, as justification for the enforcement of penalties 
for wrongdoers within the burgh and as a description of the town’s communal funds. In 
each instance the good of the whole community is invoked regardless of the extent to which 
everyone in the town would benefit from the suggested measures and they could, in fact, be 
reinforcing the privileges of a very few. 
An interesting final example can be found in St Andrews. In 1485 the archbishop and 
‘citiners’ of the town were obliged to defend the burgh’s privileges from a challenge by the 
bailies and community of Crail, who had obtained a letter of suspension from James III to 
prevent the St Andrews burgesses from trading with neighbouring towns.73 In their petition, 
they argue that the privileges which the citizens have long held are for ‘the augmentatione 
of thar common gud’, and that they should enjoy ‘lyik fredome to the saidis citineris as uther 
burgessis and gild brether hes and joysis within the kynryk of Scotland’, suggesting a 
uniformity of basic privileges which was both commonly known and understood.74 To 
reinforce their argument, they state that they have the power to choose their own officers 
every year to ‘conforme to the lawis of this realme for administracione of and weyll public 
with power of the officiaris thane chosyn to cognosche and minister justice in all actionis 
civill eftir the tenor and forme of the burgh lawis’.75 This is the sole use of the phrase ‘weyll 
public’ to be found within the material considered for this thesis, and may tentatively be 
aligned with a slight but important shift in political discourse, discussed further below, 
which increasingly saw the realm being explicitly connected to ideas of public authority 
from the 1470s onwards. 
 
Guilds: Incorporation, Reputation and Brotherhood 
It is perhaps the guild which is most characteristic of medieval collective endeavour. Guilds 
were a very old form of association, which came to include ‘any group bound together by 
ties of rite and friendship, offering mutual support to its members on payment of an entry 
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fee (geld)’.76 These guilds had a religious character from the beginning, being firmly 
Christian by the tenth century, and expressed their solidarity in feasting, drinking and 
pageantry.77 Reynolds defines guilds as ‘essentially…a voluntary association of people who 
were not blood relations but who used the analogy of brotherhood to express their 
solidarity’.78 These associations were found to be particularly helpful to merchants, who 
were able to distribute risk amongst the group and defend their interests collectively.79 From 
the twelfth century it became common for craftsmen to form guilds of their own, which 
drew upon the same model of collective action in order to support manufacturing interests 
and policies.80  
Tine De Moor argues that the emergence of guilds was part of a ‘silent revolution’ of 
‘corporate collective action’.81 She suggests that guilds were a very effective way of resolving 
the ‘social dilemma’, a sociological thought experiment which suggests that an individual 
within a group can profit from self-interested behaviour unless everyone in the group 
chooses to act in the same way, in which case everyone loses out on the benefits of group 
membership.82 According to De Moor the need to publicly swear an oath tied guild members 
to the group, an explicitly stated set of rules prevented ‘free riding’ - the temptation of 
individuals to put in less effort than their colleagues in an attempt to reap the same rewards 
- while the security from the vagaries of the market which guild membership bestowed 
encouraged a high degree of self-regulation and ensured a willingness to co-operate.83 These 
strategies enabled both risk-sharing and economies of scale, and ensured that the skills and 
knowledge upon which guild members relied did not become common knowledge.84 De 
Moor concludes that, given the right conditions, the pursuit of joint welfare by collective 
action was ‘frequently preferred’.85  
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Focusing upon medieval craft guilds, Gary Richardson offers further insight into the benefits 
of membership, by looking at their Christian ethos.86 He argues that the ‘bundling together’ 
of commercial and religious practices in craft guilds strengthened both endeavours for a 
variety of reasons. The reputation of a guild for high quality merchandise was what allowed 
it to maximise profits, by selling to people who did not personally know the craftsmen. In 
order to ensure a reputation for quality craftsmen had to work collectively to high 
standards, and severe sanctions had to be in place for any guild member who was found to 
be putting the reputation of the guild in jeopardy by producing inferior goods.87 As the most 
severe punishment a guild could implement was expulsion, this had to be a sufficient 
deterrent. There were certainly harsh economic disadvantages to being a craftsman without 
a guild, but the attachment of Christianity to guilds ensured a wide range of spiritual and 
social benefits which would have made expulsion even less desirable. Expellees lost ‘their 
church…and the network of individuals who promised them a proper burial, a respectable 
funeral and prayers for their soul…friends, colleagues and access to their guild’s social 
services…[they] no longer had feasts to attend, friendly neighbours working in the same 
industry or someone to talk to about the state of trade’.88 As membership of the guild 
brought both economic and spiritual advantages, the fates of guild members were linked 
together in both spheres, and it was this mechanism which worked to limit ‘free riding’.89  
Many of the above features are apparent in the guild court book of Dunfermline, which 
provides a helpful case study for looking at these ideas. Around one third of all burgesses 
belonged to the guild in Dunfermline, meaning that men of different social standing were 
included: merchants and craftsmen but also churchmen, clerks and many others.90 It also 
meant that burgh and guild were closely related, and there was not always a clear 
distinction between the business of each, although the dean of gild did not usually hold 
office within the burgh.91 Dunfermline was an ecclesiastical burgh and an important cultural 
centre, if a small town.92 It had a grammar school, where the poet Robert Henryson likely 
taught, and Ian Campbell has argued that it was one of four ecclesiastical centres in which a 
resurgent Scottish identity was expressed in this period through a revival of Romanesque 
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architecture, a strong interest in Scottish saints, in this case St Margaret, and a connection to 
the ‘principal Scottish historians’, this taking the form of the Pluscarden chronicle, which 
was written for abbot Richard Bothwell, superior of the burgh from 1445 to his death c. 
1470.93 These relatively highbrow endeavours co-existed with more traditional amusements; 
there are many instances where the gild entry payment of wine was ‘dronkyn…at the 
nichtburis will’ at the end of the meeting, while a Robin Hood play was held well into the 
sixteenth century.94 Although the abbots allowed the burgh a fairly high degree of 
independence, the association of gild with Christian practice must have been strong indeed, 
and Torrie suggests that membership demanded only ‘support for the church and active 
fellowship’ which are both strongly evidenced in the record.95  
The discourse of brotherhood and friendship is immediately apparent, as is the importance 
placed upon conforming to the rules of the gild. In 1440 it was recorded that ‘the gildbrethir 
with hall common consent statut that thair suld nan be resavit na mad gildbrothir in thair 
fraternite but or evir he swer the ath to that fraternite to be laid doun xl s or ellis frely to be 
gyffin hym as tyll a gildbrotheris ayr’.96 In 1482 Robyn Scharp was entered ‘to the fraternite 
and to the fredome for xl s’, while in 1479, Johne Wrycht ‘was convickit in amerciament for 
his contumasy for the hale brethir’.97 There are many instances of the gild court resolving 
disputes between brothers, or between brothers and others, with the result that people were 
‘put in friendship’ with each other. In 1456, two bailies were ‘put in friendschip anent the 
discordis and debatis betwixt them and for the strublance of the toun’, for which each paid 
12 pence.98 It was further recorded that if they did not keep their friendship, whichever of 
them was found to be at fault ‘by the sicht of the brethir’ would pay half a mark. In 1449 the 
gild court stepped in to resolve what was apparently a disagreement between two families. 
John Chapman was ‘put in to frenschip’ with Tom of Brais and his son.99 Once the resultant 
fines had been paid, Tom of Brais’s wife and John Chapman’s wife were also put in 
friendship, ‘in presens of John Wricht aldirman Schir Johne Wylyhamsone den witht the laff 
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[rest] of the consalle of the ton’.100 As discussed in the previous chapter, it was important 
that the whole community knew of the result of such agreements, in part so that harmony 
was restored and in part to prevent the problem from resurfacing. 
In 1438 Will of Gelland was made gildbrother after paying 40 shillings in silver and giving 
the traditional gift of wine, but the brothers gave him back ten shillings ‘for hys gud dedis 
doand till the makyn of a cawsay betuyx the Lim kill and our ton of Dunfermlyn’, 
highlighting the benefits of mutual co-operation and the willingness to reward it.101 In 1459 
it was ‘ackit and consentit with the hale fraternite of the gilde’ that whenever a gild brother 
died, the sergeant of the gild would ‘warne all the gild brethir on the nycht befor to pass 
with that corsse [corpse] to the erde’.102 Each brother was to make sure a mass was said for 
the soul in question within eight days, and any who failed to do so ‘sall rasse on him xij d 
without remissione and giff it for the saulle’, tying gild obligations firmly to the afterlife.103 
In 1441 the following was recorded: 
In the presens of the aldirman and Wilyam of Kyrcaldy deyn of the gild it was 
fundyn be the nychburis that Alan Lytstar had brokyn thar stutut of sellyn of gild 
merchandis tyl unfremen of this burgh quarfor the nychburis decretyt tha the said 
Alan sal be excludyt of al gild fredoum quyl he opteynyt [it] again at the aldirman the 
deyn and the brethir and pay xls to the brethir. Thir ar the namis of thaim that war 
thar…104 
Enforcing the rules with expulsion increased the likelihood of their being followed by others 
and, as with the reading of James III’s letter in Aberdeen, the book records the names of the 
men who were present in order to establish the decision as truly representative of wishes of 
the gild brothers. In a final example, from 1487, Andro Gerwes was accused of ‘strublans of 
the aldirman and the dene and the hale court in ful [foul] langagis spekyn to Davy Litstar 
balye’ for which he was charged ‘throw the vertu of his aith and tinsel [loss] of his fredome’ 
to ask forgiveness from everyone assembled.105 Gerwes ‘denyit to ask the said David 
forgyffnes’ and thereafter ‘for his dissobeying’, he was ‘chargit to remayne in the tolbutht 
ondir the payne and chargis foirsaide’. Instead, he ‘contemnandly passit furtht of the 
tolbutht but licens of the aldirman and dene’.106 Unfortunately any repercussions which may 
have resulted from Gerwes’s actions remain unrecorded, but it demonstrates that no matter 
                                                          
100 Dunfermline Guild Bk, p. 14. 
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105 Ibid., p. 31. 
106 Ibid., p. 31. 
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how heavily the discourses underpinning the gild were weighted towards co-operation and 
harmony it was always possible to break from the constraints if one was prepared to lose the 
attendant privileges. 
In thinking about how ideas of incorporation could be used by guilds in day-to-day politics 
it is also illuminating to examine the seals of cause of the Edinburgh craft guilds, which 
survive from the end of the fifteenth century.107 Edinburgh was a large and prosperous 
burgh, and by that time the de facto capital of Scotland, with a greater social demarcation 
between merchants and craftsmen than was the case in Dunfermline. The seals of cause are 
documents of incorporation, granted by the provost, bailies and council of the town to the 
body in question, and there are seven altogether, ranging in date from 1473 to 1489. These 
belong to the Hatmakers, Skinners, Wrights and Masons, Websters, Hammermen, Fleshers 
and Coopers. Very little work indeed has been done on Scottish craft guilds in this period, 
and so what follows is in some respects more general than could be wished. There is no 
doubt that these documents do, however, give an excellent insight into the nature of 
incorporation in Scotland, how it was conceptualised by contemporaries and how 
communitarian ideas were employed in the legitimisation of incorporated bodies.  
Each seal of cause is different in formulation, but there are some broad similarities. Each 
begins with a greeting clause, and an oath from the council that the document is a true 
record of their judgment upon the ‘bill of supplicatioun desyring of us our license consent 
and assent of certane statutis and reullis maid amangis tham self’ presented to them by the 
craftsmen.108 The reasons for applying for incorporation are enumerated, often at length, 
before the consent of the council is recorded as having been granted. It is often only then 
that the privileges sought are stated explicitly, whether in the first person as a record of 
what the craftsmen actually requested in person in the tolbooth, or whether as an itemised 
list as reported to and recorded by the clerk. Finally, a clause is added which records that the 
council found the request of the craftsmen to be ‘consonand to reason’, and official 
confirmation is granted with the appending of the seal of cause. In several of the examples, 
the council addresses the newly-formed guild as ‘your universiteis’, reflecting its 
incorporated status. 
                                                          
107 Edin. Recs, pp. 26-34, 47-49, 54-58. 
108 Ibid., p. 31. This example is from the Wrights and Masons’ Seal of Cause, but others have broadly 
similar formulations. 
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With the exception of the Hatmakers’ guild, the reasons given for requiring incorporation 
are invariably framed with comments upon the difficulties facing the craftsmen, and how 
the town would benefit from these difficulties being alleviated. The Skinners, for example, in 
1474, claimed that through the problems which the craftsmen were bringing to the council’s 
attention 
the tone had a sclander and lak, the craft sustentit gret scaith and hurt and the 
commounis dissavit, and als that divine service and sufferage of Sant Cristoforis alter 
is mynist and reparatioun of the said alter nocht beildit nor helpit…and als anentis 
the disobeying of thair dekin in the cumming and gaddering befor hym and the craft 
quhen thai ar warnit and for the comonning and avising for the gude of the hale craft 
and for the stanching of deformaris and babillars of the werk baith in kirkis and in 
tone and for the reformation to be had of thir thingis and divers utheris concerning 
and rying to the hale craft.109  
In the Hammermen’s 1483 Seal of Cause, it is recorded  that the craftsmen were  
rycht havely hurt and put to greit poverty throw the doun cumming of the blak 
money…and in lyik wayis…be the dayly mercat maid throu the hie streitt in cramis 
[stalls], and on the baksyde [of] the toun in bachling [discrediting] of hammermenis 
werk pertaining to thame of their craft, in greit dishonour to the burgh…and upoun 
uther skaithis that thay sustentit in default of reformatioun.110 
Finally, the Fleshers make the case for incorporation, in 1488, by 
considering the grit trubill and vexatioun that officeris haid of before tyme be the 
evill reull [of] multitude of dyverssis persouns unhabill [incompetent] contenit in the 
burgh, [who] sclander and blaspheme men of the toun and the hail craft throw evill 
payment and uther wrangous iniuris and deidis usit amangis the craft, in grit hurt 
and preiudice of the toun and common profeit, that sic thingis micht be retreitit and 
reformeit be the provest, bailieis and counsall of the toun.111 
While each petition has been formulated to reflect the particular concerns of the craft in 
question, the arguments also appear to be highly formulaic. The desire for a good reputation 
is given practical expression in the ‘stanching of deformaris and babillars of the werk’, the 
need to ensure quality is articulated in ‘the evill reull’ of the incompetent craftsmen, and the 
Skinners explicitly link the difficulties faced by the craftsmen with the diminishing of ‘divine 
service and sufferage of Sant Cristoforis alter’. As a case had to be presented by the 
craftsmen before the council in order to be granted their seal of cause, each craft marshalled 
what it considered to be suitable evidence, and presented it within the expected framework. 
This framework required that great difficulties had been encountered by the craftsmen, 
                                                          
109 Edin. Recs, p. 29. 
110 Ibid., p. 47. 
111 Ibid., p. 54. 
69 
 
which were hindering not only their work, but the good of the whole town. Although the 
arguments put forward by the craftsmen clearly are based upon the perceived advantages of 
incorporation, it is debatable, without further research, to what extent each craft actually 
experienced these difficulties in fifteenth-century Edinburgh. It is possible that there were 
also broader political issues in play. 
In 1469 the Scottish parliament passed legislation which fundamentally altered the 
structures of authority within the burghs: 
because of gret truble and contensione yeirly for the chesing of the [burgh officers] 
throw multitud and clamor of commonis sympil personis, it is thocht expedient 
that…the chesing of the new officiaris be in this wise that is to say that the aulde 
counsail of the toune sall cheise the new counsail in sic noumyr as accordis to the 
toune, and the new counsail and the aulde of the yeir before sall cheise all officiaris 
pertenyng to the toune as alderman, bailyis, dene of gild and uthiris officiaris, and 
that ilka craft sall cheise a persone of the sammyn craft that sall have voce in the said 
electioune of the officiaris for that tyme in like wise yeir be yeir.112 
As Michael Lynch argues, this had the effect of ‘concentrating power in the hands of 
merchant-dominated councils now able to re-elect themselves to office with impunity’.113 
Although craftsmen were to have a ‘voce’ in the election of officers, the council would 
remain firmly in the hands of the merchants. Lynch suggests that, due to the decline in 
overseas exports, the later fifteenth century saw a ‘flowering of commercial jealousies’ 
between merchants and craftsmen.114 It is perhaps unsurprising that the craftsmen would, as 
a consequence of the 1469 legislation, wish to have a greater degree of control over their own 
affairs. It was, of course, also in the interests of the merchants that the goods produced by 
the craftsmen were of high quality and good reputation, and so it can be argued that the 
council would also see incorporation as a way of better achieving these ends. The seals of 
cause employ a mode of discourse which idealises and standardises the political 
relationship, in order to achieve that which is mutually beneficial for both groups.  
This is why appeals to the good of the town or the common profit are also peppered 
throughout the petitions. The justification for incorporation rests on the argument that it will 
be of benefit to more than simply the craftsmen concerned. The Hatmakers invoked the 
‘honour worschipe and common proffeit of our Soverane Lord his Heines realm and ledgis 
and for the hail craft’, while the Wrights and Masons, in 1475, argued that their 
                                                          
112 RPS 1469/19.  
113 M. Lynch, ‘The Social and Economic Structure of the Larger Towns, 1450-1600’, in Lynch, Stell and 
Spearman (eds), The Scottish Medieval Town, pp. 261-86, at p. 264. 
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incorporation would promote ‘the honour and worschip of Sanct Johne in augmentatioun of 
devyne seruice, and richt sa for reuling governyng of the saidis twa craftis and honour and 
worship of the towne’ and that they should ‘have power, quhatsumevir utheris actis statutis 
or ordinancis, that thai think mast convenient for the utilite and proffet of the gud towne.’115 
The Websters perhaps come closest to covering all bases, in 1476, when they argue for their 
incorporation for ‘the governance of thare werks and labour and gude reule baithe fore 
worschip of the realme, commone profite and laute of craftismen and for uther divers and 
mony causes of gude motive.’116 The good of the guild is linked with the good of the town, 
and on occasion even the good of the realm itself.   
In his discussion of incorporation, Hunter mentions in passing that ‘it is in the petitions by 
craftsmen for formal approval of their societies and for the grant of power to regulate their 
several crafts that English styles seem to be influential’, with which he is contrasting the lack 
of an explicit grant of communitas in the Scottish royal charters, as opposed to the English.117 
It can be argued, however, that by the later fifteenth century there was a well-established, if 
less explicit, idea of Scottish incorporation which could be drawn upon by the crafts in 
presenting their petitions. As has been shown, the pool of communitarian ideas available in 
the urban context to those wishing to frame or legitimise their authority was rich and varied, 
and while it cannot be argued from a range of examples that each idea applied in all places 
at all times, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that those living in Edinburgh in the 
1470s and 1480s would have had better access than most.118 The seals of cause show a firm 
grasp of the legal concepts and political language which could be attached to a communitas, 
and similarities with the arguments earlier put forward by Aberdeen burgh council, such as 
the Fleshers’ citation of ‘grit hurt and preiudice of the toun and common profeit’, are 
apparent. 
 
Conclusion 
Even allowing for the limited geographical spread represented here the first and most 
obvious conclusion which can be drawn from this evidence is that the burghs had a vibrant 
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political culture of their own which has been overlooked by political historians. It has not 
been possible here to explore in any detail the principles and structures which underpinned 
the relationship between the crown and these towns, but it is an area in urgent need of 
further research. The implications of the current findings for the contribution of burgh 
representatives to parliamentary decision-making, whilst very difficult to investigate on 
available evidence, also needs to be given greater attention.  
Collective action in the burghs was framed using customary ideas, corporation theory and 
Aristotelian ideas of the common good. The flexibility which this overlap gave to discourses 
of community allowed the burgh council to position the town as a legal entity, a physical 
location or a group of people, thereby legitimising a wide variety of decisions and actions by 
claiming to be acting for the good of the whole town. The community referred to was often 
that denoted by communitas in the charters – the burgesses - yet it could nevertheless be 
applied much more broadly in certain circumstances. Conversely, community was not the 
only word which identified the burgesses as a group. Other collective terms, such as 
neighbours, freemen or commons could be used, and conflating the interests of the 
burgesses with those of the town itself was also not unusual. Given that the burgh was an 
important source of revenue for the crown, and that the town’s prosperity relied upon 
commercial activity, the good of the burgesses was in fact synonymous with the good of the 
burgh in many, quite tangible, respects, and the communal defence of their interests 
necessary to its survival. Whether or not the council actually had the greater good in mind 
when taking decisions, communitarian rhetoric provided a very powerful way in which the 
council could legitimise its authority.  
Because the burgesses as a group were taken to be the default community, the particular 
men who sat on the council at any given moment could claim to be acting in the interests of 
all the burgesses; the communitas. Sometimes the council members may in fact have been 
attempting to do this and sometimes they may not, but the language could be used to justify 
either possibility, and lent a certain weight to the actions of the council which would 
otherwise have been lacking. The flexibility of the terminology allowed the burgh council to 
include within or exclude from the community unfreemen, outdwellers, outburgesses or 
potentially anyone else as seemed appropriate, and outdwellers in particular could be used 
in order to justify actions, often in regard to law and order. To this extent the idea worked in 
a very similar way to the Habermasian public; it allowed a particular group of men to 
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construe itself as ‘the community’, and make a claim to universality which would not have 
been possible otherwise. 
The discourse of brotherhood and friendship which permeated the guilds not only bonded 
them together but provided a means of dispute resolution which was frequently drawn 
upon. The swearing of an oath in the presence of the brothers was recorded in the guild 
book, ensuring that the whole guild could hold each member accountable for adhering to 
the rules. To the economic benefits of guild membership were added a range of religious 
and social benefits. As these could be withdrawn if a brother was expelled, they acted to 
lessen the temptation for individuals to attempt to make an inferior contribution. 
Maintenance of reputation was essential to the craft guilds, in order to be able to sell their 
products, and the power to control this was one of the central arguments put forward for 
incorporated status in Edinburgh, where the craftsmen were able to draw upon a 
sophisticated range of communitarian concepts and language in their petitions in order to 
make their case. 
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Chapter Three: Public or Private? Lordship, Kingship and Justice 
 
The settlement of disputes, whether in the burghs or otherwise, was integral to the exercise 
of political authority, and Jenny Wormald’s work has been central to our understanding of 
these processes as they pertain to lordship.1 In making the argument for a new approach to 
political history Wormald was reacting to the ingrained assumptions of previous historians, 
from the late sixteenth century onwards, who had argued that Scottish kings were weak and 
Scottish magnates were ‘overmighty’.2  These assumptions were problematic because they 
were teleological, taking as read an implicit desire on the part of medieval elites to 
modernise political institutions and practices, praising ‘good’ kings who managed to take 
steps towards creating a strong, central government and bemoaning the perceived 
backwardness of Scottish governmental structures, which gave the aristocracy the power to 
flout royal commands. Such an interpretation was in need of significant revision, and 
Wormald’s alternative framework of close co-operation between crown and nobility 
provided just that. It has rightly been hugely influential. It is fair to say, however, that 
between the Wormaldian emphasis upon co-operation and bonding, and the focus upon 
interpersonal ties underpinning the work of the Macdougall school, that the study of the 
structures of royal government has become rather unfashionable in recent years.3 In 1952 
William Croft Dickinson published a short article entitled ‘The Administration of Justice in 
Medieval Scotland’.4 It bears all the hallmarks of the earlier historiography, arguing that 
‘feudalism’ could still operate ‘when the central authority is weak and unable to control the 
localities’.5 Then, he continues, ‘the strong magnate seizes control in the outlying parts, and 
obtains…confirmation of powers which that authority is itself too weak to exercise.’6 Such 
assertions about strength and weakness have undoubtedly obscured both the importance of 
                                                          
1 In particular her Lords and Men and ‘Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government in Early Modern 
Scotland’, Past and Present 87 (1980), pp. 54-97. 
2 Wormald, ‘Taming the Magnates?’, p.  271. For the older historiography see the ‘Bibliographical 
Note’, at pp. 279-80. 
3 The exception to this is MacFarlane, William Elphinstone, which explores in depth the workings of 
royal government, eschewing the focus on personality adopted elsewhere, but retaining the analytical 
framework of strength and weakness adopted by earlier historians It sees James III’s reign as a 
‘struggle for order’. See pp. 154-55 for an explicit statement of his approach. For a brief critique see 
Tanner, ‘James III’, pp. 210-11. 
4 W. C. Dickinson, ‘The Administration of Justice in Medieval Scotland’, Aberdeen University Review, 34 
(1952), pp. 338-51. 
5 Ibid., p. 339. 
6 Ibid., p. 339. 
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Dickinson’s subject matter and the value of some of his insights.7 While prioritising the 
explanatory power of administrative systems over that of personal relationships is certainly 
problematic in studying medieval governance, the same can surely be said when the 
positions are reversed.8 Unless the structures within which people were operating are fully 
understood there is a risk of ascribing to those people certain attributes based upon a 
reading of their actions, and then explaining their actions with reference to the ascribed 
attributes. While in some cases this will work well, in others it could potentially be rather 
misleading. A renewed focus upon the administration of justice in the localities can add 
substantially to our current understanding of lordship and kingship. By examining both 
discourses and practices this chapter will argue that the framework in which discussions of 
justice are currently placed needs to be substantially reconsidered. 
 
Franchisal Courts and Private Justice 
The generation of common knowledge was as important in local courts as it was to the 
crown. Outwith the burghs, franchisal courts were held by lords granted jurisdiction by the 
king, either in liberam baroniam or in liberam regalitatem.9 The sheriff, as an officer of the 
crown, also held his own court, while the justiciars, the highest crown judges, drove 
peripatetic justice ayres around the kingdom, in the same way as did the chamberlain. Both 
the ‘performance’ of justice through ritual and a reliance upon reputation can be traced 
throughout the sources, and were often mutually reinforcing. Cynthia Neville has 
highlighted the importance of ritual to the barony courts in the period between 1150 and 
1400.10 Emphasising the court as a social space and physical setting for expressions of power, 
she argues that formalised speech acts fulfilled a ‘crucial mnemonic function among 
audiences’ and that the linking of aural and visual cues is ‘readily observable in Scottish 
courtrooms in a host of contexts across the length and breadth of the kingdom’.11 The precise 
form these rituals took varied with the period, geographical area and purpose. Due to the 
                                                          
7 On the problems of strength and weakness as analytical tools see Watts, Henry VI, pp. 14-15. 
8 Powell, ‘After “After McFarlane”’, p. 12. 
9 The term franchisal is here preferred to feudal as being more appropriate to the fifteenth century 
while still encompassing both barony and regality courts. The earliest baron court book which 
survives dates from the sixteenth century, The Court Book of the Barony of Carnwath, 1523-1542, ed. W. 
C. Dickinson (Edinburgh, 1937). This is also true of the earliest sheriff court book, The Sheriff Court 
Book of Fife, 1515-1522, ed. W. C. Dickinson (Edinburgh, 1928). 
10 C. Neville, Land, Law and People in Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 2010), pp. 24-30. 
11 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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actual and symbolic elevation they provided, hills were sometimes used as spaces for courts. 
In Annandale, for example, in 1456, an instrument of sasine was given by the king’s sergeant 
to the brother of the laird of Johnston ‘at the hill of Hutoune’, while the Lords of the Isles are 
known to have convened their courts and councils on Eilean na Comhairle [Council Isle], 
part of their stronghold at Finlaggan.12 Likewise, the touching of the ‘holy evangels’ in front 
of witnesses during the swearing of an oath remained a central practice in many Scottish 
courtrooms throughout the medieval period.13 However inspiring or expected each act may 
have been, these performances were carefully staged in order to assert and legitimise 
authority, and to ensure that the events which transpired within the court became common 
knowledge. This was particularly important in matters relating to landholding. The public 
ceremony by which the witnesses heard the donor utter the words of the grant and saw him 
make the transfer by symbolic object remained an integral part of the exchange, even as 
written documents became an increasingly important part of the legal landscape.14  
Central to the functioning of all medieval justice was the obligation of those who held land 
within the court’s jurisdiction to perform suit of court.15 Suitors were expected to attend the 
three head courts each year and were responsible for returning the verdict of the court.16 
Once a court was called it was formally ‘fenced’, marking ‘its bounds and the limits of its 
peace’.17 In fencing the sheriff court the suits were announced formally from a roll. As each 
suitor was called he answered and entered the court to take up his place.18 In the barony 
court a similar system was in operation.19 After the preliminary statements had been heard 
and the oaths of the witnesses sworn before the whole court, the jury would hear the 
evidence and make their decision.20 Once the matter had been decided the dempster 
                                                          
12 NRS GD150/121; J. Munro and R. W. Munro (eds), Acts of the Lords of the Isles, 1336-1493 
(Edinburgh, 1986), p. xlix. 
13 Neville, Land, Law and People, pp. 26-8; Regiam majestatem, p. 78. 
14 M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307 (3rd edition) (Oxford, 2013), pp. 
254-56. For an example in St Andrews in 1434 see Copiale Sancti Andree: The Letter-Book of James 
Haldenstone, Prior of St Andrews (1418-1443), ed. J. H. Baxter (London, 1930), no. 62.  
15 J. W. Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, in R. Zimmermann and K. Reid (eds), A History of Private Law 
in Scotland (Oxford, 2000), pp. 14-184, at p. 25; I. D. Willock, The Origins and Development of the Jury in 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1966), pp. 75-76 and pp. 89-90. For examples of this stipulation see Fraser, 
Buccleuch, ii, pp. 30, 44, 48; Fraser, Douglas, iii, pp. 76, 86, 104. 
16 Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, p. 26. 
17 Ibid., p. 26. See P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, ‘Fencing the Court’, SHR, 21 (1923), pp. 54-62, at p. 55, nn. 5-
10 and p. 56, nn. 1-4 for a list of examples for courts of various jurisdictions. 
18 Sheriff Ct Bk., lxxxv and Appendix I, p. 406. 
19 Carnwath Ct Bk, lxxxv, for example p. 3, ‘sectis vocatis curia firmata absentes patent per rotulum’. 
20 Ibid., xcii, for example pp. 69-70, ‘of the quhilk deliverance the bailye gart gyf dome in dew fourme 
as efferit’. 
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publicly announced the judgement, or doom.21 In 1413, for example, it is recorded by the 
assizers in the court of the earl of Lennox that they ‘saw and harde that D. J. a soytture of the 
foirsaid courte, with the counsel and assent of all the soytouris of it gafe for dome, that…’.22 
The justice ayre was an equally public occasion. MacQueen notes the extensive amount of 
preparation which would have been necessary to host the ayre in each sheriffdom it 
visited.23 The ayre was proclaimed forty days in advance to allow for the summoning of the 
suitors and litigants.24 The justiciar moved around the kingdom with ‘pomp and display’, 
and a sizeable retinue, many of whom had official functions to perform in relation to the 
ayre. It could therefore be an ‘impressive display of the king’s power and authority in the 
localities’.25 Borthwick and MacQueen have collated  three notarial instruments which 
record the outcomes of cases heard in the court of the justiciar, in 1430, 1455 and 1465.26 They 
provide a very helpful insight into court procedure and the authors note that there seems to 
have existed a distinction between ‘the court, as the judge of the law and the assize as the 
judge of the facts’, presumably because the facts would have had to have been judged by 
local men who knew the people involved in the disputes.27 The importance of local 
knowledge is reinforced by the second case, which had proven difficult to resolve because 
the assizers were unaware that one of the litigants had been granted papal legitimation 
thirty years before.28 
The generation of common knowledge through reputation was also essential to the 
workings of the courts. Regiam majestatem states that 
Any person who…perjures himself upon the Evangel or any sacred emblem, so as to 
condemn an innocent man through fear or favour, shall be excluded from the comfort 
and society of all Christian men…Thereafter he shall never be allowed to give 
evidence or to swear an oath, and shall be deemed unworthy of credit.29 
                                                          
21 Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, p. 25. Quoniam attachiamenta, p. 322, states ‘What persons may give 
Doom’ in the sheriff court. The actual words of a doom against James Douglas, earl of Angus for 
rebellion, given in parliament by David Dempster, are recorded in RPS 1445/8. 
22 P. J. Hamilton-Grierson (ed.), Habakkuk Bisset’s Rolment of Courtis (3 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1920-26), i, p. 
314-15. 
23 MacQueen, Common Law, p. 63. 
24 For example TA, i, pp. 173, 182; MacQueen, Common Law, p. 63, n. 210. 
25 MacQueen, Common Law, pp. 63-4. On the circuit of the justice ayres in the 1490s, see Armstrong, 
‘Justice Ayre’, pp. 7-8. 
26 A. R. Borthwick and H. L. MacQueen, ‘Three Fifteenth-Century Cases’, Juridical Review (1986), pp. 
123-51. 
27 Ibid., pp. 148-49. 
28 Ibid., p. 133. 
29 Regiam majestatem, p. 273. 
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The link between oath-taking and honour is well understood, but it is worth underlining 
that the oath was taken publicly, in front of the court, so that everyone knew what an 
individual had promised, and could hold him to his oath if necessary.30 As with the guilds, 
discussed in the previous chapter, expulsion from the group was the worst punishment 
which could be meted out; the group in this case being those who were trustworthy enough 
to influence local affairs by sitting upon juries. Walter Bower notes that ‘very many people 
both when serving on juries and when bearing witness take little or no care over making 
their oaths void…[E]very perjurer is a traitor by his disloyalty as far as God is concerned, 
causes harm by his deceit as regards his neighbour, and is destructive by his wickedness as 
regards himself.’31 While undoubtedly not always effective, therefore, the oath was 
performing an important function, acting to limit the extent to which people would pursue 
their own interests at the expense of others. The penalty for oath-breaking was social 
exclusion through the withdrawal of ‘credit’, or good reputation.  
In both franchisal courts and crown courts members of the jury were drawn from the 
suitors.  Juries were in use by the thirteenth century, although the earliest court books which 
survive date from the sixteenth century.32 The members of the sheriff’s court juries were 
‘representative local men’, who almost certainly would have had some particular knowledge 
of the facts of the case.33 In civil cases the jury was chosen by the sheriff acting in 
consultation with the parties concerned, and was likely to be composed of ‘near kinsmen, 
friends and neighbours’.34 These men were required to swear to their knowledge of the truth 
of the matter, or step down from the jury, although partiality or nearness of kin could be 
grounds for exception.35 Regiam majestatem provides plentiful evidence of the importance of 
reputation to the workings of local justice: 
Each of the jurors should take an oath that in relation to the matter remitted to them 
they will not knowingly conceal the truth nor declare that which is false…it is 
necessary that they should be acquainted with the matter either from what they have 
personally seen or heard, or from the declarations of their fathers, or from other 
sources as much entitled to credit as if falling within their own personal knowledge.36 
                                                          
30 On the role of oaths in peacemaking more broadly, see J. Bentham, Peacemaking in the Middle Ages 
(Manchester, 2011), pp. 145-55. 
31 Chron. Bower, iii, p. 383. 
32 MacQueen, Common Law, p. 50. Sheriff Ct Bk; Carnwath Ct Bk. 
33 Sheriff Ct Bk, p. lxxxviii. P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, ‘The Suitors of the Sheriff Court’, SHR, 14 (1916), 
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34 Sheriff Ct Bk, p. xci. 
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36 Regiam majestatem, p. 79. 
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Every baron may purge his lands of malefactors and men of evil fame thrice annually 
by an assise of faithful men.37 
Where a person…avers his loss is inestimable and claims a larger sum than is due by 
law…the defender need not answer to any such inflated claim, but the loss sustained 
by the claimant by the death of his relative shall be assessed at a reasonable sum by 
trustworthy men of the court…38 
If any man has made it known that his money has been stolen from him, then finds it 
in some township…he may not at his own hand recover it, but must deposit it in the 
custody of honest men…39 
Parallels with the evidence from the burghs are clear. The entire system hinged upon being 
able to rely upon men of good local standing to carry out important duties, and to have 
reliable testimony either from witnesses to the crime or from those who could speak to the 
characters of the parties involved. Armstrong also notes that during the justice ayre 
accusations could be levelled ‘for commone’ – as in common theft – which he characterises 
as ‘a general accusation which must have depended upon fame and reputation, appealing to 
communal sentiment against persistent wrongdoers who threatened “public” order or the 
common good.’40 Such crimes could carry the death penalty, although mercy was common.41  
The centrality of common knowledge both to crown courts and to franchisal courts raises 
questions as to the utility of the usual designation of royal authority as public and 
aristocratic authority as private. The public/private division, while long established, was 
underlined by Wormald in her pivotal article ‘Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government in Early 
Modern Scotland’, in which she argued that royal justice, or formal litigation in court, and 
kin justice, or arbitration and the resultant compensation, were not in conflict, as had 
previously been assumed, but interacted in a number of important ways.42 She stated 
explicitly that she intended to use the phrase ‘private justice’ to refer to the justice of the 
feud.43 This was in keeping with Wormald’s analysis of greater co-operation between crown 
and nobility but the term ‘private’ has since been adopted to mean the justice, and by 
implication authority, of the aristocracy in general terms. This has led to several recent 
                                                          
37 Regiam majestatem, p. 336. 
38 Ibid., p. 364. 
39 Ibid., p. 284-85. 
40 Armstrong, ‘Justice Ayre’, p. 11. 
41 Ibid., p. 29. 
42 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, pp. 54-97. 
43 Ibid., p. 57, n. 13. 
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analyses which stress the interaction between public and private justice.44 The apparent 
readiness of the two to co-exist can, in part, be attributed to the characteristics ascribed, 
consciously or otherwise, to each term. Public authority is royal authority.45 Justiciars, 
sheriffs and other crown officers are considered to exercise public authority but lords are 
not, unless they also hold office directly of the crown.46 Public authority is also formal.47 It is 
connected to parliamentary statute and to a royal court of appeal whether this is parliament 
or the king’s council.48 This authority has the capacity to centralise, even if this process was 
not always straightforward, and this articulates with an increasing ‘professionalisation’ of 
the law.49 Public justice is carried out in the courts of the officers to whom royal authority is 
delegated,50 and closely interacts with contemporary notions of ideal kingship.51 Private 
authority, in contrast, is aristocratic.52 It is exercised by a lord within his lordship. Standing 
in opposition to public authority, and to the embryonic legal profession, it is informal, local 
and even ‘amateur’.53 It is related to customary practices and structures of kinship, whether 
these are authentic or simulated by bonding, and relies heavily upon the aptitude of the lord 
for negotiating personal relationships, honour codes and the dynamics of feud for its 
efficacy.54 Private justice is concerned with matters outwith the jurisdiction of the crown, of 
which local political considerations and alliances are likely to be integral components.55  
These sketches are, of course, overly simplistic. Nevertheless, they do help to highlight the 
conceptual confusion which renders the categories public and private so problematic for the 
                                                          
44 In particular A. M. Godfrey, ‘Rethinking the Justice of the Feud in Sixteenth-Century Scotland’, in 
Boardman and Goodare (eds), Kings, Lords and Men, pp. 136-54, which raises several questions which 
have informed the following arguments, but see also A. Grant, ‘Murder Will Out: Kingship, Kinship 
and Killing in Medieval Scotland’, in Boardman and Goodare (eds), Kings, Lords and Men, pp. 193-226 
and M. Brown, ‘The Lanark Bond’, in Boardman and Goodare (eds), Kings, Lords and Men, pp. 227-45, 
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and slippery’ to be of use to medieval historians. ‘The Historiography of the Medieval State’, in M. 
Bentley (ed.), Companion to Historiography (London, 1997), pp. 117-38, at p. 125. 
45 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, passim. 
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47 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, p. 91. 
48 Godfrey, Civil Justice, pp. 7-93. 
49 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, p. 91; pp. 95-6; Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, pp. 23-25; J. Finlay, 
Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland (East Linton, 2000); R. Mason, ‘Laicisation and the Law: The 
Reception of Humanism in Early Renaissance Scotland’, in L. A. J. R. Houwen, A. A. MacDonald and 
S. L. Mapstone (eds), A Palace in the Wild: Essays on Vernacular Culture and Humanism in Late-Medieval 
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50 P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, ‘Falsing the Doom’, SHR, 24 (1926), pp. 1-18.  
51 Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, pp. 56, 97. 
52 A. Grant, ‘Franchises’, p. 157; Brown, ‘Lanark Bond’, passim. 
53 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, pp. 87,  91; Court, Kirk and Community, p. 24. 
54 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, pp. 71-72, 75.  
55 Boardman, ‘Politics and the Feud’, pp. 92-97. 
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analysis of political authority in the medieval period; many lords would have been involved 
in both sets of activities.56 Separating public and private authority requires that a lord 
exercise one variety when he holds a sheriff court and another when he holds a baron court, 
when in fact one of the most striking features of local justice as outlined above is the 
similarity of processes and procedures between jurisdictions. Both the civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of free barony closely paralleled that of the sheriff.57 The much more 
comprehensive jurisdiction of free regality additionally covered the pleas of the crown: 
murder, rape, arson and robbery, providing a jurisdiction parallel to that of the justiciar. The 
crown provided the hierarchy of courts of appeal from all franchisal courts, so that all 
dooms could eventually be falsed to parliament.58 Furthermore the process on brieves, by 
which many matters relating to freehold were obliged to be raised, ensured the crown’s 
involvement in a dispute from the beginning, even as the matter was heard in the barony 
court.59 Crown judges were drawn from the ranks of the upper nobility, and so held 
franchisal jurisdictions in their own right. The earl of Crawford, for example, was sheriff of 
Forfar between 1466 and 1488, a jurisdiction which encompassed several baronies which he 
himself held, such as Clova, Finavon and Inverarity.60 Grant characterises the authority of 
franchisal courts as ‘the private exercise of public power’, while MacQueen also argues that 
the ‘antithesis’ between royal and franchisal justice has been overdrawn for Scotland, as the 
‘private courts’ of magnates were instrumental in the maintenance of good governance.61 
It may still be argued that the authority a lord exercised over feuding parties was something 
qualitatively different to that which he exercised during a sitting of his franchisal court. If 
this is assumed it makes the designation of both as ‘private’ more problematic, rather than 
less. The distinction was not one which was made in the fifteenth century. That the concept 
of public authority existed is suggested by the scattered references to res publica, which are 
occasionally contrasted with regnum.62 The former tends to be translated as ‘state’, which is 
not without its own attendant difficulties in this period, or as ‘public good’, as the context 
                                                          
56 For a study of exactly this phenomenon in the sixteenth century see A. Groundwater, ‘“We Bund 
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57 MacQueen, Common Law, p. 57. 
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demands.63 When royal authority is discussed in the vernacular, however, whether in 
literature or in records of government, it is styled as the ‘croun’, the ‘dignitee riale’ or simply 
as ‘majeste’, without explicit reference to a public element. As discussed in the first chapter 
the word ‘public’ described actions or spaces rather than people or authority, and this did 
not begin to change until the very end of the period under discussion. There are some 
instances of the adjective ‘privat’, but they are very rare. Like ‘public’, its use appears to 
increase from c. 1490 onwards, becoming more common in the sixteenth century.64  
While there is no question, therefore, that the authority of a king was different to that of a 
lord, it is suggested that the difference was one of degree, rather than type. Use of the term 
‘private’ to describe aristocratic authority elides two quite separate senses of the word which 
would have been covered by different concepts in the fifteenth century. The first of these is 
‘private’ as in ‘personal’. Personal relationships were the basis of medieval politics, and 
scholars have used ‘private’ in this sense quite freely, to encompass discussion of kinship 
ties, bonding, marriage contracts and a host of other activities central to lordship which took 
place outwith the purview of the crown. Contemporaries, however, thought in terms of 
‘allegeance’, ‘manrent’, ‘friendschip’, ‘luf’, ‘kindnes’ or, if an adjective is required, a 
‘speciale’ relationship.65 The second sense is perhaps the more straightforward, that of 
actions done ‘in private’. Such actions were most often identified by the adjective ‘secret’, 
which was a far broader term in the fifteenth century than now. It encompassed not only the 
familiar sense of the clandestine but also acted as an antonym to ‘opin’.66 It could even pass 
into a sense of being confidential, hence, from the later fourteenth century, the office of 
Royal Secretary.67 Furthermore, these two quite separate senses – the personal and the secret 
- each combine very easily with ideas of self-interest, complicating the matter still further. 
Items explicitly connected to self-interest were described as ‘particular’, ‘singular’ or 
‘parciale’ during this period, rather than private, so although in any given situation these 
                                                          
63 For a lively introduction to this debate see R. R. Davies, ‘The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a 
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Medieval England (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 243-67. 
64 DSL, privat, adj. 
65 DSL, special, adj. Wormald discusses many of these concepts in Lords and Men. 
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different aspects of privacy may have been interacting in important ways and to varying 
degrees, this cannot be adequately assessed or described by using a single term for all three 
circumstances. In particular, leaving ‘personal’ and ‘secret’ intertwined within the 
description ‘private’ means that both are placed in opposition to ‘public’ which, if the latter 
is taken to mean ‘royal’, results in two assumptions which require to be considered much 
more closely: that there was no public dimension to the exercise of aristocratic authority, 
and that the king was unable to act both ‘privately’ and legitimately at the same time. 
As has been shown, the first of these assumptions is demonstrably false; the public domain 
was as essential to the justice of franchisal courts as it was to royal justice. The second 
assumption has fairly significant implications for the current political narrative. While a king 
was certainly supposed to work towards the common profit rather than his own, singular 
profit, personal motivations were a standard, and assumed, component of all political 
behaviour. The commonplaces of advice literature which advocated moulding the king’s 
character towards virtue remained relevant precisely because the king was fully entitled to 
act upon his personal inclinations.68 In practice, of course, this was not always possible in 
fifteenth-century Scotland.69 While the myth of the overmighty magnate may have been well 
and truly laid to rest, the ultimate fate of both James I and James III demonstrated that 
Scottish monarchs could rely upon theories of kingship only so far before political 
expediency, rather abruptly, took over.70 Nevertheless, Scottish politics were certainly not 
devoid of political principle. If it is accepted, following the advice writers, that the purpose 
of a fifteenth-century king was to ensure ‘justice, peace and policy’ in the realm, and yet 
personal political motivations are placed in opposition to public authority because they are 
‘private’ and therefore self-interested, the paradox is instantly created that a king’s political 
objectives could not possibly have aligned with a desire to improve his kingdom.71 The 
advice offered to him on this subject by the mirrors for princes is therefore bound to appear 
conventional and derivative, because it cannot be taken to have any real resonance if the 
                                                          
68 Watts, Henry VI, p. 17. On the balance between the will of the king and his need to be accountable 
as expressed in Hay see Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, p. 132. 
69 Brown, ‘Scotland Tamed?’, pp. 128-33.  
70 Mason, ‘Kingship, Tyranny and the Right to Resist’, p. 10. 
71 For example Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, p. 79, which states that the kings of late medieval Scotland 
were not ‘lofty and high-minded creatures thinking of ideals’ but instead ‘used justice for their own 
ends’. 
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person receiving the advice is assumed always to be motivated by his ‘private’ interests.72 To 
set the monarch in opposition to the realm in this way would have been wholly alien to 
contemporary political thought.73 While the extant evidence does not suggest a great 
preoccupation in late medieval Scotland with constitutional theory it is perhaps going too 
far to suggest that such considerations did not apply at all; the concern with both the 
Stewart lineage and the Scottish origin myths evidenced in the chronicles would suggest 
precisely the opposite.74 Designating the personal relationships between individual lords as 
‘private’ also removes the need to assign to them any higher motives, because their 
authority is not conceived of as ‘public authority’.75 It is argued here, therefore, that ‘public’ 
and ‘secret’ usually described modes of action through which authority could be exercised; 
that lords, just as much as kings, were obliged to exercise their authority publicly, and that 
secrecy, far from having negative connotations, was essential in structuring one of the most 
important components of both royal and aristocratic governance: the taking of counsel. 
None of these assertions is incompatible with the idea that political authority in the fifteenth 
century was exercised primarily through the cultivation of a strong network of personal 
relationships, and it is here suggested that this was just as important, and legitimate, a modus 
operandi for a king as for a lord.76  
 
Common Knowledge and the Justice of the Feud 
It is the justice of the feud, or dispute resolution through arbitration, which Wormald 
originally classed as ‘private’, in order to show the complex ways in which it both drew 
upon and fed into royal, or public, justice. In adopting this terminology she was following 
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accepted practice, and wished to argue against the clear demarcation between government 
and kindred which had characterised previous work.77 Yet the acceptance of public and 
private as categories to describe the authority of royal government and of the kindred 
respectively has entrenched the belief that these were essentially different types of authority 
which happened to share certain important attributes or applications, and which could be 
adopted interchangeably in particular circumstances as the need arose. According to 
Wormald, bonds of manrent were used ‘quite explicitly’ as the most effective way of adding 
to a lord’s kin group, thereby imposing kinship obligations upon those who were not related 
by blood.78 Although the social function of this kin group was mutual help and support, it 
was not a cohesive entity whose members acted on ‘theoretical obligations’.79 Instead, 
bonding was the way in which a lord could gain a more effective hold over men who were 
not otherwise within his sphere of influence.80 He might have kin, friends, tenants, or 
members of his household amongst his adherents; bonding was the means by which other 
men of lesser rank entered into a personal relationship with him, becoming a part of his 
affinity. As these relationships often overlapped with ties of marriage and kinship, the 
dividing lines between kin, friends and men was often blurred.81 Wormald therefore 
highlights the prominence of the language of kinship within bonds. Although the inclusion 
of explicit references to each kin group, rather than simply the individual men in question, is 
not common in the fifteenth century it becomes so in the sixteenth, and Wormald argues that 
it is likely that the earlier bonds do not reflect the situation as it was, attributing the omission 
to ‘a tendency in this period not to spell out the obvious.’82  
From the examination of fifty-eight fifteenth-century bonds, it is clear that the language of 
kinship is far more likely to be found within what Wormald terms ‘contracts and bonds of 
friendship’, which tend to be made between men of similar rank.83 In 1466, for example, the 
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earl of Erroll made a bond with George Lord Gordon, son of the earl of Huntly, in which he 
promised to be ‘for hym and with hym, his kynne, friendis ande ther querallis in consale, 
help, supple, mantenans ande defens…in the strattast fourme of bande of kyndnas’.84 In 
1467, a bond between William lord Forbes, Alexander Forbes of Pitsligo, Alexander Forbes 
of Tolquhon, Arthur of Forbes and John Forbes of Brachouse ‘on a pairt’ and Duncan 
Mackintosh, captain of Clanchattan, Huchon Rose of Kilravock, and Duncan’s brothers Alan 
and Lauchlan ‘on the tother pairt’, bound the men ‘baith for thairselffis and all and sundrie 
thair kine, men, pairtie and inheritouris that wil inherit to thaim, to keip hartly friendschipe, 
kinrente, lufe and kindness.’85 In a particularly strong formulation, an indenture between 
William Thane of Cawdor and Huchon Rose of Kilravock, from 1476, records that Rose  
is becummyn sone for all the days of his lyff to the said Wilyame Thayne of Caldor 
and takyn hyme as fadir, ande the saide Wilyame…ys becummyn to hym as luffyt 
fadir and takyn hym as sone and ilk ane of thaim sal help, supple, and defend utheris 
in all actionez, causis, ande querelis as sone aucht to do to fadyr and fadir to sone…86 
If it is the case that these bonds make explicit that which the contemporary bonds of 
manrent left unsaid, it is clear that the ideal of kinship was extremely important indeed in 
reinforcing the personal relationships through which political authority was mediated.  
This language has clear parallels with the discourse of fraternity which, as discussed in 
chapter two, characterised the political relationship of guild members to their corporation.87 
Admission to the brotherhood of the guild was only possible after the swearing of an oath, 
in front of the other members, and payment of the fee.88 An example of ‘the entire oath of a 
burgess and a brother of the guild’ survives from the reign of Robert I.89 The man had to 
swear 
That he will be leel and feel to our Lord the King, and to the community of that burgh 
in which he is made burgess. And that he will give to the King, faithfully, rent for the 
land which he defends. And that he will be obedient in things lawful to the provost 
and bailies. And that he will keep the secret counsel of the community. And if any 
thing to their prejudice shall come to his knowledge he will forewarn them or apply a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Misc., ii, pp. 251-60; Spalding Misc., iv, pp. 179-88; Spalding Misc., v, p. 288; Wormald, Lords and Men, p. 
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(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 66-67. 
88 For example Dunfermline Guild Bk, pp. 13, 22; Abdn Guild Recs, pp. 65, 72; Perth Guild Bk, pp. 10-11. 
89 Ancient Burgh Laws, i, pp. 127-28.  
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remedy if he can. And that as often as he shall be asked he shall give them faithful 
counsel and assistance in common matters to his power. And that he will maintain 
the liberties, laws and customs of the said burgh during his life according to his 
burgh. And the oath being made in this manner, he ought to kiss the provost and the 
brethren.90 
While there are important differences between this oath and the language of bonding, there 
are also some striking similarities. Wormald provides an example of a typical bond of 
manrent, that between George Turnbull of Bedrule and George earl of Angus in 1456, in 
which Turnbull bound himself 
lely and treuly to be with [Angus], serfe him & afald part tak with him at al my 
gudely power, bath in wer and pes in al his richtwys accionis causis and querelis for 
al the dais of my lyfe aganis & befor al thaim that lef may and de may, myne 
allegiance til our soverane lord the king alanerly outan [only excepted] & als oft as he 
askis me ony consel I sale gif him the best I can & gif he schewis me his consel I sale 
kep it & hed it as afferis at al tymis & nowyr her his skath nor se it bot lat it or warn 
him at my power, and thir thyngis forsaidis to do & fulfil I bynd me…91 
In each case loyalty, fidelity and obedience is sworn, the authority of the king is granted 
primacy, and explicit promises are made regarding both the giving and receiving of counsel, 
and the forewarning of ‘prejudice’ or ‘skath’. The most important difference is of course the 
individual nature of the oath given to a lord, versus the oath sworn to the community of the 
burgh or guild; these bonds were not multilateral and in no sense was a lord creating any 
sort of corporation by accepting bonds of manrent from lesser men. Nevertheless, the clear 
relationship of the customary practices in each case requires some further explanation. 
Boardman, in his doctoral thesis, offered a different interpretation of bonding to that 
suggested by Wormald.92 He demonstrated an important connection between the making of 
bonds and the settlement of particular disputes, and highlighted the role of bonds of 
friendship in that process.93 Boardman argued that these bonds ‘formalised and guaranteed’ 
the cessation of hostilities, secured the adherence of both parties to the settlement, and 
precluded further action by either.94 This can be seen for each of the bonds of friendship 
discussed above. The Forbes-Mackintosh bond includes a promise that neither party will 
‘cum na gang to mak herschyp slawchter or dystrowbelans one tother in ony tyme to cum’.95  
Whoever did these things was to be ‘haldin infamous, mansuorne, and renounce the fath of 
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Chryst, and nevir to be hard in prufe na witnes, na ly in kyrke na Cristin beris.’96 The Errol-
Huntly bond states that ‘giff ony contraversyis happynis betwixt the saide lordis, thar kynne 
or freindis thai sall be decidit and decernit be thre of thair weil set consaell on athir syde, 
deput and chosin therto’.97 Finally, the Cawdor-Rose bond records that Cawdor has 
‘remyttit and hartfullie forgevyn the rancour of his hart all sclauchteris harmez scathis ande 
injuris done to hyme his brethir, kyne, men ande party be the said Huchowne’ and that 
‘athir of the saide parties has takyn ande gevyn utherlie the kys of pece.’98 
Practices which parallel each of these examples can be found within the guild records. It has 
already been noted how important the connection of Christianity was to the craft guilds, 
ensuring that sanctions applied in both the commercial and religious spheres, reinforcing 
adherence to the rules of the guild from two directions. A similar process would appear to 
be at work in the first bond, between Forbes and Mackintosh, which includes the 
withholding of Christian burial as one of the penalties for breaking the bond. The other 
penalty is the threat of loss of reputation, and of the right to act as a witness or offer proof, 
again similar those we have seen in local courts, urban or otherwise. One of the Statuta Gilde 
stipulates that ‘giff ony of the brethir stryk ane uther with his nef [knife] he sall amend it 
with half a mark, and efter the will of the Alderman and the Den and the layff of the brether 
he sall mak asyth to the perty.’99 This conciliar approach to dispute resolution finds a 
parallel in the Errol-Huntly bond, above. The inclusion of the ‘kys of pece’ between Cawdor 
and Rose recalls the requirement, cited in the oath, that a new burgess kiss the provost and 
the brethren on being admitted into the brotherhood.  
Just as bonds drew upon the same customary language and practices as did guilds, so 
guilds, like bonds, had an important role in resolving conflict between members. As 
discussed above, the discourse of friendship found throughout the Dunfermline gild book is 
most prominent when brothers are being ‘put in friendship’ with one another, that is, when 
a dispute is being settled. As with the bonds above, the language of kinship acts to bring the 
parties together – even where the true feelings are less than brotherly – while the penalties 
were designed to prevent further discord. While applying the idea of the social dilemma and 
its attendant danger of ‘free riding’ to bonding practices may be rather unappealing, at root 
the mechanism is arguably the same as that which allowed the guilds to function so 
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effectively. It amounts to a commonly-known set of principles by which everyone agrees to 
abide, in order to prevent individuals from profiting by taking independent action, in this 
case in the form of violence. Such a model goes some way to bridging the gap between 
Wormald’s analysis which stressed peace in the feud and that of Boardman, which stressed 
competition.100 The more likely ‘free riding’ was to occur, whether this took the form of 
proscribed economic activity or of unilateral acts of violence, the more important it was to 
ensure that the language and practices which structured relations between group members 
acted to promote consensus and harmony.  
It follows that, on certain occasions at least, bonding could be used to further joint aims, 
rather than simply acting to restrain violence, just as guilds did not simply settle disputes 
between members. In 1470, for example, Archibald, fifth earl of Angus made an indenture 
with George Hume of Wedderburn and his brother Patrick for the express purpose of 
assisting Patrick Hume in a legal dispute in which he was engaged with William Sinclair of 
Herdmanstone.101 The dispute was over the lands of Kimmerghame, which John Sinclair had 
given to his surviving son William, in 1463, after the death of his eldest son, also John. 
Despite this, an inquest held in the sheriff court in 1467 found that Marion Sinclair, daughter 
of John Sinclair junior, was the lawful heir of half the lands.102 Marion was Patrick Hume’s 
wife, and her sister Margaret was married to George Hume, and Boardman argues that the 
women, backed by their husbands, were attempting to ignore or invalidate the wishes of 
their grandfather by arguing that the lands should come to them as joint heiresses.103 The 
indenture states that Angus promised to ‘help, supple, maneteine and defende, at all his 
gudely power, the saidis George and Patrik, in the brouking and pesable joising of the landis 
of Kymbirgeame’ giving detailed specifics of the manner of assistance that Angus would 
offer, and in return the Humes would ‘giff, content and pay to the said lorde erle the soume 
of ane hundredth markis of usuale mone of Scotland’.104 This was reinforced by the 
statement that the Humes  
lelely becummys men to the said Archibald erle of Angus, for all the dais of thair 
liffis, to be with him in all his actiouns, causis and querrellis, movit or to be movit 
before and aganis all thaim that liff or de may, thair allegiance till our souverane Lord 
the King alanerly outtane, of the quhilkis thai sall gif thair lettris of manrent in the 
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best wys, and the said lord erle giffand agane to thaim his lettris of maneteinance in 
the best forme…105  
Angus and the Humes appear to have been using the particular circumstances of the legal 
dispute to form an alliance of sorts, which included both the payment of a fee for legal 
assistance and the exchange of manrent and maintenance. This alliance was to have 
important implications, discussed further below. 
To what extent, then, can such practices be considered private? Bonding was not informal. If 
anything, it constituted the formalisation of personal agreements which would otherwise 
have been verbal.106 Wormald discusses the scant evidence there is for the bonding 
ceremony itself, noting that both parties were present, that they swore their oaths upon the 
‘holy evangels’ and that they did so in the presence of witnesses, just as happened in a 
court.107 Bonds could be produced as evidence in a crown court to prevent claims being 
pursued there in defiance of the decision reached at arbitration.108 They thus provided 
‘documentary proof’ that an agreement had been reached and the matter was settled.109 In 
1492, for example, the feud between John, lord Drummond and Laurence, lord Oliphant, Sir 
William Murray of Tullibardine and John Haldane of Gleneagles was arbitrated by William 
Elphinstone, bishop of Aberdeen, Colin Campbell, earl of Argyll and Chancellor, and Robert 
lord Lyle, the justiciar, during the justice ayre.110 As part of the settlement, the arbiters 
stipulated that neither party should ‘persew nor follow utheris civily or crimnally in tyme to 
cum for ony manner of accionis…movit betwixt thaim’.111 A further example can be found 
from 1491, when a feud between the Lennox and Sempill families was brought to a 
conclusion at the justice ayre.112 Given that each bond of manrent also begins with the 
phrase ‘Be it kend til all men’, it is very difficult not to regard the practice as having a public 
dimension.113 This is perhaps best demonstrated by a bond made between John, Lord 
Maxwell and Cuthbert Murray of Cockpool, in 1486, in which it was specified that in order 
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to make amends for the ‘handlyng of lord Maxwellis persone and slauchter of his eme 
[uncle]’, Murray and his party had to present themselves at the Market Cross of Edinburgh 
or Dumfries ‘or quhat uther place at plessis the said Lord best’ and ‘in thair lynyng clathis, 
in the maist lawly wis thai can…ask the said lord, his kin and frendis forgivenes of the 
rancor of thair hertis’.114 Part of the compensation required by lord Maxwell in order to 
resolve the matter was a public display of contrition very similar to those performed by 
offenders in Aberdeen.115 In fact, as Wormald argues, the act of publicising the agreements 
which resulted from arbitration was an essential part of the process.116 Again, justice had to 
be seen to be done, and if it was important that the men involved understood that hostilities 
had ceased, then it was also true that those who lived locally had to be informed about the 
peace in order for it to remain effective.117 Crown courts, franchisal courts and the parties 
involved in personal arbitration all shared an imperative to publicise the results of justice, 
whatever form that justice took. As Godfrey argues, it was in fact the methods of conflict 
resolution – litigation versus arbitration - which were qualitatively different, rather than the 
justice itself or the nature of the political authority which underpinned it, and the parties 
involved, no doubt with a great degree of guidance from the lord to whom they took their 
grievance, could choose how best to resolve a dispute in any given circumstance.118 Jackson 
Armstrong has argued that this form of arbitration was very effective in promoting peace 
through compromise, by ‘building new, positive relationships, transforming the structures 
which generated conflict’ and limiting the desire for revenge, and the language of kinship 
was well-placed to facilitate such ends.119 While it was certainly a very different method of 
dispute resolution to litigation pursued in the courts, therefore, the similarity of personnel 
and practices, the common need for publicity and the interaction between litigation and 
arbitration within a given case all argue against classifying arbitration as somehow being in 
opposition to authority as exercised in the courts. As Grant concludes, there was ‘no 
dichotomy’ between the justice of the feud and that of the ‘state’.120  
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Although a lord may have exercised very extensive judicial powers, therefore, this authority 
was never fully independent of the crown.121 While in practice the king doubtless often had 
no choice but to grant franchisal jurisdictions, and indeed recognise pre-existing ones, 
nevertheless they were always theoretically subject to ‘royal correction and control’.122 
Indeed Grant has described the regality as a ‘private-public partnership’.123 It is perhaps 
better to characterise such jurisdictions as personal, having been granted by the king to each 
man individually, to exercise freely within the law. As Brown has demonstrated, the 
Douglas propaganda of the 1440s, in particular Richard Holland’s Buke of the Howlat, chose 
to highlight the fact that many of that family’s lands were originally won in war, but they 
were still, technically, held of the king.124 Indeed these competing narratives likely did 
nothing to alleviate the tensions which would later arise between the eighth earl and James 
II. None of this is to argue for the political authority of the nobility as being in any way 
diminished, simply that it was not of a type which can readily be set in opposition to that of 
the king. As Gilbert Hay argued in the Buke of the Ordre of Knychthede: 
as kingis and princis has dominacioun and seignoury here upon al knychtis – sa suld 
knychtis have dominacioun and seignourye subordinate of the princis and lordis 
behalve, be semblance of syk like figure apon the small peple to governe reugle and 
defend thame in all thair necessities…125 
 
Kingship, Lordship and Counsel  
If political authority had to be exercised publicly it was equally important that it was 
exercised personally, and this was as true of royal as aristocratic authority. It was for this 
reason that counsel had such a central place in the political culture of this period. Because 
the king was able to direct policy according to his personal wishes his advisers had both a 
duty and a right to ensure that this was done for the good of the realm.126 Clearly, this was a 
far more complex process in practice than in theory; the prevailing political circumstances, 
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the conventions attached to the giving of advice and the forum in which it was offered, the 
different objectives of the king and of his advisers, and the personalities of those involved 
must all have had a bearing upon the outcome of any particular act of counsel.127 These 
variables are extremely difficult to investigate for a variety of reasons, not least the fact that 
counsel given personally was often secret counsel, of which no records were kept. This 
element of secrecy stands in sharp contradistinction to the publicness which characterised 
the exercise of political authority in almost all other contexts.128 It is therefore very difficult 
to ascertain the extent to which such advice was offered in an institutional setting, or as part 
of a less ‘formal’ discourse of counsel. It is possible that such a distinction may have been 
lost on contemporaries when it came to advising an autonomous, adult king.129 
Giving and receiving counsel was not only essential for the smooth running of a kingdom; 
lords were also required to listen to the counsel of their men.130 The stipulations regarding 
counsel within bonds of manrent were very common during the fifteenth century, even if no 
standard format existed for their expression.131 In 1477 William Scheves, then co-adjutor of 
St Andrews, promised to give to William, earl of Erroll ‘the best counsale we can quhen he 
askis at us And concele the counsal that he schewes to us And revele it to na person with 
oute his awin avise’.132 In the same year Hugh of Douglas swore to the Lord of Morton that 
‘I sal gyf hym and his ayris the best counsale I cane and heile [hide] thair counsale gyf thai 
ony schaw me’, while in 1489 Alexander Cummings gave his bond to the Master of Huntly, 
and agreed that ‘I sall gif him best and trewast counsale I can, gif it be requirit therewitht, 
and gif he schawis me ony of his counsale I sall keip it secret’.133 A clear parallel to all of 
these oaths can be found in those sworn to James II by the prelates and barons at the 1445 
parliament, suggesting that counsel had a similar function whether oaths were sworn to a 
king or to a lord.134 Each required reliable sources of information in order to make sound 
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decisions and judgements, and each had to be able to share plans with his men individually, 
without the plans becoming common knowledge. In parliament, where it was possible that 
the interests of individual lords were not always in alignment with those of the king, such 
an oath was especially important; the act of receiving counsel provided a means by which 
the king could effectively bind men to his own interests, in theory at least. 
Whereas the king’s great council, parliament, has left plentiful records, evidence that 
magnates convened similar councils is very patchy. The Lords of the Isles are perhaps the 
exception to this. There exist charters, issued at Dingwall castle between 1463 and 1467 by 
John MacDonald as earl of Ross, which explicitly state that the grants were made ‘with the 
consent and assent and mature deliberation of our whole council’.135 The degree of 
institutional formality which characterised these meetings must remain unknown, but the 
references are suggestive of a body of men which regularly gave advice to the MacDonald 
lords. A few further references to aristocratic councils survive. The Register of the Great Seal 
provides evidence of the councils of Alexander, lord Gordon, from 1440, Archibald, earl of 
Moray, from 1447 and David, earl of Crawford, from 1471.136 A notarial instrument, from 
1446, records a dispute which was settled by William Hay, the constable of Scotland, and his 
council, while another, from 1403, records the settling of a dispute by lord William Keith, 
marischal, and his council.137 In both instances the instruments were drawn up by Imperial 
notaries. 
Two further examples form part of the documentation created by the claims of Robert, lord 
Erskine to the earldom of Mar during the minority of James II.138 One is an ‘appoyntement’ 
between Erskine, calling himself lord of Mar, and the lord of Forbes and his sons, from 1439, 
and states that Forbes agreed to submit himself ‘to my Lorde of Mar forsayde ande to his 
consale upon al unkindnes wrangkis ande iniurris don be him or his sonnys’ and that 
Erskine shall ‘refowrme at the sycht of the sayde consale of al unkendnes wrangkis ande 
iniurris don be thame to the sayde Lorde of Forbes or his sonys forsayde’.139 Eight men are 
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then named as counsellors, before the stipulation is made that men of the Forbes party will 
be added to Erskine’s council once the indenture has been fulfilled.140 The second document 
is an indenture between Erskine and James II, from 1440.141 It states that 
it is accordit be way of amiable composicioun betuex oure Sovereyne Lord the King 
and his counsaile underwrittin on the taapart, and ane noble lord Schir Robert lord of 
Erskyne with deliverance of his counsaile on the tothire part, in maner and fourme as 
eftir folowis, that is to say that for the gude and the quiete of the land oure forsaid 
Sovereyne Lord will, withe avice of his said counsaile, gerre deliver the castel of 
Kildrummy [in the earldom of Mar] to the said Lord of Erskyne…to be kepit…to the 
Kingis behuve and age and than to be deliverit to the King but [without]obstacle…142  
In return Erskine was to surrender the castle of Dumbarton to the crown.143 Although 
magnate councils could serve different functions to their royal counterparts, therefore, it is 
clear that a conciliar approach to governance and justice could structure and enhance the 
authority both of the king and of his greatest subjects.  
While the advice writers, without exception, emphasise the importance of wise counsel and 
urge the king to heed it, only Gilbert Hay offers any practical advice on how this ought to be 
done: 
ever halde in thy hert thy secret thingis that thou thinkis to do and schwa it never to 
nane of thame [the counsellors], na lete nocht that thou wald ask counsale at thame, 
na lat thame never have a fele in quham thou fyes [trust] the maist, na quhais 
counsaile of thame thou wald erest [first] traist in and follow to do, for and thou do 
that the lave [rest] sall pris the the lesse.144 
ask thair opyniouns and here gladly ilkane of thame be thame self severaly and trete 
in to thy hert and cast all thair counsailis ilkane till other in thy mynde and wey 
thame as thou thinkis the cause requeris with thair jugementis and opyniouns. And 
syne ches be thyne awn wit the best or at the leste the lykliest for thy prouffit and the 
common prouffit of the realme.145  
quhen thou askis at thy counsailouris thair opyniouns it is loving that thou here 
thame diligently and severalie ilkane efter other in thy presence and melle nocht thair 
sawis [reports] togeder na let nane other persone cum amang thame in the tyme bot 
anerly thame self…And syne thou sall assemble thame agayn quhen thou art avisit 
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and geve out thy conclusioun. Ande thus sall thy wit be commendit And thou lovit 
and doubtit.146  
It is nocht spedefull that thou ask the counsaile at us all togeder bot spere at ilkane be 
him self, for mony man will say in secrete to the allane it that he wald nocht say in 
the presence of all thy counsale.147 
What stands out most strikingly is the importance placed upon interacting with counsellors 
individually. The king has to retain control over the information he uses to inform his 
decisions, and so secrecy is vital if he is to avoid any loss of authority. This is suggestive of a 
broader desire on the part of the crown to deal separately with its greatest subjects, other 
than in parliament. While there are undoubted dangers in arguing from negative evidence, 
it is interesting to note that the advice writers in this period studiously avoid portraying the 
kingdom as a community. Bower uses a variety of terms in relation to the realm: gens, nacio, 
res publica, communitas and civilitas; it is therefore not always straightforward to ascertain if 
he drew any meaningful distinctions between them.148 Regarding his use of communitas, 
however, two points can be made; it is used to denote the towns, although not exclusively, 
and it is not used to describe the kingdom during his discussion of the fifteenth century. The 
Pluscarden chronicle follows this lead, employing communitas rarely, and solely in the earlier 
period.149 Hay’s Gouernaunce uses the term ‘communitee’ only once, in connection to the 
Roman legal maxim quod omnes tangit.150 It is found only twice within Ireland’s final book of 
the Meroure of Wyssdome, while Holland’s Buke of the Howlat, with its avian parliament, 
avoids the word completely.151 While all of these texts have very different origins, sources 
and indeed purposes, they were all written in the political milieu of the later fifteenth 
century, suggesting that the concept of community was not one which was widely applied 
to the realm in this period.152  
The same conclusion can be drawn from the parliament records.153 The concept of the 
communitas regni had been instrumental in countering English claims to overlordship during 
the Wars of Independence. From the reign of David II parliament is referred to throughout 
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the fourteenth century as the ‘three communities’, and this begins to overlap with ‘three 
estates’ from the reign of Robert II.154 A particularly nice example, the ordinance entailing 
the crown in 1373, states that ‘from the deliberation of council and with the consent and 
assent of the prelates, earls and barons, and the rest of the leading men and nobles and all 
others of the three estates or communities of the whole kingdom assembled in the same 
place…’, suggesting that as both terms were in current use, each was included to avoid any 
ambiguity.155 The decisive shift came, perhaps unsurprisingly, with the accession of James I, 
after which time parliament is invariably comprised of three estates, and the word 
‘community’ is reserved for the towns.156 While the standardisation was doubtless partly 
prompted by the policy of recording legislation in the vernacular, this alone does not 
account for choosing one term over the other. There is only one piece of pre-1424 vernacular 
legislation, from 1397, which uses the older nomenclature: ‘it is statutit and ordanyt with 
assent of the thre communatez…’.157 This suggests that both terms  - communities and 
estates - were in use in the vernacular, and that James I’s government made a conscious 
decision to use the latter over the former. While any conclusions drawn from this must, by 
necessity, be rather circumspect, it does not seem entirely implausible that a desire to 
decouple meetings of parliament from ingrained notions of corporate action could be 
attributed to James I or, for that matter, his successors. The rhetoric of both the chronicles 
and the parliament records certainly stands in sharp contradistinction to that of the burgh 
records outlined in chapter two, where it can be seen that the invocation of community was 
integral to the exercise of political authority. 
The idea that the crown preferred to deal with the members of the nobility as individuals is 
also given support from the existence of the clause inserted into all bonds of manrent which 
stated that the parties’ allegiance to the king should be excepted from the agreement. The 
royal absences and minorities of the fifteenth century ensured that the Stewart kings were 
very familiar with the idea that a group of magnates could wield royal authority for the 
good of the realm, and it was presumably not something that they wished to encourage 
during their personal rule. In 1425 parliament enacted a statute which stated that 
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it is decretyt and throu the halle perlyament consentyt and be the kyng forboddin in 
all the realme till his legis that ony lygis or bandis be mayd amang thaim owthir to 
conffeir again the kyng or agayn ony of his legis in parcialete. And gif that ony has 
bene mayd in tym bygain and thai be nocht kepit nor haldin in tym to cum.158 
While this act was certainly prompted by the particular political circumstances which 
pertained at that time, it clearly articulates a concern to prevent any sort of collective action 
which might be considered detrimental to the interests of the crown.159  
Rather than a communitas, therefore, the fifteenth-century kingdom could be conceptualised 
as a network of personal relationships which the king both encompassed, via the delegation 
of personal authority to the localities, and directed, via the distribution of patronage.160 It 
was his right to shape this network as he chose, as long as it was done for the common good, 
and this required secrecy in order to minimise the difficulties which must undoubtedly have 
arisen as one man came to be preferred over another. From the perspective of the king this 
model was infinitely preferable to the existence of a cohesive community whose interests 
could be set in opposition to his own, and so he took advice from his tenants-in-chief 
separately and secretly, as well as together in parliament. Secrecy was therefore a legitimate 
mode of governance without which the mechanism of counsel would have been completely 
ineffective. This situation was not without difficulties, however. The trope of the ‘evil 
counsellors’, common across Europe and used to great effect to justify the overthrow of 
James III in 1488, was so effective precisely because counsel was taken secretly and so could 
be fairly easily framed as malign by the disaffected, given the right circumstances.161 This 
trope was surely bolstered by the negative attributes in law of secret behaviour, and it is 
perhaps no coincidence that evil counsel was strongly associated with low birth and 
unworthiness.162  
 
The king, like the lord, had the right to form personal relationships, take advice and reward 
his supporters in any way that he chose, without having publicly to justify his choices. 
Providing that he did this in accordance with the norms of good kingship no difficulties 
arose. Only when crown authority was less than robust was it necessary to formalise these 
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relationships and to publicise them. This was particularly true for minority governments 
which, despite having possession of the person of the king, could not exercise anything close 
to the same degree of personal authority as an adult monarch ruling in his own name, and 
could not command either loyalty or obedience as a matter of right. Brown gives many 
examples of this process in action, arguing that ‘since 1437 (and before 1424) royal 
governments had repeatedly regulated their relationships via essentially private 
arrangements’, and it is certainly the case that the ‘appoyntements’ and indentures made by 
the crown during this period were performing the same regulatory function as has been 
demonstrated above in relation to lordship and to the guilds.163 As with other bonds, 
however, it was necessary that such agreements became common knowledge, so that they 
could be successfully implemented. The 1439 ‘appoyntement’ between Queen Joan and 
Alexander Livingston of Callendar and others, which gave James II into Livingston’s 
custody, was witnessed by ten men who are explicitly referred to as representing each of the 
three estates, thereby ensuring that the accord, such as it was, was legitimised publicly.164 
The personal nature of such agreements, far from being in opposition to royal authority, was 
entirely in keeping with it; it would have been very difficult indeed for minority regimes to 
claim legitimacy whilst making indentures if this were not the case. Instead, it was the need 
to formalise such relationships which indicated that the full force of royal authority was 
lacking. This was both expected and accepted from a minority government.165 It became 
unusual when an adult king had to resort to such measures. It was very rare indeed for a 
king to find himself in direct competition with one of his subjects to the extent that 
regulation was required of the type that bonding provided; any such ‘free riding’ on the part 
of a lord would ordinarily be considered treasonous. The acrimonious personal relationship 
of James II to the 9th earl of Douglas had been established in circumstances in which the 
legitimacy of the king’s authority had been called into question.166 In such conditions any 
agreements made had to be both formalised and publicised, and the ‘appoyntement’ 
between James II and Douglas, of August 1452, and the Lanark bond of the following year, 
can both be seen in this light. Indeed in the latter Douglas swore to come to ‘ye said nixt 
generalle counsall’ in order to bind himself formally to the king.167 As Brown notes, no 
treason charges were brought against Douglas in the parliament of July 1452, and this is 
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surely indicative of the extent to which James II’s authority had been diminished by his 
action against the 8th earl.168 The other famous, or indeed infamous, royal bond of the period 
– the indenture of 1483 between James III and his brother Alexander, duke of Albany – was 
made in similarly fraught circumstances following the Lauder rebellion of the previous year, 
and Norman MacDougall notes that its stipulation that the terms should be endorsed by 
parliament was included to  generate ‘the widest possible publicity’ for the agreement.169  As 
Gilbert Hay cautioned, ‘Quhen ryall maiestie is oure comoun The autairetie is degradit of 
the croun’.170 
 
Legal Reform in the Later Fifteenth Century 
The period between the rise of the written bond, in the 1440s, and the foundation of the 
College of Justice in 1532 was characterised by profound changes in both political and legal 
culture in Scotland. This is particularly true for the period under consideration, and yet the 
conclusions of political historians have tended to be considered separately to those of legal 
historians. While constraints of space prevent a full assessment, it is instructive to consider 
both here and in the following chapter some important legal reforms made by James III’s 
government and their implications for the current narrative.  
The period from James I’s return to Scotland until the end of James III’s reign saw a 
substantial restructuring of the nobility in Scotland. Grant has described the processes by 
which, between 1350 and 1450, a Scottish peerage was created through the fragmentation of 
the great territorial earldoms and the transformation of both the provincial lords and the 
greater barons into lords of parliament.171 These men came to derive status from 
administrative privileges, rather than from strong ties to a particular locality, and received a 
personal summons to parliament which distinguished them from the lesser nobility.172 There 
were probably twenty-one lordships of parliament by 1445, and more were created by James 
II during his personal rule after his victory over the Douglas family resulted in the break-up 
of the last of the great earldoms.173 At the same time, between 1437 and 1445, the number of 
earls in Scotland had become depleted so that the greater barons assumed a more important 
                                                          
168 Brown, ‘Lanark Bond’, p. 235. 
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role in the governance of the kingdom than had been the case previously.174 Wormald 
associates these changes with the rise of bonding, suggesting that the link between lordship 
and landholding became less strong due to land becoming a ‘saleable commodity’, and that 
the new comital families had concerns about status that were ‘partly attributable to 
economic stress and the redistribution of wealth’.175  
The period between 1450 and 1500 was therefore one in which political authority was being 
redistributed on a basis which made its holders more directly answerable to the crown, and 
in which the crown was adapting the legal system so that justice was more firmly under its 
control. In his 1952 article, Dickinson highlighted several linked measures during James III’s 
reign which, he argued, acted to ‘break the feudal bond which tied the tenant to the court of 
his lord’.176 Whether or not we agree with his characterisation, the measures he discusses 
were important indeed, as they essentially allowed litigants with a legitimate complaint to 
appeal directly to the King’s Council, thereby avoiding the time-consuming process of 
falsing the doom to parliament.177 An act of 1469 allowed that a litigant who did not receive 
justice from his local judge could complain to the council and have the judge summoned 
before them: 
gif the juge ordinare failyis [the complainant] and wil nocht minstir to him justice, he 
sal cum to the king and his consail, tak lettres and summond his partii. And in like 
wise his juge ordinare, quhat ever he be of temperale landis. And gif the juge be 
fundin culpable and wald nocht minstir justice, he salbe punyst and put fra his office 
for certane tyme eftir the discrecioune of oure soverane lorde and his consail, and pay 
the expensis of the partii conplenyeande. And oure soverane lorde sal ger minstir 
justice to the said partii conplenyeande in that case, and gif the juge ordinare 
minsteris him partiale justice and dois him wrang in the adminstracioune of justice, 
in like wise the partii conplenyeande sal summond him befor the king and his 
consail. And gif before thame he be fundin culpable or partiale in the 
adminstratioune of justice, be it a schiref, bailye or uthir officiare of fee, he salbe put 
fra his office for thre yeris.178  
This procedure was augmented by a further statute in May 1471: 
for the eschewyn of maneswering [perjury] of inquestis and assisis in gret hurtyn of 
oure soverane lordis leigis, and specialy be the inquestis in thar heretage, it is statut 
and ordanit that in tym cummyne quhar a party findis him grevit be ony assise or 
inquestis be partial, malice or ignorance of the assise or the inquest…it salbe leful to 
the said partii grevit to cum to oure soverane lorde or his consal and tak a 
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summondis of the said inquest to compeir befor thaim a certane day and place 
perempturly, and thar produce his avidentis of the ignorance or falste of the said 
inquest.179  
This allowed the litigant to summon the whole assize before the council and present 
evidence of the offence.180 There were significant restrictions upon these jurisdictions, but it 
allowed the council to hear complaints against local officers who failed to do justice 
properly.181 Because James III chose to remain in Edinburgh, instead of driving justice ayres 
around the kingdom, his council was therefore also static. This meant that civil causes could 
be heard by the Council, in Edinburgh, all year round, instead of waiting for a sitting of 
parliament. Godfrey describes this new situation as ‘an innovation not in terms of function 
or jurisdiction so much as breadth of access’.182 It is worth noting because it sheds a rather 
different light upon the accepted view of James III as reclusive and unwilling to do justice. 
Although Macdougall acknowledges that James III’s record in civil justice is ‘generally a 
positive one’, and that the switch from parliamentary auditors to council was popular, he 
suggests that this was less important than the king’s failure to personally drive the justice 
ayres in the localities.183 It is arguable which of these may have been considered most 
important at the time, but the detachment of this court from parliament undoubtedly 
allowed for more cases to be heard, and facilitated the establishment of a permanent home 
for the embryonic legal profession, in Edinburgh.  
Altering the law to ensure local justice was unlikely to have been universally popular, 
however. The alliance between the earl of Angus and the Humes, discussed above, provides 
an important example. While the indenture appears to be a straightforward transaction, in 
which a family appeals to a great lord for help in a legal dispute, in fact Angus was superior 
of the lands of Kimmerghame, and was therefore to act as judge ordinary in the case.184 
Boardman has shown that the lands were in Angus’s hands following the death of John 
Sinclair, and that in May 1470 he granted a charter to the Humes, giving them possession of 
the lands.185 By May of the following year the dispute had been brought before the Lords 
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Auditors in parliament, William Sinclair having brought an action against the Humes.186 The 
Humes, keen to ensure that Angus would be able to render the services for which they had 
paid him, argued that the case ought to be determined by the judge ordinary because it 
concerned fee and heritage.187 The case was continued until August ‘because thar is diverse 
of the lordis auditouris allegit be baith the partiis to be suspect to thaim, and the remanent is 
to wayke [too weak] to determyne the saide materis’.188 On 13 August the auditors decided 
that 
the erle of Angus, quhilk is juge ordinare to him [Sinclair] and his partii in the said 
actioune, is partiale to him and suspect of the law, that tharefore the kingis hienes ger 
call the erle of Angus and baith the said partiis before him and his counesaile the 
ferde day of October next tocum.189  
 
Rather than simply an ‘ad hoc response to a specific complaint’ this must surely be viewed 
in relation to the legislation of 1469 on corrupt judges.190 Angus was probably allowed to 
judge the dispute, subject to the presence of royal officers in his court, although the next 
time the case is found in the records it had been decided in favour of Sinclair before the 
Lords Auditors sometime between May 1472 and August 1473.191 The Humes continued to 
make trouble, however, and in a separate document of March 1475 James III promised to 
support Sinclair’s claim against the family ‘in safere [so far] as we may be law and justis of 
oure realme’.192 Boardman characterises the episode as ‘a powerful clash of interests in and 
around the royal court’, and suggests that the king and Angus were ‘thoroughly committed’ 
to opposing sides.193 The legislation of 1469 and the outcome of the Kimmerghame dispute 
can be seen as part of a broader programme of reform by the crown, to limit the ability of 
corrupt and powerful judges ordinary to interfere with due process in local disputes. This 
will be investigated further in the following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
It is unlikely that the justice of the feud had ever been completely separate from the 
franchisal courts, as judgments reached in one would almost certainly have affected 
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treatment in the other.194 The dual role of the local lord, if nothing else, would have made 
this a natural state of affairs. The agreements reached by personal arbitration may originally 
have been verbal, but they would have been none the less binding for that, and were 
publicised so that they became common knowledge. Likewise, the dooms of the franchisal 
courts were announced publicly in order to make them legitimate. By these methods the 
reputations of men, or indeed women, for honest and trustworthy conduct would have been 
made or lost, which in turn would have informed judgements on matters such as common 
theft. In fact this entire system relied upon common knowledge to be effective, and this is 
one reason why the jurors of the franchisal courts, rather than the lord himself, made the 
judgements; they were the most likely to have the detailed knowledge of the events and of 
the characters of those involved necessary to settle the matter fairly. On the other hand there 
was an omnipresent danger of prejudice on the part of the franchisal courts because judge 
and jury were likely to have some personal interest in the case. A tighter control of justice by 
the crown was partly a response to complaints about the lack of fair litigation in the 
localities.195 The changes in procedure in 1469 and 1471 would have been significant. They 
may not be best viewed as the breaking of feudal bonds, but they certainly represented an 
important step taken away from common knowledge and towards learned law in medieval 
courts. Cases which found their way to the parliamentary auditors would have been falsed 
through the court of the sheriff and the justiciar first, each of which relied, to an extent, upon 
the judgements of men who knew the litigants. In contrast, the king’s councillors may have 
had no personal knowledge at all of the people they were judging and certainly could not 
have integrated verbal agreements made after arbitration into their decision-making 
processes. From the middle of the fifteenth century, therefore, as the system of courts 
underwent a transformation, agreements reached after personal arbitration required to be 
written down in order to continue being effectively integrated with the processes of 
litigation, as they likely always had been.196  
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Cairns argues that by 1532 the ‘system of process on brieves was dead’, and instead the 
College of Justice adopted a ‘variation of the Romano-canonical procedure of the Church’.197 
This he describes as follows: 
The lack of a jury or inquest meant that testimony was presented before the Lords 
either in written form or by examination of witnesses in front of them. In the latter 
case, a small committee of the Lords would examine the witnesses in private with 
neither the parties nor their lawyers present, although the parties could submit 
interrogatories. Their depositions would be reduced to writing and then sealed, to be 
opened later.198 
Further research is required in order to draw any firm conclusions, but it is surely possible 
that such changes in procedure and personnel made an important contribution to the 
growing importance of the idea of privacy within the legal system in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. For the period between 1440 and 1490, however, the concept of privacy 
is singularly unhelpful in framing discussions of politics or law. If the term is to have any 
meaning at all it must be something distinct from public authority, and given the role of the 
nobility in governing the realm, whether as crown officers or through personal franchisal 
jurisdictions, it is difficult to argue that this was the case.  
Characterising both royal and aristocratic authority as personal and public does not imply 
that kings and lords were the same. Instead it emphasises that the important difference was 
the degree of authority exercised by each rather than the type. In a rigidly hierarchical 
political framework this surely makes sense, as authority required to be delegated from the 
crown and, unlike their English and French counterparts, Scottish monarchs never laid claim 
to the sacral element of kingship which might have enhanced their authority through a 
firmer association with the divine.199 In addition, the important distinction between 
litigation and arbitration was not one which only affected the aristocracy; as has been shown 
members of the King’s Council could also act as arbiters, so that both legal procedures were 
used by the crown and by the nobility to resolve the disputes of their men. There were, of 
course, tensions between the exercise of royal authority as practiced by James III, for 
example, and the understandable desire of certain members of the aristocracy to retain as 
much autonomy as possible, but they occurred within a framework of shared expectations 
and structures. The terminology of ‘public’ and ‘private’ therefore acts to obscure not only 
the extent to which both kings and lords legitimised their authority through common 
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knowledge and reinforced it with secret counsel, but also the extent to which the crown was 
the source of that authority in both cases. This suggests that any model which places either 
crown or king in opposition to the ‘political community’ needs to be substantially revised.  
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Chapter Four: Crown, Parliament and the ‘Common Profit’  
 
The crown-magnate debate outlined in the introduction has both taken as read and greatly 
contributed to a model of medieval politics which is highly oppositional; whether crown 
and ‘political community’ are taken to be co-operating or not, they are taken to be separate 
entities with competing interests. Tanner, although he avoids the term ‘political community’, 
has focused upon the ability of parliament to limit the authority of the king, arguing that the 
roots of a Scottish ‘radical tradition’ can be found within the acts of ‘legitimate resistance’ by 
the estates.1 Mason, on the other hand, has emphasised the ‘patriotic conservatism’ of the 
political community, noting the lack of any explicit theories of ‘resistance, deposition and 
tyrannicide’ and the contemporary association of kingship with the bonum commune.2 The 
relationship between crown and parliament is an important one, and will be discussed 
further in the second part of this chapter. So far it has been argued that the difference 
between royal and aristocratic authority was one of degree, rather than type. It was the 
crown which conferred this greater, royal authority upon the person of the king.3 Particular 
kings may have felt it necessary to suppress perceived threats from individuals, or groups of 
individuals, but the crown itself was the source of authority from which the nobility derived 
its own. It therefore embodied an inclusive aspect which is not always taken into account in 
discussions of crown-magnate relations. The following will consider in more detail the 
changes which the Scottish crown underwent during the period under discussion, and the 
effect this had upon how it was perceived.  
 
The Growth of the Scottish Crown 
In the current historiography, the Scottish crown tends to be discussed either as an entity 
interchangeable with the person of the king, or as an ideological abstract. In his rebuttal to 
the framework of co-operation between crown and nobility put forward by Grant and 
Wormald, Brown argued that the personal hostility of the king to alternate sources of 
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2 Mason, ‘Kingship, Tyranny and the Right to Resist’, pp. 9, 33. 
3 On the concept of the crown see Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, pp. 336-82 and passim; Watts, 
Making of Polities, p. 75; J. Dunbabin, ‘Government’, in Burns (ed.), Medieval Political Thought, pp. 477-
519, at pp. 498-501; Black, Political Thought, pp. 189-91. 
107 
 
authority within the realm was the decisive factor in the growth of crown authority.4 Brown 
describes the first four Kings James as variously ‘demanding’, ‘aggressive’, ‘predatory’ and 
‘unscrupulous’ and states that ‘during periods of active royal rule, it was the crown which 
acted antagonistically, rather than magnates individually or in groups’.5 While the 
personality traits of individual kings were undoubtedly of the utmost importance to 
contemporary governance the king and crown were not synonymous. Even when particular 
monarchs pursued unpopular policies, finding themselves in opposition to certain members 
of the nobility as a result, the authority of the crown was never questioned. Mason has 
argued that this predatory Stewart kingship was supported, from the reign of James III 
onwards, by the adoption of a royalist ideology based upon the Roman legal maxim rex in 
regno suo est imperator; the king is emperor in his own kingdom, which found its way to 
Scotland from Italy via the French jurists.6 This was expressed not only in the claim, 
discussed above, that James III had ‘ful jurisdictioune and fre impyre’ in his realm, but also 
in a scheme of royal iconography, the earliest example of which saw James III portrayed 
upon a silver groat of c. 1485, wearing a closed imperial crown.7 In an extension to this 
argument, Tanner has suggested that the 1469 parliament also saw a reformulation of the 
charge of lèse majesté, or harm to the crown, a legal concept used to prosecute infringements 
of royal authority throughout the later middle ages.8 This parliament forfeited Robert lord 
Boyd and his son Thomas, who had had custody of the king during his minority.9 Rather 
than simply hurt majesty, the charge levelled was ‘treasonable disparagement and 
degradation of our royal authority and majesty’.10 Tanner argues that this charge was 
effectively an augmentation of royal authority which paralleled James III’s assertion of 
imperial kingship.11 In a letter to the duke of Burgundy, in 1471, James III requested that the 
duke desist from harbouring the Boyds, due to their ‘degradation of the royal name’, and in 
1475 the earl of Ross was forfeited for the ‘treasonable usurpation of our authority and 
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crown’, adding weight to the suggestion of a deliberate innovation.12 Tanner attributes this 
change in the terminology to a ‘cohesive group of theologically and politically like-minded 
men’ which dominated James III’s court around 1469, and which was strongly influenced by 
Albertist theology.13 While it is certainly important to acknowledge the direct influence of 
European political thought in Scottish politics, and the development of ideology as a 
contributor to royal authority, neither this view nor the focus upon the king’s personality 
takes into account the significant structural changes which were also taking place within 
Scotland over the same period. Such changes were closely related to those identified by 
Brown, Mason and Tanner, but a picture which does not explicitly include them is 
incomplete.  What follows draws primarily from secondary research the significance of 
which, it will be argued, has not been fully appreciated, providing a new perspective upon 
the growth of crown authority in the later fifteenth century.  
According to Kantorowicz, the ‘invisible’ crown, in essence denoting royal authority in the 
abstract, represented ‘the sovereignty of the whole collective body of the realm’.14 The king 
wielded the rights and powers inherent within it for the good of the people, but the people 
were also an integral part of the ‘invisible’ crown.15 Mention of the crown in this sense is rare 
within contemporary Scottish literature, perhaps explaining its absence from much of the 
political narrative, and the places where it is not discussed are almost as revealing as the 
places where it is.16 In keeping with his emphasis upon law and order, Bower suggests that 
‘all just men on earth ought to rejoice at the justice of the king, which is denoted in the 
crown.’17 In the twelve chapters he devotes to James I’s accomplishments, however, the 
crown is not mentioned at all.18 Discussion of the contractual elements of kingship is kept to 
a minimum in the Scotichronicon, and as Mapstone notes, Bower ‘places more worth on rule 
founded on personal prudence than on the advice of counsellors’.19 Rather than praising 
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James I for bringing honour to the Scottish crown, therefore, Bower instead rehearses the 
king’s ‘good qualities’, and emphasises his achievement in bringing ‘perfect tranquillity and 
peace to the kingdom’.20 Hay, on the other hand, offers a different perspective. In the only 
reference to the crown in the Gouernaunce, at the very end of the work, he states that  
…thy peple and thy barouns, thy bacheleris and thy commouns ar the stuf and the 
multiplicacioun and furnyssing of thy realme. And be thame mon thou be crownyt, 
and thy croune uphaldyn and mayntenyt. And be thai nocht, throu the, manetenyt 
and sustenyt in thair rychtis and richess, thai will nocht lufe the na honoure the na thi 
court, na help to sustene thyne estate.21 
As has been noted by several scholars, Hay’s work places a particular emphasis upon the 
idea of the common profit of the realm.22 Mason argues that this discourse ‘not only set a 
high premium on loyalty to the crown, but viewed the bonum commune in essentially 
Aristotelian terms as the true end of government’.23 If the purpose of the crown was to 
maintain and sustain the rights and riches of the people, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect loyalty to the crown in return. This, after all, was the essence of the contract. 
References to this ‘invisible’ form of the crown within the records of government, therefore, 
occur most often where royal authority is perceived to have been challenged, in particular 
during the process of forfeiture and in legislation regarding the right of appointment to 
vacant benefices.24  
Craig Madden’s work has outlined the changes which the royal demesne underwent in the 
late medieval period.25 Madden argues that before James I returned from captivity in 
England, in 1424, there was no royal demesne as such.26 Instead, land which came into 
                                                          
20 On James I’s good qualities: Chron. Bower, viii, pp. 303-16; on peace and tranquillity: pp. 319-25. See 
Brown, ‘Vile Times’, for a discussion which situates Bower’s arguments within the political context of 
James II’s minority. 
21 Hay, Gouernaunce, p. 127.  
22 Mason, ‘Chivalry and Citizenship’, p. 91. See also Tanner, ‘Outside the Acts’, p. 62 and Mapstone, 
‘Advice to Princes’, pp. 88, 114-6, which describes the common profit as Hay’s ‘keystone to kingship’, 
at p. 114.  
23 Mason, ‘Chivalry and Citizenship’, p. 91. 
24 The former is discussed in various places in this thesis. See also, for example, the forfeiture of the 
Douglases RPS 1455/6/6, which cites ‘harm to the royal crown’. The latter was a contentious and 
recurring issue in the later fifteenth century, which arose in many parliaments. RPS 1462/10/1, 
1481/4/10, 1485/5/23, 1488/1/20-21, 1488/10/55. For discussion see D. E. R. Watt, ‘The Papacy and 
Scotland in the Fifteenth Century’, in B. Dobson (ed.), The Church, Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth 
Century (Gloucester, 1984), pp. 115-30; L. Macfarlane, ‘The Primacy of the Scottish Church, 1472-1521’, 
IR, 20 (1969), pp. 111-29, at p. 112; Finlay, ‘James Henryson’, pp. 35-36. 
25 Madden ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’. See also C. Madden, ‘Royal Treatment of Feudal 
Casualties in Late Medieval Scotland’, SHR, 55 (1976), pp. 172-94 and C. Madden, ‘The Royal 
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possession of the crown during the reigns of Robert II and Robert III tended to be re-granted 
in patronage, in particular to the extended royal Stewart family.27 In 1425 James I’s forfeiture 
of the Albany Stewarts brought the earldoms of Lennox, Fife and Menteith to the crown, and 
he acquired the earldoms of Mar and March in separate circumstances, forming ‘the 
foundation of a permanent royal demesne’.28 This was followed in 1437 by the forfeiture of 
those responsible for James I’s assassination, adding the earldoms of Atholl and Strathearn, 
as well as several lordships.29 The lordship of Annandale came to the crown after the ‘Black 
Dinner’ in 1440, and in 1455 the Douglas family were forfeited for treason. The lordship of 
Ettrick Forest, the lordship of Galloway and the earldom of Wigtown, as well as the lands of 
Stewarton, lordship of Annandale and the earldoms of Moray and Ormond, all came into 
royal possession.30 Following the crown’s absorption of the Douglas lands the new royal 
demesne was formalised by the Act of Annexation, passed by the Estates in 1455. It began 
thus: 
In the first, forsamekill [forasmuch] as the poverte of the crowne is oftymis the cause 
of the poverte of the realme, and that mony uthir inconvenientis the quhilk war lang 
to expreyme [relate], be the awyse and full consale of the parliament it is statuyt and 
ordanyt that in ilk part of the realme for the kingis residence, quhar it sall happyn 
him to be, thar be certane lordschippis and castellys annext to the crowne perpetualy 
to remane, the quhilk may nocht be giffyn away, nothir in fee nor in frangtenement, 
till ony persone of quhat estate or degre that evir he be but avyse delivirance and 
decret of the thre estatis and of the haill parliament ande for gret, seande 
[appropriate] and resonable cause of the realme…31 
This act has been cited as evidence of the ability of the estates to limit royal action.32 James 
I’s acquisition of lands for the crown, occasionally by extra-legal means, had certainly been a 
contributory factor to his assassination in 1437, as had his demands for extraordinary 
taxation.33 The estates therefore fully understood the value of a clearly-defined group of 
royal lands which could support the expenses of the royal family, and took the opportunity 
                                                          
27 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, p. 51-52. On the reigns of these kings see Boardman, 
Early Stewart Kings, passim. 
28 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, p. 63-70. Madden provides a list of lands acquired by the 
crown during this period in a very helpful appendix to his thesis: Appendix B/2 (j). The pages are not 
numbered. 
29 Ibid., pp. 77. 
30 Ibid., pp. 83-84; A. L. Murray, ‘The Procedure of the Scottish Exchequer in the Early Sixteenth 
Century’, SHR, 40 (1961), pp. 89-117, at p. 99. 
31 RPS 1455/8/2. 
32 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 151.  
33 The destruction of the Albany Stewart family caused particular concern, but so did the king’s 
reforms to the collection of crown revenues. See Brown, James I, pp. 72-4, 148-49 and passim. On 
taxation see Brown, James I, pp. 139-40; A. A. M. Duncan, James I: King of Scots, 1424-1437 (Glasgow, 
1984). 
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presented by the forfeiture of the Douglases to ensure that James II could provide for 
himself from the lands of the crown.34 It was to the advantage of the king’s subjects that the 
crown be as fiscally strong as possible, and Atholl Murray has argued that the act did not 
represent a ‘constitutional or legal restraint’ upon the king’s ability to dispose of his 
property, instead affording ‘a sure ground for subsequent challenge’.35 As Tanner suggests, 
therefore, the act was, in effect, ‘a contract between king and Estates from which both stood 
to gain’, and the king was free to grant lands to whomever he chose without further 
hindrance, as long as such grants were unlikely to be opposed by a significant proportion of 
the estates.36 The real significance of the act is arguably that it created a commonly-
acknowledged fiscal entity over which the king had de facto control,  in contrast to the earlier 
situation, in which no royal demesne as such existed. 
James III’s reign was punctuated by forfeitures and attempted forfeitures, from the Boyd 
faction in 1469 to the duke of Albany and his allies in the 1470s and 1480s.37 A further act of 
annexation was included in the forfeiture of the Boyds, which stated that the new lands 
will be united, incorporated and annexed to us the kings of Scotland and the right of 
our crown in perpetuity…and thus it will not be permissible for us, or any of our 
successors, the kings of Scotland, or eldest princes as aforesaid, to give or grant or in 
any way alienate the lordships, lands, castles, or any part of them…away from the 
right and property of the royal crown and the eldest prince, unless the same gift or 
alienation be with the advice, mature deliberation and decree of the three estates of 
the parliament of our realm, and also for the evident profit and manifest utility of us 
and our successors.38 
Tanner highlights the similarity to the 1455 legislation, with parliamentary oversight of the 
king’s ability to alienate his estates forming the core of the act, and notes that while the first 
act was ‘broadly obeyed’ over the long term, the latter was not.39 This, he argues, suggests 
that parliament ‘still relied to a large degree on the co-operation of the king to see acts 
implemented.’40 The question of the relationship between the king and parliament is one to 
which we shall return  shortly, as it certainly requires closer investigation. It is interesting to 
note the contrast, however, between the condition subsequent to that of the estates’ consent 
in each case; while in 1455 the requirement for the advice of the estates was followed by the 
                                                          
34 McGladdery, ‘James II’, in Brown and Tanner (eds), Scottish Kingship, p. 197. 
35 Murray, ‘Exchequer and Crown Revenue’, p. 355. 
36 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 151. 
37 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, pp.  85-87. The Lord of the Isles was forfeited in 1475, but 
many of his lands were returned the following year.  
38 RPS A1469/2. 
39 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 193. 
40 Ibid., p. 193. 
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stipulation that any alienation be for the ‘gret, seande and resonable cause of the realme’, in 
1469 it had to meet the criterion of ‘the evident profit and manifest utility of us [James III] 
and our successors’, which is rather different. When the duke of Albany was eventually 
forfeited, in 1483, the crown gained the earldom of March and the lordship of Annandale as 
well as the earldoms of Mar and Garioch which had been granted to him the previous year.41  
In addition to the fruits of forfeiture, the royal demesne was augmented through 
inheritance, exchanges of property and, especially, the marriage of James III to Margaret of 
Denmark, which brought Orkney and Shetland to the Scottish crown in 1469.42 Using the 
figures obtainable from the accounts of the Ballivi ad Extra, and with important caveats about 
the limitations of the evidence, Madden suggests that the average annual gross farm, or 
rents from crown lands, charged between 1450 and 1454 was £3,270.43 By 1487 this amount 
had increased to £6,659.44 Other than the lands gained by the forfeiture of the Lord of the 
Isles in 1493, which brought ‘little financial benefit’, the reign of James IV saw no 
‘appreciable extension of property’.45 In the forty-five years between 1424 and 1469, then, the 
number of people who found themselves to be holding land directly of the king increased 
significantly. While one result of this change was greatly augmented revenues for the crown, 
another was a surge in both litigation and feuding, and the attendant complaints regarding 
the lack of justice in the realm, which led to the restructuring of the system of courts 
throughout the period.46 It is therefore possible to see the adoption by the crown of an 
ideology of enhanced royal authority as part of an attempt to manage these changes, rather 
than simply as a quest for personal aggrandisement on the part of James III.47 The machinery 
of government required to be significantly altered, and this process was aided by the 
                                                          
41 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, p. 89. 
42 Ibid., pp. 97-100, at p. 98. For the political negotiations which accompanied this transfer, see B. 
Crawford, The Northern Earldoms: Orkney and Caithness from AD 870 to 1470 (Edinburgh, 2013), pp. 365-
70. 
43 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, p. 106. This figure ‘represented the gross rent and other 
levies due from these estates and in no way corresponded to either the actual cash handled by the 
local Ballivi ad Extra or the actual or real income handed over to the comptroller. Such values are 
useful for comparing the theoretical value of various properties to the crown during the later Middle 
Ages but since they represented only the returns for which the Ballivi ad Extra was [sic] responsible 
and not the actual cash which passed through their hands, these figures were, in a sense, fictional.’ 
44 Ibid., p. 106. See ER, ix, pp. 561-656 for the actual lands involved. 
45 Madden, ‘Finances of the Scottish Crown’, pp. 93, 107. 
46 For example Chron. Pluscarden, ii, p. 291; RPS 1473/7/10, 1485/5/10. 
47 For another argument which expresses doubts as to the extent to which James III’s personality alone 
can explain his difficulties, see Macfarlane, William Elphinstone, pp. 154-55.  
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projection of imperial ideas which heightened the authority of the crown in both its visible 
and invisible senses.48 
Gareth Prosser, writing on fifteenth-century France, offers a timely reminder that ‘the 
machinery of government was not machinery: it was persons, each with kinship and 
personal connections, career strategies and collective interests.’49 Questions of morality and 
loyalty within governmental structures have recently been addressed by many scholars of 
late medieval Europe.50 The limitations of the Scottish evidence make the adoption of this 
approach problematic until the sixteenth century, although work has been done on the 
offices themselves, if not the backgrounds or motivations of the men who held them.51 In 
1982 Trevor Chalmers made a study of the royal council in the reigns of James III and James 
IV, with a focus upon the administration of crown business, both financial and judicial.52 
Chalmers’s work, while often cited, has yet to be fully integrated into the political narrative. 
His doctoral research investigated the different roles and groupings of the King’s Council 
during the reigns of James III and James IV, and traced the administrative changes which 
took place over that period. Using the witness lists of royal charters, he identified a variable 
                                                          
48 Cf. Carpenter, Wars of the Roses, p. 43, which argues that there has been ‘a failure to understand that 
the cake of power does not stay the same size in the later middle ages but is growing’. 
49 G. Prosser, ‘“Decayed Feudalism” and “Royal Clienteles”: Royal Office and Magnate Service in the 
Fifteenth Century’, in C. Allemand (ed.), War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France 
(Liverpool, 2000), pp. 175-89, at p. 186. 
50 See, for example, K. Daly, ‘Private Vice, Public Service? Civil Service and Chose Publique in 
Fifteenth-Century France’, in Curry and Matthew (eds), Concepts and Patterns of Service, pp. 99-118;  J. 
Dumolyn, ‘Justice, Equity and the Common Good: The State Ideology of the Councillors of the 
Burgundian Dukes’, in D’A. J. D. Boulton and J. A. Veenstra (eds), The Ideology of Burgundy: The 
Promotion of a National Consciousness, 1364-1565 (Leiden, 2006), pp. 1-20; C. Fletcher, ‘Morality and 
Office in Late Medieval England and France’, in N. Saul (ed.), Fourteenth Century England V 
(Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 178-90; D. Grummitt, ‘Household, Politics and Political Morality in the Reign 
of Henry VII’, Historical Research, 81 (2009), pp. 393-411; F. Lachaud, ‘Ethics and Office in England in 
the Thirteenth Century’, in B. Weiler (ed.), Thirteenth Century England XI (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 16-
30. 
51 The notable exception is A. R. Borthwick and H. L. MacQueen, ‘“Rare Creatures for their Age”: 
Alexander and David Guthrie, Graduate Lairds and Royal Servants’, in Crawford (ed.), Church, 
Chronicle and Learning, pp. 227-39. See also G. W. S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots: Government, 
Church and Society from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century (2nd ed.) (Edinburgh, 2003); A. Murray, 
‘The Comptroller’, SHR, 52 (1973), pp. 1-29; ‘The Lord Clerk Register’, SHR, 53 (1974), pp. 124-56; J. 
Finlay, ‘James Henryson and the Origins of the Office of King's Advocate in Scotland’, SHR, 79 (2000), 
pp. 17-38; Stevenson, ‘Jurisdiction, Authority and Professionalisation’, pp. 41-66. 
52 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’. Such an approach had earlier been advocated in A. L. Brown, ‘The 
Scottish “Establishment” in the Later Fifteenth Century’, Juridical Review, 23 (1978), pp. 88-105. 
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but cohesive group of lords and prelates, with no formal designation, which could be found 
regularly in the presence of the king. This group he named the ‘daily’ council.53  
Chalmers draws a distinction between this ‘daily’ council and the king’s secret council 
which, he argues, was a ‘large, fluctuating body of lords sworn to give true counsel’ and 
which dealt with matters of high politics.54 This distinction has not always been noted in the 
historiography, and it is worth exploring the implications. According to Chalmers the role of 
the ‘daily’ council was the day-to-day running of the realm, and in particular the 
administration of royal finance and justice; ‘daily’ councillors had access to the necessary 
facts and figures which required to be produced in the event of disputes or challenges, and 
so acted as ‘information officers’ rather than straightforwardly ‘political’ advisers.55 This 
distinction is problematic. Royal servants acting as ‘information officers’ would certainly 
have offered advice within their area of expertise, which may have had very real 
implications for practical politics, and those who were ‘daily’ councillors would often, in any 
case, have been entitled to offer ‘political’ advice by virtue of their social status. Nevertheless 
the fact that a ‘daily’ council can be identified is helpful for three reasons. Firstly, it stresses 
the fact that this body of men held particular positions, rather than being counsellors in the 
general sense, and ran their various ‘departments’ independently for the king. Secondly, it 
throws into relief those members of the clergy and aristocracy who would have been entitled 
to counsel the king when in his presence, but who nevertheless probably only did so during 
sittings of parliament. In 1476, for example, John MacDonald, Lord of the Isles was restored 
to his lands, in parliament, after being forfeited the previous year.56 Chalmers’ list of royal 
charter witnesses for that year is considerably larger than usual, therefore, as the charter 
granting these lands to MacDonald was witnessed by a great many more men than most 
royal business.57 It was not witnessed by all the men listed in the parliamentary sederunt, 
however, suggesting that only particular advisers were asked to witness the document.58 
                                                          
53 Chalmers, ‘Kings Council’, p. 86-92.  He explains the designation thus: ‘To this regular, inner circle 
of the secret council, the style 'daily council' has been applied in this thesis. This is partly to avoid 
confusion with the larger body, and partly to recognize the evident regularity of its personnel, and its 
probable day-to-day administrative function. The use of the term (which was not contemporary), and 
the addition of inverted commas, is intended to act as a reminder that the grouping has a second-
hand, almost unreal quality, due to the questionable nature of the source.’, p. 91. 
54 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 18. On the right of the nobility to counsel the king, see Mason, 
‘Kingship, Counsel and Consent’, pp. 278-80. 
55 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 18.  
56 RPS A1476/7/1. He was not restored to the earldom of Ross, which remained with the crown. 
57 RMS, ii, 1246; Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 426. 
58 RPS 1476/7/2. 
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While many of the ‘daily’ councillors acted as witnesses to this charter - William Tulloch, 
Keeper of the Privy Seal, Andrew, lord Avandale, Chancellor, Colin Campbell, earl of Argyll 
and Master of the King’s Household, Archibald Crawford, Treasurer – many others were 
men who would have been entitled by their status to counsel the king, but who are not 
found witnessing any other royal charters that year. These include the earls of Angus, 
Huntly, Morton and Atholl and the bishops of Ross, Argyll, Galloway and the Isles.59 That 
these men were not regular witnesses in 1476 reflects a complex mixture of factors that is 
very difficult to unpick: the degree of royal favour which they enjoyed at that moment, the 
urgency of matters to be dealt with in their own localities and the ease with which they 
could travel to court surely all influenced how much time they spent in physical proximity 
to the king in any particular period. It is also important to note, as Chalmers does, that 
witnessing charters is not the same as having the king’s ear. Nevertheless, rather than 
membership of the ‘daily’ council it was the calling of parliament which afforded these men 
the opportunity to offer advice on the important matters of the day. They were able to 
counsel the king not only within that ‘formal’ forum, but also by virtue of the fact that they 
were potentially in his presence at less formal moments as well. It is perhaps the case that 
the king’s secret council comprised the ‘daily’ councillors and whichever other great men 
the king chose to take advice from at any given moment. 
The third reason that the identification of the ‘daily’ council is helpful, is that it allows the 
structural changes made to that council to be mapped onto the political narrative. Two 
periods of administrative change are particularly important. The first comprises a group of 
reforms in the mid-1470s which were likely intended to alleviate the pressure of business 
which the newly-augmented crown generated. In either 1476 or 1477 James III revived the 
position of Director of Chancery, which was given to Master Alexander Murray.60 By this 
date the office of Chancellor had become detached from everyday administrative concerns, 
so that while its incumbent was entitled to advise the king he was not conversant with the 
workings of the chancery itself. The Director of Chancery therefore acted as a liaison 
between the chancery and the king’s advisers.61 Chalmers suggests that the directorship was 
                                                          
59 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 426. 
60 RMS, ii, 1280; Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, pp. 35-36; A. L. Murray, ‘The Scottish Chancery in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries’, in K. Fianu and D. J. Guth (eds), Écrit et Pouvoir dans les 
Chancelleries Médiévales: Espace Français, Espace Anglais (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 133-51, at pp. 150-51. 
Master Richard Craig had held the title for around a month in late 1440. 
61 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 41. In 1496, for example, it is recorded in the Acts of the Lords of 
Council that ‘letters be written to the Directour and clerkis of the Chancellary chargeing thame to 
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intended to ‘add depth to the lines of communication’ between the administrative 
departments of chancery and exchequer and the policy-makers in council.62 This change 
coincided with another. Before 1476 matters which related to royal patronage, and which 
involved a third party, could be brought to the attention of the Lords of Council by 
purchasing a chancery brieve, under the Quarter-Seal.63 From 1476 Chalmers detects a ‘slight 
shift in emphasis’ from established practice, in that it became more common to use letters 
under the Signet in order to issue summonses. This he attributes to the need to manage the 
general increase in litigation, which by then provided work for two writing offices.64 It also 
had the effect, however, of potentially allowing greater oversight of the process by the king 
and his advisers. Chalmers rightly warns against ‘confident generalizations’ given the 
limited evidence, but it is interesting to note that Norman Macdougall identifies 1476 as the 
year in which William Scheves achieved his ‘most striking career breakthrough’, when he 
was appointed as co-adjutor of the vacant see of St Andrews, and became a member of the 
‘daily’ council.65 From that year onwards Scheves’ signature can be found upon numerous 
royal letters, and Macdougall suggests that he ‘usurped the functions’ of William Tulloch, 
Keeper of the Privy Seal and Archibald Whitelaw, Royal Secretary, the latter of whom ought 
to have had custody of the Signet.66 Not only, then, was the communication between 
chancery and council improved, but the authority of the council was also enhanced relative 
to that of the chancery, potentially bringing a variety of crown business far more closely 
under the scrutiny of the king than had been the case before. This was no doubt necessary 
given the increase in traffic, but James III’s decision to hand much of this newfound 
authority to Scheves, who until very recently had been his physician, would prove to be 
extremely unpopular.67  
It is likely that these changes were not wholly unrelated to another political upheaval which 
occurred at the same time. Between 1474 and 1476 a legal dispute occurred over the lands of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deliver the copy of the sade retour awtentikly to the saidis Wilzeame, lord Ruthven’, ADC, ii, pp. 25-
26. 
62 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 37. 
63 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
64 Ibid., p. 24. 
65 Ibid., p. 24; Macdougall, James III, pp. 147-48. 
66 The signet letters can be found in Spalding Misc., iv, p. 133 [discussed further below]; Fraser, 
Annandale, i, pp. 13-14; Edin. Chrs, p. 140; Bannatyne Misc., iii, p. 431. For the other letters, see Spalding 
Misc., iv, p. 134; Cal. Docs. Scot., iv, no. 1448; Morton Registrum, ii, p. 243; Cal. Docs. Scot., iv, App 1, no. 
30. Macdougall suggests that these probably amount to ‘only a fraction’ of those that Scheves actually 
countersigned. Macdougall, James III, p. 149. 
67 Scottish Formularies, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 2011), p. 241. 
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Cranshaws, involving Laurence Lord Oliphant and Sir John Swinton of that Ilk.68 The case 
was heard in the regality court of the duke of Albany, and his steward found in favour of 
Oliphant. Albany then claimed the thirty years’ worth of non-entry fees which became due 
as a result of the judgement, despite the fact that the money was due to the crown. In March 
1476 James III issued a summons to the jury to answer to the Lords Auditors of Causes and 
Complaints for their ‘unjust answer’ to the brieve procured by Albany.69 The result of this 
appeal, made at the July parliament, was inconclusive and so the king, using the 1471 
legislation against partial assizes highlighted in the previous chapter, summoned the entire 
committee of Lords Auditors before the Lords of Council to answer for their failure to reach 
a judgement.70 The records of the council unfortunately do not survive before 1478, but 
Albany was apparently successful in his aims.71 It is hard to see the episode as anything 
other than a deliberate attempt by Albany to undermine the authority of the king, and the 
credibility of his reforms to civil justice, for personal gain. A desire to prevent such a 
situation from arising again may give weight to the suggestion that the king brought the 
entire process of crown administration much more firmly under his direct control from 
August 1476, just a month after the Lords Auditors failed to provide justice, and that he 
might have preferred an unquestionably loyal man to oversee it on his behalf.  
The second period of administrative change followed the battle of Sauchieburn in 1488, 
when James III’s government was replaced overnight by that of his son. James IV has always 
been viewed as a far more successful monarch than his father, and on any particular 
criterion for good kingship it is difficult to disagree.72 The changes made to the ‘machinery’ 
of government between 1488 and 1492, however, suggest that James IV’s administration in 
fact reaped some of the rewards generated by James III’s unpopular decisions. The main 
transformation was in the composition and authority of the ‘daily’ council. In 1488 John 
Hepburn, prior of St Andrews, was granted custody of the Privy Seal, reaching ‘a height of 
personal influence and control over the administration of patronage unrivalled by either his 
predecessors or his successors.’73 All administration of crown resources was routed through 
the Privy Seal office, effectively suspending the Signet and bypassing the authority of 
                                                          
68 NRS GD12/49-51. Discussed in Macdougall, James III, pp. 157-58; Tanner, Scottish Parliament, pp. 21-
12; Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 23. 
69 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 211. 
70 NRS GD12/52; Tanner, Scottish Parliament, pp. 211-12. For the legislation see above, pp. 100-1. 
71 Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 212. 
72 For his reign see Macdougall, James IV. 
73 Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 50. 
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Secretary Whitelaw who was one of the few of James III’s ‘daily’ councillors who remained 
in post. The Privy Seal in effect became the seal of the ruling council, allowing the Hepburn 
faction to use crown assets to reward their supporters at the expense of those who had 
remained loyal to James III.74 There were simultaneous changes in respect of the exchequer 
and attendant crown land commissions, headed by the comptroller, which leased the king’s 
lands and oversaw the collection of rents and other duties, essentially distributing patronage 
at a local level.75 In 1469 the commissions were staffed by ‘fairly humble personnel’, 
chancery clerks and financial administrators, with minimal supervision from the council.76 
There were some gradual changes during James III’s reign, but after Sauchieburn the 
commissions were brought immediately and firmly under the control of the council, with 
twelve named members being granted ‘full power and special mandiment’ to set all vacant 
crown lands within the realm.77 This meant not only that royal councillors were much more 
likely to act as crown land commissioners, personally making grants in the localities, but the 
administrators who had been performing this function were accorded far greater status than 
was the case before.78 Chalmers suggests that the comptroller’s court went from being ‘an 
outreach of chancery’ in 1460 to being ‘an ad-hoc local sitting of the king’s council’ by 1500.79 
In effect, as new powers and heightened status accrued to the ‘daily’ council it became the 
body through which political influence was truly wielded.80 During the reign of James III the 
royal demesne had grown to the extent that the administration of crown lands became a 
greater, more politically important and therefore far more prestigious undertaking than had 
been the case before. After 1488 both the exchequer and the chancery were brought under 
the direct control of the council, which was now composed of men who actively wished to 
use this authority for political ends, rather than men whose remit was primarily 
administrative. This adjustment of apparatus allowed the council to grant crown lands in 
accordance with its own inclinations, which it did to the detriment of James III’s supporters 
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76 Ibid., p. 145. 
77 ER, x, pp. 629-30. Chalmers, ‘King’s Council’, p. 145. There was a substantial overlap between the 
lords in this group and those charged by parliament shortly afterwards to ‘serche and seik’ 
trespassers and bring them to justice. These extensive powers allowed the pursuit of personal 
grievances backed by parliamentary authority, and contributed to the rebellions of the following year. 
RPS 1488/10/45. Macdougall, James IV, p. 60; Boardman, ‘Politics and the Feud’, pp. 169-71. The 
events of 1488 and 1489 are discussed further in the final chapter. 
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in 1488.81 In order to maintain political stability, therefore, it became necessary that the 
council became far more representative. After 1492, the crown having weathered two 
rebellions in the interim, the council gradually came to include a broader cross-section of 
allegiances, with some of James III’s supporters being given important positions. Henry 
Arnot, abbot of Cambuskenneth became treasurer, while Bishop Elphinstone became Keeper 
of the Privy Seal.82 Conversely, Andrew, lord Gray, a ‘bitter opponent’ of the late king, was 
appointed Master of the King’s Household, while the earl of Angus became chancellor.83 By 
the end of James IV’s reign the council displayed a ‘much broader territorial, family, and 
banded [tied by bonding] representation’, allowing more equitable access to crown favour 
and patronage.84  
This is a startling transformation, and one which has perhaps not been fully appreciated. 
The rapid growth of the royal demesne during James III’s reign meant not only that 
litigation increased to an extent which the courts found difficult to manage, but also that the 
structures which had ensured that the king’s ‘natural’ counsellors could be consulted were, 
quite suddenly, completely inadequate to the task. As long as the status of the nobility was 
closely tied to local spheres of influence, and the royal demesne was mostly granted out in 
acts of patronage, parliament was an efficient and effective way for the requirement of 
consultation to be met. Once the large territorial lordships of the Albany Stewarts and 
Douglases had been annexed to the royal demesne the crown found itself with many more 
tenants than before, and the administration of crown lands took on a significance which it 
had never before enjoyed. This administration therefore became an important route to 
political influence. It seems likely that such appointments, which were previously the 
preserve of chancery clerks, became more attractive to the nobility, whose personal 
relationship to the king and position on the council would come to have a stronger bearing 
on their political influence than had been the case before.85 This goes some way to explaining 
both James III’s ‘evil counsellors’ who, with their growing administrative and judicial 
power, no doubt appeared that way to men such as the duke of Albany or the earl of Angus, 
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and James IV’s ability to govern in a much more consensual style than his father, relying on 
his council to provide counsel and consent, and almost dispensing with parliaments.86  
While the personality of a king undoubtedly had a profound bearing on how well he 
managed the challenging circumstances in which he found himself, therefore, it does not, by 
itself, provide an explanation for his approach to kingship. This is particularly true of James 
III, whose personality has come under severe criticism.87 Likewise, if ideology is given 
primacy at the expense of structural changes it will always support the contention that the 
king held a ‘dangerously exalted’ view of his role. Currently, the estates are praised for 
limiting the extent to which royal lands could be alienated, while the king is simultaneously 
criticised for his reluctance to distribute patronage; it is acknowledged that James III had to 
govern a hugely augmented royal demesne, with shifting power structures and 
expectations, yet his attempts at a parallel augmentation of crown authority in order to do so 
are condemned; the high frequency and great size of the parliaments during his reign are 
noted, but it is argued that he failed to seek the counsel of the great men of the realm, 
instead relying on lowborn favourites.88 James III may well have been greedy, mercurial, 
inept and belligerent but this cannot be assumed until we take account of the governmental 
structures within which he was operating, and the profound political changes which 
occurred in his lifetime. By 1490 John Ireland was able to put forward a rather different idea 
of kingship to that expressed by Hay thirty-four years earlier: 
The rial dignite is a hie and public honour and requires for the honour of god and 
profit of the peple a digne [exceptional], abill and wourthi persoune to governe the 
pepil and realme…the king resavis a croune of gold that signifyis his gret excellens 
and dignite our all his pepil. He is anoyntit to signifye and declar that the dignite riall 
he haldis of the hevinly king jhesus…89 
Even allowing for the natural divergences of emphasis between a scholar-cleric and a 
university-educated knight, the characterisation of the royal dignity as a ‘hie and public 
honour’ is suggestive of a shift in the zeitgeist. This is something different to Bower’s 
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221. 
89 Ireland, Meroure, pp. 149, 159. 
121 
 
advocacy of ‘strong’ kingship, with justice as the first concern of the crown, and Mapstone 
suggests that this section is the closest Ireland comes to ‘attributing to the monarch a quasi-
divine, almost mystical status’.90 Equally, however, it can be seen as an acceptance of the 
heightened royal authority necessary to govern directly a far greater number of subjects than 
before. While this certainly remains compatible with the view that the king ought to govern 
for the common good it is not a characterisation of royal authority which would have fitted 
well into the political milieu of the 1440s or 1450s. As political influence shifted from the 
franchises to the court of the king, so began a reinterpretation of public authority in which 
the crown, comprising both the king and his noble counsellor-administrators, was to have a 
far greater role in the lives of the governed. 
 
Parliament and Political Discourse 
Our understanding of the medieval institution of parliament has been revolutionised by the 
work of Roland Tanner. Tanner’s main concern was to underline the importance of the 
personal relationships and political aims of those who attended meetings of the estates and 
to demonstrate parliament’s resistance to royal control. In particular, he argued for the 
autonomy of the Lords of the Articles, the body which drafted legislation and which Rait 
had argued was little more than a tool of the king.91 Tanner has clearly demonstrated that 
Rait was mistaken in these views, and yet in placing parliamentary resistance at the centre of 
his argument he posits a highly oppositional model in which a ‘strong’ parliament was 
synonymous with the ability to modify royal policy.92 While there is no doubt that the late 
medieval Scottish parliament could deny taxation to the king, limit his ability to alienate his 
own lands and prevent him from going on campaign abroad this was not its purpose nor, 
necessarily, its aim. It was, essentially, the king’s great council; a formal advisory body. In 
theoretical terms it provided the mechanism though which the consent of the governed 
could be granted in order for the king to rule legitimately. Its practical function was to 
ensure that the realm actually was governed in accordance with the contemporary norms of 
good rule. Those who wished to advance their personal interests in parliament - whether 
this was the king, his counsellors or a group of individuals within the estates - had to 
represent those interests as being for the good of the realm as a whole in order for them to be 
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implemented. The ease with which this could be achieved did, of course, vary considerably 
with the prevailing political circumstances, but the need to reach a consensus, or even the 
appearance of consensus, meant that parliament tended to place an upper limit upon the 
worst excesses of individual ambition. The purpose of parliament was not to oppose the 
king per se, but to provide a forum in which claims to be acting for the good of the realm 
could be made and contested. Such arguments could take different forms, some of which 
will be discussed below, but once decisions were taken they were proclaimed throughout 
the kingdom by sheriffs, constables and bailies, thereby ensuring that they became common 
knowledge.  
Parliament’s ability to grant consent was underpinned by the Roman legal maxim quod 
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur – that which touches all ought to be approved by all – 
which was employed from the thirteenth century onwards in both the secular and 
ecclesiastical spheres to assert the authority of representative assemblies.93 It can be found, 
restated in somewhat more practical terms, in Hay’s Buke of the Gouernaunce of Princis: 
In some case it is nocht spedefull to ger thame [counsellors] opinly depone [declare] 
their consal in presence of all, bot quhilom [sometimes] it is gude to be done. In sic 
case may it be, for sumquhile all must be semblit, for general points of the communite 
and other points of commoun profit, and than sall thou bath be better lufit and mare 
doubtit [feared].94 
This is in contrast to Hay’s advice, noted in the previous chapter, that counsel be taken from 
each adviser separately, and shows the unique status of parliament both as a forum for 
debate and as the one in which questions pertaining to the kingdom as a whole ought to be 
addressed. This is Hay’s only use of the term ‘community’ to describe the kingdom, and it is 
possible that he is here deliberately attaching contemporary ideas of incorporation to the 
realm in order to make his point. Meetings of parliament undoubtedly provided the means 
by which a group of disparate individuals with competing interests could be transformed 
into a single political entity; indeed this was essential in order for parliament to fulfil its 
function. This entity did not, however, have any legal status independent of the crown. 
There was no mechanism which could have accommodated such a situation even if it were 
desirable, and it was not. As Brown argues, the emphasis upon the effectiveness of the 
estates as a ‘communal element’ in Scottish politics should not obscure the ‘principal 
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character of parliament as a royal institution, summoned, headed and largely directed by the 
crown.’95 The rights and privileges which pertained to its members were those of 
counselling the king and of assisting him in doing justice. Parliament may have imbued its 
members with some of the features of a communitas, most clearly the ability of a group of 
individuals to construe themselves as the realm as a whole, but it was a communitas which 
contained the king, rather than opposed him. He was the head of the body politic.96  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the oaths recorded in the 1445 parliament:  
Forma juramenti regis suis tribus statibus, etc. 
I sall be lele and trew to God and halykirk, and to the thre estatis of my realm, and ilk 
estate kepe, defende and governe in thar awne fredome and privilege, at my gudly 
power, eftir the lawis and custumis of the realm; the law, custume and statutis of the 
realm neyther to eik nor to myniss without the consent of the thre estatis, and na 
thing to wirk na use tuiching the commoun proffit of the realm bot consent of the thre 
estatis; the law and statutis maid be my forbearis keip and use in all punctis, at all my 
power, till all my leigis in all things, sa that thai repung nocht agane the faith. Sa help 
me God and this halydome, etc.97 
Forma fidelitatis prelatorum 
I sall be lele and trew to you, my liege lord, Schir James king of Scottis, and sall nocht 
heir your scaith, or se it, but I sall lat it at all my power, and warn you therof; your 
consell heil that ye schaw me; the best consale I can gif to you, quhen ye charge me in 
verbo Dei. And als help me God and haly ewangelis, etc.98 
Juramentum baronum, et ipsorum homagii juramentum 
I, B., becumis your man as my king, in land, lif, licht and lym, and warldlis honour, 
fewtie and lawtie, aganis all that leif and dee may; your consale celand that ye schaw 
to me; the best consale gevand, geif you charge me; your scaith nor dishonour to heir, 
nor se, bot I sall lat it at all my gudlie power and warn yow therof. Sa help me God 
etc.99 
Forma fidelitatis juramenti regi 
I sall be lele and trew to yow, my liege lord, Schir James king of Scotland; I sall nother 
heir your scaith nor se it bot I sall lat it at my power, and warn you therof; your 
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consell schewin to me I sall conseille; the best consall I can I sall gif youw, quhen ye 
charge me therwith. Sa help me God, etc.100 
Much emphasis has been placed upon the evidence that the first oath provides of the estates’ 
power to limit royal authority, and given their appearance during a period of minority 
government, in which the earl of Douglas dominated the council, this may be an accurate 
assessment.101 Those magnates who had experienced James I’s robust style of government 
were perhaps keen to ensure his son adopted a rather more consensual approach. The 
important promises made by the king, however, amount to agreeing that he would not 
change the laws, statutes or customs of the realm without the consent of parliament, and 
that he would take no decisions regarding the common profit of the realm without the 
consent of parliament. It is difficult to imagine how the king could, in practice, go about 
altering the laws of the realm without the agreement of the estates; an alternative 
mechanism for the dissemination of royal commands, which did not require the co-
operation of the political elites, would have had to be found.102  
Furthermore, the idea of the common profit, as we have seen in the burghs, was a highly 
malleable one which could be appropriated by different groups in order to advance their 
particular aims. There existed a common understanding that contentious political actions 
ought not to be undertaken for personal gain; they had to be necessary for the greater good. 
In practice, of course, this sometimes meant using conventional rhetoric to justify some 
rather heinous actions ex post facto, and this will be explored further in the final chapter. 
Nevertheless, the ideal of the common profit provided an important way in which the worst 
excesses of individual men could be limited, by ensuring that actions sanctioned by 
parliament fell within a range which could be agreed to be good for all. It is by no means 
certain that such individual men were always the king, and the extant parliamentary 
register, which records decisions but not debates, undoubtedly obscures the extent to which 
many of the more outré propositions made by certain members of the estates were 
immediately shouted down by the others.103 It follows that this mechanism certainly did, in 
principle, allow the estates to defy the king outright, although it is notable that the only 
occasion in the fifteenth century when this allegedly occurred, in 1436, was resoundingly 
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unsuccessful.104 Despite the collective political authority that parliament embodied, being 
the king would have conferred a considerable advantage over other members in deciding 
what was best for the realm. It must also not be forgotten that the oaths of 1445 were 
reciprocal. In particular, the promises made by the prelates and barons to offer counsel 
when asked clearly draw from the same body of customary, contractual ideas as those 
discussed in the previous chapters, in relation to bonding and to guilds. Their use in 1445 
may suggest that parliament was the forum in which the kings tenants-in-chief were 
expected to proffer most of their advice, and it is possible that the taking of this oath 
separated those who were entitled to counsel the king from those who were not, allowing 
them personally to offer advice when they were alone in the king’s presence or otherwise 
invited to do so. Circumscribing the power of the king to enact his own wishes did not, in 
and of itself, lead to good rule, and while there is no doubt that Tanner’s research shows just 
how much political conflict was embedded within meetings of the estates, and how often 
parliament was able to modify royal policy, its importance was as the location within the 
public domain in which king and estates came together to govern the realm. It was pursuit 
of the common profit, acknowledged by all as the best way to govern, which allowed 
political conflict to be successfully managed.  
The idea of the common profit was, of course, strongly connected to the rule of law, and this 
was ultimately the responsibility of the crown. The king was able to demonstrate a 
commitment to the common good in a highly practical way, by making tangible 
improvements to the lives of the governed. As discussed in the first chapter, Walter Bower’s 
concern for the jura publica was just as integral to good kingship as were the Aristotelian 
notions of the common profit which so concerned Hay.105 As Bower advises James II 
…you will have the power, when we are troubled by daily acts of tyranny or 
oppressed by robberies or pillaging, to relieve us from the distress that weighs us 
down, to draw up laws, to exercise justice, so that you may free the poor man from 
the powerful man…And you will remember that you have responsibility for the law, 
so that you may restrain the thief and check the robber. If you fail in this you cannot 
rule properly, you cannot be a lawmaker, but will confirm lawlessness.106  
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Or, as the Pluscarden chronicler has it, in slightly more succinct manner, ‘A ruler is so-called 
from ruling well; for where there is no rule there is no ruler’.107 Just as parliament could 
claim legitimacy for its actions on the basis of the common good, so it could invoke 
contemporary ideas of justice, couched in terms of care for the common people.108 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, such language is most often found used within parliaments when political 
authority is being forcefully asserted.  
In 1450, as Brown and Tanner both note, the holding of parliament symbolised ‘the renewal 
of active kingship’ after James II’s turbulent minority.109 One act states that ‘general pece be 
proclamyt ande kepit oute throu the realme that al man may travel surely and sickirly in 
marchandice ande uthir wayis in al placis throu the lande swa that na man nede til have 
assouerans of uthir bot the kingis pece be souer til al man’ before going on to recommend 
that ‘juste men be maid justecez [that] kennys and minister evinly justice alsweill of the grete 
als of the smal.’110 Shortly afterwards, an act is recorded ‘for the saueritie and favor of the 
pure pupil that laubouris the grunde’ which forbids lords to increase mails following 
acquisition of new lands, instead requiring that the terms of a pre-existing lease should be 
honoured.111 A final statute from the same parliament orders that ‘justicez, chaumirlanis, 
crownaris and uthir officiaris that makis course throu the lande ryde bot competent and esy 
nowmir to eschew grevans and hurting of the puple’, again invoking the good of the 
common people as a reason to curb the excesses of the nobility.112 The extent to which these 
acts created a demonstrable improvement in the circumstances of the commons, or indeed 
the extent to which they were actually expected to, is secondary, in this context, to the fact 
that the good of the people was used as justification for action. If a king wished forcefully to 
assert his authority, this rhetoric allowed him to do so.  
Nowhere is this clearer than in 1469, the year in which James III began his personal rule.113 
As has been noted, it was in this parliament that his kingship was proclaimed as imperial 
and that the Boyds were forfeited under reformulated treason charges. This augmentation of 
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royal authority was accompanied by a series of statutes, the purpose of which was to give 
the crown a greater degree of control over justice in the localities.114 These claims were again 
justified by invoking the plight of the poor commons. The first act, discussed in the previous 
chapter, stated that anyone who did not receive justice from his judge ordinary, whether 
‘justice, schireff, stewart, bailye, barone, provost or bailyis of burowis’, could appeal directly 
to the King’s Council.115 This was done to counteract judges ‘quhilkis wil nocht execut thare 
office and minstir justice to the pure pepil’ and the earl of Angus fell foul of the law in 
1471.116 As noted in the second chapter a further statute, relating to the election of burgh 
officers, dictated that the outgoing council was to choose the incoming council, and that no 
captain or constable of the king’s castles should have office in adjacent burghs ‘because of 
gret truble and contensione yeirly for the chesing of the [officers] throw multitud and clamor 
of commonis sympil personis’.117 A third piece of legislation was directed towards the 
problem of constables, sheriffs and bailies who, during fairs, parliament and general 
councils, ‘takis gret extorsionis of the kingis pure liegiis quhilk thai call thair dewitis and feis 
that is nocht aucht to thame’.118 It ordered that ‘na sic extorsionis be takin of the kingis liegiis 
under the payn of punycioune of thair personis at the kingis will and to be put fra the 
executione of thair office for a yeir’. And finally, in order to  
eschow the gret herschip and distructiounes of the kingis commonis malaris and 
inhabitaris [of] lordis landis throw the force of the brefe of distress, quhare ony 
soumes ar optenit be virtu of the said brefe upoune the lorde awnare of the ground, 
that the gudis and catal of the pure mennis inhabitaris of the ground ar takin and 
distrenyeit for the lordis dettis, quhare the malis extendis nocht to the avail of the det, 
it is avisit and ordanit in this present parliament that fra hyne furth the pure tenandis 
sal nocht be distrenyit for the lordis dettis forthir than his termes mail extendis.119 
In essence, this statute forbade the practice of seizing tenants’ goods in payment for the 
debts of their lords.120 If the value of the debt exceeded the value of the tenants’ rental, then 
the officer executing the brieve could claim from the lord’s goods held elsewhere. Most 
importantly, however, ‘quhare the dettoure has na moveble gudis bot his lande, the schireff 
before quham the said soume is recoverit be the brefe of distres sall ger sell the landis to the 
avail of the det and pay the creditour sua that the inhabitantis of the said landis be nocht 
                                                          
114 The connection is noted in Woodman, ‘Education and Episcopacy’, pp. 74-5. 
115 RPS 1469/16. Above, p. 100. 
116 RPS 1469/16.  
117 RPS 1469/19. Above, p. 69. 
118 RPS 1469/23. 
119 RPS 1469/26. 
120 The act is highlighted in Macfarlane, William Elphinstone, p. 108. 
128 
 
hurt nor grevit for thair lordis dettis.’121 Even allowing for the fact that debtors were 
permitted to redeem their debts within seven years, this would have been a dramatic change 
of policy.122 The earl of Angus was again amongst those who felt the effects of this legislation 
when, in 1486, land worth £155 12s 8d was apprised and sold by the sheriff of Forfar to settle 
a debt to Thomas Fotheringham, placing the earl in opposition to James III’s reforms yet 
again.123 In all of these examples royal authority was exercised and changes were 
implemented with the justification of acting for the good of the governed. The ‘poor 
commons’ are here acting as a rhetorical device in order to justify James III’s legislative 
programme, but this would have been ineffective if there had not been a fairly high level of 
dissatisfaction with the execution of justice in the localities. 
This formulation of the common profit, as justice for the governed, was not only employed 
to assert the authority of the crown. In 1458 two parallel acts dealt with royal authority in 
the localities. In the first it was ‘sene speidfull’ that ‘justice ayris be haldin and continewyt 
yerly out throu the realme for gude of the commownys’, while the second stated that 
because ‘all the estatis and specialy pure commownis ar sairly grevyt’ by the reformation of 
the chamberlain ayre, ‘the lordis in the name of the thre estatis exhortis oure soverane lorde 
that it plese him…to haif piete and consideracioun of the mony and gret inconvenientis that 
fallys on his pure liegis thar throu, and of his grace to provyde and remeide for 
reformacione tharof’.124 In fact, James II had been involved in a ‘costly war’ in England and 
Man, and the estates took the opportunity provided by a meeting of the estates to advise the 
king that he ought to turn his attention back to his kingdom:125 
sene Gode of his grace has send our soverane lorde sik progress and prosperite that 
all his rebellys and breikaris of his justice ar removit of his realme, and na maistirfull 
men nor party remanande that may cause ony breking in his realme, sa that his 
hieness be inclinyt in himself and his ministeris to the quiet and commowne profett 
of his realme, justice [to] be kepit amang his liegis, his thre estatis with all humilite 
exhortis ande requiris his hieness to be inclynit with sik diligence to the execucione of 
thir statutis and actis abwne writynge that God may be emplesit of him and all his 
liegis spirituale and temporale may be sa content of him that thai haif cause to pray 
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allmychtthy Gode for his prosperite and gif hertly thankynge to Gode that sende 
thame sik a prince to thar governour and defendour, etc.126 
The estates are ‘speaking’ directly to the king, using the language of justice and the common 
profit in order to frame their advice, and this is followed by a suggestion that attending to 
such business will earn him the prayers of all his lieges. As Tanner argues, the statute 
contains both a ‘conventional plea’ that the king maintain justice, and a more specific plea 
for stability after the disruption of the Douglas conflict in the early 1450s.127 It is not 
necessary to see these pleas as separate, however. The estates here are drawing upon the 
commonplaces of political advice literature in order to couch their rather forthright counsel 
in language to which the king could respond without difficulty. 
This can be seen again in 1473, when the estates were forced to respond to James III’s 
proposal to lead personally an army to ‘retake’ the duchy of Brittany from the French.128 This 
rather unlikely idea was an integral part of the king’s foreign policy objectives, or at least his 
diplomatic manoeuvring, and so the reaction of the estates must have been unwelcome in 
the extreme. Tanner characterises the resulting advisements as ‘some of the most detailed 
and manifest evidence of parliament resisting and modifying royal policy available in the 
fifteenth century.’129 The eight acts which address the question of ‘the passing of the king’ 
begin with the statement that ‘the lordis cane nocht in na wise gif thare counsale to his 
passage of his realme’ and continue with the observation that ‘his hienes may not in na wisis 
dispone him for his worschip to pas in this sesone, considering that he is unprovidit or 
furnyst of his expensis’.130 This last reveals that the grant of taxation to which the estates 
agreed in 1472 in order to fund the expedition remained uncollected, presumably due to the 
king’s intention to go abroad in person.131 The next advisement states that 
gif his hienes stande uterly deteremyt to pas in uthir contreis, the lordis findis na 
causis honorable nor acceptable for the sammyne, bot alanerly gif his hienes walde 
tak the labour on him tobe mediatour be his vertew, cure and diligence to trete, unite, 
concorde and frendeschip betuix his derrest bruther the king of France on the tapart, 
and his dere cousing and alia the duke of Burgunye on the tother, that to the 
eschewing of the gret effusioune of Cristin blude, distructiouns of citeis, wallit tounis, 
justice and policy committit ymangis thaim of tyme bigain and hable to be committit 
in tyme cumming, to the resisting of the gret enemy of Cristin faithe, the gret Turk, 
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sene throw the contencioune being betuix the said princis, the gretast part of 
Cristindome is trublit; and couthe this mater be tretit, concordit and appointit be the 
kingis gret gret nobilite, vertew and wisdome, it may redound in gret plesure to God, 
proffit to the maist part of Cristindome, gret honour and worschip to his croune, and 
habile to bringe him thairthrow to his richt nocht alanerly to the counte of Xancton 
[Saintonge], bot als of the duchery of Gillir [Gueldres].132 
If the king was determined to involve himself in European politics the estates felt that he 
should do so as a mediator between the duke of Burgundy and the king of France, rather 
than at the head of a Scottish army. By reconciling them, and perhaps even uniting them on 
crusade, James would demonstrate his statesmanship, and would thereby be able to secure 
the duchy of Gueldres and the county of Saintonge. The idea that this strategy might have 
been effective was, for several reasons, very much at odds with contemporary realpolitik; 
there was virtually no chance of James being given either territory, regardless of his skills as 
a mediator.133 The crux of the matter was that the estates were denying the king the means to 
fund his expedition, and many of the following advisements can be seen as a way of limiting 
further royal objections by proposing an alternative method by which his foreign policy 
ambitions could be achieved, no matter how unrealistic. Realism was not the goal; it was 
arguably to offer advice to the king in a way which would allow him graciously to accept 
the rather severe limitations that the estates were placing upon his plans. In order to achieve 
this, the estates again borrowed heavily from the tropes of advice to princes literature. 
In the Gouernaunce Hay states that ‘mortall bataillis ar caus of destructioun of realms and 
citeis’ and ‘destructioun of realmes and citeis is caus of destructioun of the lawis bathe of 
nature and of man’.134 He returns to the idea later in the book, with an assertion that men 
ought not to break promises or oaths because ‘be the faith and leautee of men all 
congregaciouns of men and unioun of citeis and wallit townis is manetenyt and 
uphaldyn’.135 References to ‘justice and policy’, can also be easily found, such as the 
following in his ‘Regiment of Princes’: 
…in gud faith all justice was first foundit 
And in justice all gudlynes was groundit 
All governance and all gud polycie 
And all gud workis are nurisit halelie.136 
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The estates’ reference to the destruction of cities, walled towns, justice and policy can be 
seen as a conscious decision to position their advice very firmly within the framework of 
ideal kingship. Adding references to the king’s virtue and wisdom, the common profit and 
the honour and worship of the crown cemented this impression even further, and put the 
kingdom at the heart of their concerns. Bower advises that  
In the matter of taxes and tallages and similar exactions…a king or any lord should 
seek from their subjects only that which their predecessors have received honestly, 
without deception or compulsion… Also, if a lord wishes to go on an expedition 
called by a church or a prince against heretics or pagans, and he does not have the 
means without serious loss, but lacks the wherewithal for the cost, he can ask for 
moderate help from those under him.137 
This perhaps explains why the estates chose to recast the king’s venture as a crusade rather 
than a quest for personal glory.138 By employing the easily-recognisable language of the 
mirrors for princes genre, the estates positioned their rather unwelcome ‘advice’ within a 
framework which conferred legitimacy, while also enhancing the arguments through an 
association with ideal kingship and, perhaps not least, depersonalising the counsel due to 
the conventional nature of the advice tropes. As in 1458, the good of the people can also be 
found invoked in the statutes of 1473 which followed the advisements. It was decided that 
no English cloth should come into the realm, ‘quhilk is gret hurt and skaithe to hienes in his 
custume and to his liegis that ar bare of money’, and that a warden and a deacon of craft 
were to oversee the work of the goldsmiths because ‘the pupill is oure gretly scaithit and 
dissavit tharthrow’.139 The good of all was again used as justification for legislation on the 
matter of the bullion, when it was ordained that ‘the actis and statutis maid apone the 
keiping of money within the realme be deuly keipit, and sic sercheouris and inquisitouris set 
tharupoune that will execut the said actis without corrupcioune or dissimulation for the 
commoune proffit of the realme.’140 As has been noted in the burghs, this formulation of the 
common profit shades well into actual fiscal profit; such discourse was just as useful for 
governing the kingdom as for running the towns. 
As might be expected, cognates of the ‘common profit’ often accompany the more divisive 
royal actions to which the estates consented. Large parliaments were often prompted by 
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demands for taxation, and this is perhaps best exemplified by the parliament of March 1479, 
in which the forfeiture of the duke of Albany was attempted and which, with a sederunt of 
at least 104, was the best attended of any in the late medieval period.141 The parliament had 
been called by James III to gain consent to a grant of taxation to fund the expenses for the 
marriage of his sister Margaret to Anthony earl Rivers, and the sum agreed – 10,000 merks 
Scots – was ‘the largest taxation of James III’s reign and probably the second largest of the 
fifteenth century’.142 This was granted ‘with unanimous consent and assent’.143 Consent was 
also explicitly granted to an act concerning the diocese of St Andrews, which was ‘primarily 
designed as a declaration of support’ for William Scheves, newly-appointed as the 
Archbishop of St Andrews.144 Scheves’s meteoric rise from minor household official via 
king’s physician to archbishop was not well-received by the Scottish clergy, and the favour 
bestowed upon him by the king was resented in many quarters; a letter sent from James III 
to the pope in 1483, the midst of the Lauder crisis, stated that the bishops ‘refuse to obey a 
man not of illustrious birth’.145 In particular, the act restated the right of the Archbishop of St 
Andrews to confirm the nominations of prior and abbots in the diocese.146 This privilege was 
stated not only to be ‘rycht honorable in the selve’, but to tend to the ‘comoune proffit of the 
realme and oure souverane lordis liegis’.147 Each abbey and priory within the diocese was to 
be given a copy of the act under the king’s great seal ‘to perpetuale memour of the said 
constitucione, act and deliverans of parliament in the conservacione and keping of the 
commoune gud of oure souveraine lordis realme and liegis’.148 The less likely it was that 
individual members of the estates would approve of a royal decision, the more important it 
was that the king gained the approval of parliament as a whole.  
In fact, it is within the contexts of royal finance and ecclesiastical appointments that the 
common profit is most likely to be found as a justification for action, mirroring the 
references to the crown noted above. In 1471, for example, there are three such acts. The first 
regards the purchasing of benefices at Rome by the clergy, in contravention of the king’s 
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rights of appointment, which is characterised as ‘in heirchip and distruccione of the 
religiousis placis and agayne the comone gud of the realme’.149 Another states that ‘the 
lordis that sal have the powar in al uther materis for the comoune profet of the realme at that 
tym to avise determyn and conclude apoune the said mater of the mone’.150 Finally, it was 
decided that more fishing boats ought to be acquired ‘for the comone gud of the realme and 
the gret encresis of riches to be brocht within the realme of uthir cuntreis’.151 The problem of 
money was ongoing in this period, and, as in the burghs, the rhetoric of the common good 
provided an inclusive framework within which to position financial decisions. In 1455 an act 
was passed in which it was ‘ordanyt that thar pass ane ambaxat to our haly fadir the pape 
for the obedience to be maide and certane privilegis to be purchest for the common gude of 
the realme.’152 As embassies also required to be paid for from extraordinary taxation, it is not 
unusual to find them linked to the good of the whole realm in this way.153 In this instance, 
‘thar expensis and instructiouns [were] referryt to our soverane lordis secret consale’.154 
Another can be found in 1476, when an embassy was sent to negotiate the marriage of James 
III’s sister, and ‘alsa to common apoune uthiris gret materis gif ony hapins to occure in the 
tim, and gif neid be to conclude thareapoune or to refferre again to the next parliament or 
generale consail as sal be thocht speidful be thaim for the common profit of the land’.155 A 
third was agreed in 1485, when it was ‘requirit that oure souveran lord sal sende his 
honerable ambassat to oure haly fader the paip for the making of his obedience and for the 
desiring of sic honerable and proffitable privilegez and faculteis for the king and the 
commoune gude of the realme.’ 156 In this case William Scheves offered to finance the trip at 
his own expense, ensuring that ‘tharefor he is maist convenient and maist honerable 
persoune that can be sende’.157 Scheves’s plans came to fruition in 1487 when he was made 
primate of Scotland, having petitioned the pope for the honour the previous year while he 
was in Rome, much to the consternation of the bishop of Glasgow.158 In the first parliament 
of James IV’s reign, in 1488, an act can be found which addresses both issues 
simultaneously: 
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as to the article of gret dampnagis and scaithis dayly done to all the realme be clerkis, 
religiousis and seclaris, quhilkis purchessis abbacyis and utheris beneficis in the court 
of Rome, quhilkis wes never tharat of befor…and takis apoune thayme to raise hevy 
and gret taxaciouns of prelatis and clerkis…and unit to bischoprikis or uthir in 
herschip and distruccione of the religiousis placis and agane the commoune gud of 
the realm, quhilkis thingis cause unestimable dampnages and scatht, considering the 
innomerabill riches that is had furthe of the realm tharthrow…the lordis thinkis 
expedient that na sic abbacyis nor uthir beneficis quhilkis wes newer at the court of 
Rome of befor be purchest be na seculere nor religiouse persouns…159 
The way in which these decisions are justified by reference to the good of all has clear 
parallels with the way such language was used in the burghs. This is in part due to the 
financial nature of the subject matter of many of the acts, but also because there is often 
reference to an outside entity, whether a trading partner, a potential ally through marriage 
or indeed the papacy. From the perspective of the crown, the rhetoric around the common 
profit of the realm became particularly effective if it could be used to position the king and 
the estates as a single entity, and this was more straightforward when a third party was 
involved, against which the crown and realm could be contrasted simultaneously. This is 
also suggested by three further examples from the records of parliament. The first two relate 
to the problems of the devalued currency, through which ‘his hienese and the haill body of 
the realme gretumly hurt and skathit’, while the third comes from the parliament which met 
shortly before Edward IV sent his army north in 1482, and states that if the English king 
chose to lead his army in person, he would be ‘resistit be oure soverane lord in proper 
persoune and withe the hale body of the realme to leyf and dee with his hienes in his 
defence’.160 In the event things turned out rather differently in 1482, but these few examples 
are suggestive of a preference on the part of the king, when attempting to galvanise his 
subjects, for the image of the realm as body with the king at its head, over that of the 
kingdom as a community.161 
Although the term res publica can be found in Latin sources from the start of the period 
under discussion, it appears to enter the vernacular as the ‘public good’, and cognates, from 
around the 1470s. Given the limitations of the evidence firm conclusions are difficult to 
draw, but there are no instances of vernacular terms attaching ‘publicness’ to the realm 
during James II’s reign in the sources examined for this thesis. Two examples can be found 
in the records of parliament. The first, from 1484, records that  
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anent the estatis and lordis that ar nocht cumin to this parlment to gif thare consale to 
the welefair and gude public of the realme, the lordis understandis that thai have 
faltit and sulde be blamyt and referris the blame of thaim to the kingis hienes.162 
 This nicely underlines the centrality of the consent of the estates to growing ideas of public 
authority and suggests that even in 1484 structures of counsel were such that non-
attendance at parliament could have negative consequences for the legitimisation of 
authority. A second statute, from 1490, records the decision that 
tuiching the renewing and confirmatioune to be maid of the confideratioune and 
aliancez of France and leikwise with Denmark and Espanye, it is thocht expedient be 
the saidis lordis of the articlis that thai desire to purches and optene sic frendschipis, 
liberteis and fredommez to the gude public of this realme and proffit of course of 
merchandise and sic thingis as salbe sene proffitable be the lords of the kingis secrett 
consale, that tharefore the body of the parliament has committ power to the 
chancellare and secrett consale to mak the instructiouns and avise sic desires as thai 
sall think expedient for the gude of the king, his realme and liegis, quhilk sall be done 
be the king and in the name of the hale body of his parliament.163 
This again provides evidence of James IV’s council accruing authority to itself, this time 
from the estates, and of the good of the realm being linked once more with its finances. In 
both instances, the idea of the public good is attached to matters which address directly the 
exercise of political authority. Use of such language was not confined to parliament. The few 
of James III’s letters that survive occasionally provide glimpses into the utility of these ideas 
when the king was dealing with individuals more directly, and in this context they are often 
used to underline crown authority in difficult negotiations. In 1476 the earl of Huntly 
received two letters from James III, countersigned by William Scheves.164 Each had regard to 
Huntly’s recent capture of Dingwall castle from the earl of Ross. The first was a signet letter, 
written in March, and is at pains to explain why the castle is being given to John Stewart 
instead of Huntly, suggesting that ‘had it saa bene that ye at our last being with us had 
dissirit the keeping of our castell we suld have preferrit you therein befor all utheris’, before 
going on to exhort the earl to the ‘gude perseverance and continuance in the invasioun of 
our said rebellis, and to the augmentatioun of the gude of oure croune and bene publick and 
comoun profitt of oure realme’.165 The second letter was sent under the privy seal, and 
recompenses the earl with ‘a hunder merkis worth of land liand in competent placis in the 
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north partis of oure realme’, and is notable for its highly business-like tone.166 The king has 
no hesitation in equating the crown both with the public good and the common profit, and 
this appears to be functioning as a reminder to the earl of his duty to the realm despite the 
king’s inability to reward him with Dingwall castle. Once a suitable substitute was decided 
upon, there was no longer a need to frame the correspondence in this way, and the less 
personal style of the privy seal became more appropriate. Another letter, to the earl of 
Northumberland in 1475, addresses the breaking of the truce between Scotland and England 
by Scottish raiding parties.167 The king raises the fact that English raiding parties have also 
been coming into Scotland, and that Edward IV still refuses to hand over Robert, lord Boyd, 
‘oure rebell and traitoure’, who is known to be sheltering in the earl’s lands of Alnwick. The 
letter ends with the observation that ‘nane effect can folow tharuppoun according to the 
trewis, quhilk we sall mak for oure part to be observit to the gud publik of baith the 
realmes’.168 The truce with England was a contentious policy during this period, and the 
king was here reinforcing its importance to the Scottish crown. The public good, expressed 
only rarely before the 1490s, can be seen as part of the vocabulary of enhanced royal 
authority which developed during James III’s reign. 
 
Conclusion 
Although king and crown were not separable they were also not synonymous, and nor were 
parliament and ‘community’. Communitarian language could be harnessed and deployed in 
support of royal aims, just as the crown was understood to encompass the realm as a whole. 
The expansion of the royal demesne in the later fifteenth century altered contemporary 
understandings of royal rights and jurisdiction, not least by making many more subjects 
than before direct tenants of the crown, and central to this process was an accrual of 
administrative authority to the King’s Council, which grew to oversee procedures which 
had previously operated under the auspices of the chancery or exchequer. This 
complemented the augmented judicial functions of the council, discussed in the previous 
chapter. These changes were not universally popular, and the rhetoric of the common profit, 
employed both within parliament and without, provided an important means by which 
authority was negotiated. In the medium term some of these tensions would be resolved, to 
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an extent, by the political manoeuvrings which followed the battle of Sauchieburn. These 
allowed a new administration to reconfigure the personnel of the royal council in line with 
the expectations of political influence held by the Scottish magnates. 
As Jacqueline Rose has argued, discussion of counsel was not simply ‘unthinking reiteration 
of moral commonplaces by those too intellectually unadventurous or politically timeserving 
to dream up resistance theory’.169 While the estates certainly modified the actions of 
particular kings, and reminded them of their duties, such advice was always very carefully 
phrased, and the crown itself was never impugned. The nobility derived their political 
authority wholly from the crown, and had a personal interest in maintaining its privileges. 
This is not to suggest that king and estates never disagreed, but the framework of principles 
within which they operated dictated that disagreements had to be confined to the good of 
the realm. Ideas of the common profit were used to bolster the arguments of each, and this 
discourse overlaid and facilitated the considerable amount of disagreement which must 
have characterised meetings. The underlying purpose of parliament was to convert many 
views into one – to allow a group of individuals to construe itself as the realm - and it must 
not be forgotten that for all the conflict detectable in the records agreement and consent 
resulted every time, however superficial this may have been on any given occasion. This 
shared framework of ideas and practices, rather than any corporate will on the part of the 
‘political community’, accounts for the sense that fifteenth-century politics were based upon 
co-operation. Given the potential for confrontation and violence, which were not always 
held in check, the veneration of consensus is understandable. 
Explicit theories of resistance would therefore have been entirely counter-productive, and it 
is perhaps better to think in terms of theories of accountability. The good of the realm was 
used by the estates in attempting to limit the less palatable ambitions of the Stewart kings, 
and by the kings themselves to assert their personal authority. There is no need to attribute 
altruism to any party simply because they employ such rhetoric, but we should not be in 
any more of a rush to assume cynicism. As in the burghs, the language of the ‘common 
profit’ could be wielded in a variety of situations, and its flexibility was the reason it 
retained its utility for the entire late medieval period. For most of the time this mechanism 
acted to keep political relations reasonably stable. The final chapter examines how the 
‘common profit’ and the public domain were used during periods of crisis. 
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Chapter Five: Protest and Rebellion in Fifteenth-Century Scotland 
 
Any attempt to define who might have been a member of the ‘political community’ in 
fifteenth-century Scotland runs instantly into difficulties.1 It is usually understood to include 
those who would have had a direct say in the politics of the realm, such as the great lords 
spiritual and temporal. It would be natural to assume that all members of the nobility were 
part of this community, and yet the nobility of late medieval Scotland was a heterogeneous 
group, in terms of political interests but also in terms of the amount of personal authority 
each was able to wield.2 Likewise, it might seem reasonable to include all members of the 
three estates, whose participation in governance was essential, yet discussions of the 
‘political community’ almost never include burgesses, who are assumed only to have had 
interest in or influence over matters of extraordinary taxation.3 Within contemporary 
political discourse the term ‘community’ was used almost solely in relation to the burghs, 
suggesting that incorporated status was an integral component of the concept. The ‘political 
community’ is therefore simply a convenient shorthand which most scholars of the period 
have used, in order to frame discussions of politics; indeed it has been adopted so 
enthusiastically precisely because it is so flexible. Ultimately, however, this community 
amounts to a group of unspecified individuals whom we then oblige to act corporately, 
obscuring both the complexity of the interpersonal relationships so essential to medieval 
political practice and the adaptability of communitarian ideas within political discourse. In 
particular, the positive attributes which tend to be associated with the idea of community – 
co-operation, an inclination towards the common good, and group solidarity - become 
attached to the nobility by default. If the ‘political community’ is instead replaced by the 
public domain, it is possible to restore the agency of individuals and groups. This allows for 
an exploration of the role of common knowledge in the negotiation of political authority, 
while analysis of the rhetorics of counsel and the common profit can focus upon who was 
able to harness them, why they did so and how successful they were in their aims.  
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In order to rule legitimately those in authority had to ensure that their actions became 
common knowledge. Courts and councils - from guild courts to parliament - provided an 
important means of doing this. The decisions made by these bodies might have been 
influenced by a wide variety of factors: custom, law, vested interests, local knowledge, 
petitions from individuals, political pragmatism or even idealism. Once proclaimed, 
however, the decisions made applied across the jurisdiction in question. One way in which a 
case could be made for a particular position to be adopted as policy or given as verdict was 
by demonstrating personal credibility, in the form of one’s good reputation, or indeed by 
highlighting the bad reputation, and therefore lack of credibility, of one’s opponent. Another 
way to make such a case was by invoking the good of the governed. As has been shown, 
there were a variety of methods of doing this, and an even greater variety of political 
circumstances to which such rhetoric could be applied. Using this language to frame 
political action circumscribed, over the longer term, the range of actions which could 
legitimately be taken. If one was obliged to claim to be acting for the common profit one’s 
actions had to fit within a range which would demonstrate this claim. This, of course, left 
plenty of room for interpretation, and was more or less easy to manipulate in any given set 
of circumstances, but the imperative to use the rhetoric placed a powerful upper limit upon 
the worst excesses of individual ambition, and provided a framework within which 
individuals who transgressed could be held to account. 
The acceptance of these norms meant that royal authority could not legitimately be 
challenged other than through a public demonstration that the king was failing to govern in 
accordance with such norms. Common knowledge of the king’s deficiencies had to be 
generated in order for a challenge to be successful, otherwise the challenger left himself 
open to accusations of treason or conspiracy. In practice this must have had the effect of 
requiring that any challenger was fairly sure either of the rightness of his cause or of a 
reasonable degree of support before taking action, and ideally both. The costs of standing 
alone publicly would have been very high, while the employment of communitarian 
rhetoric would have sounded very hollow if the opinion being voiced was known to be held 
only by the challenger. Likewise, a king who was commonly acknowledged to be flouting 
the norms of good kingship was taking a very great risk, by creating a space in which a 
successful challenge might be mounted against him.  
The following offers a reassessment of some of the political crises of the fifteenth century 
which have traditionally been considered as conflicts between crown and community, by 
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highlighting the use of the public domain in each. Particular attention will be given to the 
following elements: the role of parliament in generating common knowledge about political 
events, the burghs as an alternative space in which common knowledge could be generated, 
the denigration and defence of reputation within the public domain, and how claims to be 
upholding justice, the common profit and the crown itself could be made by different 
parties.  
 
Rebellion, Reputation and Slander: 1402, 1452 and 1482-83 
In 1452 James II stabbed the 8th earl of Douglas to death in Stirling castle.4 Much of our 
knowledge of the event comes from the Auchinleck chronicle, a short, incomplete vernacular 
narrative which discusses events between 1424 and 1455.5 Although the author remains 
anonymous he was clearly politically aware, and writes in order to convey his personal 
knowledge and experience rather than from a desire to educate or advise, as did Bower and 
Ireland. The author is interested in ‘what men say’.6 He gives the impression that he has 
personally taken part in discussions about the matters to which he refers, and is 
consequently drawing upon opinions other than his own. He is concerned primarily with 
local matters, and notes the reputation of many of those he discusses. Where Bower and 
Ireland draw upon classical or biblical references in order to reinforce their narratives, the 
Auchinleck chronicler draws heavily upon common knowledge. Overall, the work suggests 
that those who were politically active in the localities discussed such matters amongst 
themselves as a matter of course, and were well aware of the importance of the public 
domain for the exercise of political authority. 
By 1452 relations between the king and the earl of Douglas had been strained for some time, 
due to an ongoing dispute over the earldom of Wigtown. The men had reached an 
agreement the previous year and, according to the Auchinleck chronicler, ‘all gud 
scottismen war rycht blyth [glad] of that accordance’, suggesting that people had been 
taking a close interest in how the situation developed.7 Despite the accord the earl had 
requested a safe conduct in order to meet the king at Stirling, a move which spoke volumes 
                                                          
4 For discussion of the background and detail of these events see Brown, Black Douglases, pp. 283-311; 
McGladdery, James II, pp. 55-74; ‘James II’, pp. 189-95; Stevenson, Power and Propaganda, pp. 78-81. 
5 For a discussion of the chronicle and its strengths and limitations as a source for the reign see 
McGladdery, James II, pp. 116-24. 
6 Above, p. 35. 
7 Chron. Auchinleck, p. 165.  
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about their strained relations, and according to Auchinleck the king’s men had also 
promised to intervene if James II attempted to break this agreement.8 James II’s greatest 
concern, however, was the formation of a bond between Douglas and the earls of Crawford 
and Ross, each of whom were also causing him political difficulties in this period.9 As 
discussed in chapter three it was not in the interests of the crown to allow groups of 
magnates to form bonds which might threaten the king’s authority, and the king 
presumably felt justified in confronting Douglas about the matter. The Auchinleck chronicle 
relates the circumstances of the earl’s death: 
[Douglas] passit to the castell and spak with the king that tuke richt wele with him be 
apperans…and he come and dynit and sowpit, and thai said thair was a band betuix 
the said erll of dowglas and the erll of ross and the erll of craufurd and efter supper, 
at sevyne houris, the king than beand in the inner chalmer and the said erll, he 
chargit him to breke the forsaid band. He said he mycht nocht  nor wald nocht, than 
the king said ‘fals tratour sen thow will nocht I sall’, and stert sodanly till him with 
ane knyf, and straik him in at the colere and down in the body. And thai said that 
patrik gray straik him nixt the king with ane poll ax on the hed and strak out his 
harnes [brains], and syne [then] the gentillis that war with the king gaf thaim Ilkane 
[each one] a straik or twa with knyffis…10 
The hot-blooded killing of a magnate of Douglas’s stature, by the king himself, under safe 
conduct would have been as controversial an action of which it was possible to conceive by 
the political norms of the time. The immediacy of the account suggests that it was related by 
someone who knew exactly what had occurred in the king’s ‘inner chalmer’, and the 
chronicler resists any temptation to draw moral lessons from the incident. It is interesting to 
note, in relation to the chronicler’s observation that the king was joined in his violence by 
Patrick Gray and others, that only four years after the incident occurred Gilbert Hay 
asserted that  
Thare is gevin [to a knight] a maisse, that is to say pollax, in takenyng [token] that he 
is officer ryale and that gif ony man disobeyis till his wand that he lay that maisse on 
thame to hald the kingis rychtis on fut.11 
 
                                                          
8 Chron. Auchinleck., p. 165. 
9 Ibid., p. 163, which describes Crawford as ‘richt inobedient to the king’. For an example of the earl of 
Ross attempting to obstruct the truce with England in 1444 see above, pp. 43-44. 
10 Ibid., p. 165.  
11 Hay, Knychthede, p. 35. To ‘hald on fut’ is not a common expression, but appears to have the sense 
of ‘stand up for’. DSL, fut, n. 
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Mapstone suggests that the poleaxe is an addition by Hay to the list of armour given in the 
French Lancelot do Lak, with which he was probably familiar.12 
The king’s actions had severe repercussions. On 26 March James Douglas, William’s brother 
and now the ninth earl, came to Stirling, where the king had been only a few days before. 
According to Auchinleck, he 
blew out xxiiij hornis attanis [together] apon the king, and apon all the lordis that war 
with him that tyme, for the foule slauchter of his brother, And schewe all thair seles, 
at the corss, on ane letter with thair handis subscrivit, and tuke the letter and band it 
on ane burd [bound it on a board] and cuplit it till ane hors tale [horse’s tail] and gart 
draw it throu the towne, spekand richt sclanderfully of the king and all that war with 
him that tyme, and spulyeit all the toune and brint It.13 
This highly public protest was carefully staged in order to denounce the king’s actions. The 
significance of the market cross as a site for the generation of common knowledge was 
established in the first chapter, as was the method by which the horning ritual changed the 
status of wrongdoers in relation to the king’s authority.14 Douglas was making use of both of 
these circumstances to cast the king in the role of the wrongdoer while simultaneously 
highlighting his inability to adhere to his own laws. That the king should commit such a 
crime was doubly offensive, because it was he who was supposed to ensure justice in the 
realm. Not only was the earl protesting against his brother’s slaughter, therefore, his actions 
constituted an implicit accusation of hypocrisy. This complemented the explicit accusation 
of hypocrisy, which took the form of the ritual destruction of the safe conduct and, 
presumably, the ‘slanderous’ words uttered about the king. Douglas intended both his 
actions and his speech to become common knowledge, in order to challenge the king 
directly, and if there were any doubt that his use of the market cross would have ensured 
this, his burning of the town would certainly have had the desired effect.  
This presented James II with a difficulty. He could not possibly allow such slander to stand - 
he was obliged to protect his reputation in order for his authority to carry any weight at all – 
and yet the earl’s accusations were true. As king, James did not need to rely upon the market 
cross to generate common knowledge of the event, however. He had at his disposal the best 
mechanism possible, and he duly summoned a parliament, which met on 12 June. The 
resultant declaration is a remarkable document: 
                                                          
12 Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, p. 161. 
13 Chron. Auchinleck, p. 165. 
14 Above, pp. 26-27, 33. 
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[It has come to James II’s] notice that some of his enemies and rebels outwith and 
within his realm denigrate his good reputation and rashly dare to slander him, 
unjustly attempting to assert that [he] slaughtered the late earl of Douglas while he 
was under special respite and certain other sureties.  
Which slander troubling our same serene lord the king…he urgently requested 
that, in order to declare his innocence, [the three estates] inquire concerning the truth 
of the foregoing…and furthermore they shall be willing to compose express 
declarations for the future memory of the matter under authentic document.  
So the aforesaid three estates, attending to the request of an examination of the 
lord king, in order that justice and a better impression and a good reputation may be 
enjoyed concerning which are facts and which fictitious slanders…clearly established 
and proved that the aforementioned late William earl of Douglas, if he had any 
respites or other sureties from the said most excellent king on the day preceding his 
death, [they] were expressly renounced before a multitude of barons, magnates, 
knights and nobles. 
Furthermore, from…other clear deductions and proofs, it is openly established 
concerning the bonds and conspiracies made and initiated by the said earl with 
certain great magnates of the realm, in oppression and offence of the most serene 
royal majesty, and the public rebellions frequently perpetrated by him, his brothers 
and accomplices…and also after many flattering persuasions made both by the king 
and by various barons and nobles for agreeing and assisting the king against his 
rebels to the said Earl William on the day of his death…he is considered to have 
procured and produced the occasion of his death.15  
 
The concern for the king’s reputation stands out immediately, as does the absence of any 
specific details regarding ‘the truth of the forgoing’.16 The multitude of noblemen before 
whom Douglas supposedly renounced his safe conduct remain stubbornly anonymous; the 
‘clear deduction and proofs’ remain unspecified, and even in its entirety the last paragraph 
is deliberately obfuscatory. Although the vagueness is certainly intentional, and 
unavoidable given the circumstances, detail was not required for the declaration to serve its 
purpose, which was to publicly counter Douglas’s claims against the king and to ensure that 
the king’s version of events became common knowledge. Once parliament had exonerated 
James II it would have been almost impossible for any individual to gainsay the result, and 
this was why the king chose to ‘submit’ to the judgement of the estates. 
The matter did not end there. The Auchinleck chronicler continues his narrative, noting that 
in that samyn parliament thar was put on the nycht, on the parliament hous dure, ane 
letter under Sir Iames of douglas sele, and the sele of the erll of Ormond, and Sir 
James hammiltonnis, declynand fra the king Sayand that thai held nocht of him nor 
                                                          
15 RPS 1452/6/1. 
16 Tanner is correct when he suggests that its function was not simply to exonerate the king, but to 
address the ‘whispering campaign’ of the Douglases, although their actions could perhaps be 
characterised as somewhat louder than this. Tanner, Scottish Parliament, p. 137. 
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wald nocht hald with him, with mony uther sclanderous wordis, calland tham 
tratouris that war his secret counsall…17 
Denied the opportunity to participate in the parliamentary ‘debate’, and denied justice by its 
result, the Douglases were forced to resort to an alternative method of making their case 
within the public domain. Bill casting was one way of doing this, and the letter nailed to the 
door of the tolbooth announced their renunciation of allegiance as publicly as any formal 
method could.18 Even in these circumstances Douglas’s words are characterised as 
‘slanderous’ to the king, perhaps reflecting the fact that the matter had been decided in 
parliament, and was therefore considered settled. It is also possible that the chronicler was 
writing after 1455, when the struggle between James II and the Douglases was finally 
resolved in favour of the former. Douglas presumably considered the king’s secret council to 
be treacherous due to their promise to prevent the king from breaking the terms of the safe 
conduct and instead joining in the violent attack on the eighth earl.19 Evidence for the 
practice of bill casting during this period is scant, but there are two further examples. In 1445 
parliament recorded a transumpt of two papal bulls, and it is noted in the record that the 
bishop of Brechin and the official of St Andrews ‘extended summonses earlier to all and 
singular whom the said bulls concern by our letters, which [they] caused to be fastened 
publicly to the doors of the parish church of St Giles of Edinburgh’.20 This clearly constituted 
part of the process of ensuring that the summons became common knowledge. The second 
example also concerns the church. In 1476 William Cameron, prior of St Andrews, alleged 
that Walter Monipenne and Henry Stag, canons of the same church, ‘composed a public libel 
in regard to his [Cameron’s] evil rule, or knew who had composed it’, and that they had 
‘assigned it to James king of Scotland and patron of the said church’.21 While it is possible 
that this libel may have been circulated rather than posted the defamatory effect was very 
similar, as was the reaction provoked by the public besmirching of reputation. Cameron 
ordered the canons to be ‘publicly denounced as excommunicate’, against the instructions of 
William Scheves, by then co-adjutor of St Andrews.22 A petition directly to the pope by 
Monipenne and Stag resulted in an order that the matter be settled by the abbot of 
                                                          
17 Chron. Auchinleck, p. 166. 
18 For the practice of bill casting in late medieval England see C. Liddy, ‘Bill Casting and Political 
Communication: A Public Sphere in Late Medieval English Towns?’, in J. A. S. Telechea and B. A. 
Bolumburu (eds), La Gobernanza de la Ciuidad Europea en la Edad Media (Logroño, 2011), pp. 447-61. I 
am very grateful to Dr David Grummitt for supplying me with a copy of this article.  
19 Chron. Auchinleck, p. 165. 
20 RPS 1445/9. 
21 Calendar of Papal Registers, xiii: i, ed. W. H. Bliss et al. (London, 1896), p. 225-26. 
22 Ibid., p. 226. 
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Balmerino instead.23 With regard to the events of 1452, it is clear that Douglas’s rebellion 
was predicated upon a belief in the righteousness of his cause, and equally clear that he 
failed to convince others to side with him against the king. It is more than likely that some 
members of the estates felt deeply uneasy about condoning the king’s actions, and yet James 
II’s masterful manipulation of the public domain meant that refusing to do so would have 
involved questioning not only the king’s judgement, but also his word. Even though the 
‘truth’ of the matter was also common knowledge, the king’s reputation remained intact, for 
the time being.24  
This was less true of David, duke of Rothesay, who died in suspicious circumstances in 
1402.25 Rothesay was heir to the throne and had been acting as lieutenant for his father, 
Robert III. This was approved in a meeting of general council, in 1399:  
sen it is welesene et kennyt that our lorde the kynge for seknes of his persoun may 
nocht travail to governe the realme na restreygne trespassours and rebellours, it is 
sene to the consail maste expedient that the duc of Rothesay be the kyngis 
lieutenande generally throch al the kynrike for the terme of thre yhere…[and] he be 
oblygit be his lettres and suorne til governe his person and the office til hym 
committit with the consail general, and in the absence of thaim with the consail of 
wyse men and lele…the quhilkis consail general and special sal be obligit be thair 
lettres and sworne til gife hym lele consail for the comoun profite nocht hafande ee to 
fede na freydschyp…26 
The authority of the king was bestowed upon Rothesay in order that justice would be done 
in the realm. To ensure this, he was to take the advice of a special council of wise men, who 
are named in the original, who would steer him towards the common profit.27 This council 
was led by the duke of Albany, who was both chamberlain and Rothesay’s uncle. Boardman 
argues that Rothesay rejected the constraints placed upon him by the council, and began to 
act as if he were already the king.28 Albany and the earl of Douglas therefore decided that he 
was ‘simply too dangerous to be allowed to live’.29 
                                                          
23 Calendar of Papal Registers, p. 226. 
24 This is a slightly different emphasis to Tanner, who suggests that ‘Even if the outcome of the 
inquest was a foregone conclusion…James II had submitted himself to the judgement of the Three 
Estates, and it was the authority of the Estates, and no other, that declared him innocent’, Scottish 
Parliament, p. 138. 
25 The events surrounding this episode are grossly oversimplified here. For a full discussion see 
Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, pp. 223-54 and Brown, ‘I Have Thus Slain a Tyrant’, pp. 41-43. 
26 RPS 1399/1/3. 
27 This council is discussed further in Brown, ‘Lele Consail’, forthcoming. 
28 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, p. 235. 
29 Ibid., p. 244.  
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In late 1401 Rothesay was arrested and imprisoned by Albany’s supporters. He was later 
taken to Falkland castle, where he eventually died sometime between 25 and 27 March 
1402.30 Two later accounts survive of his death. The first, written by an English scribe, John 
Shirley, forms part of the Dethe of the Kynge of Scotis, which narrates the assassination of 
Rothesay’s younger brother, James I, in 1437, and was probably written around 1440.31 It 
states that Rothesay ‘began unlaufully to take uppoun him the roialle governaunce’ and that 
he was ‘fulle viceous in his living, as in depucellyng and deffouling of yong maydeyns, and 
in brekyng th’order of wedlock, be his foule ambycious lust of aduoutrie’.32 The lords and 
nobles of the realm, who are not specified, therefore dreaded that Rothesay might become 
king after his father ‘by cause of hys lyf soo opnly knowen vicious’, and so Albany and 
Douglas arranged for his capture.33 The Dethe relates that, in captivity, Rothesay, ‘by dures 
of famyn…eete his own hands, and died in grete distress and myserie, the wheche was 
ageinst Goddes lawe and mannes lawe and pitte to thinke that suche unrightwisse malisce 
schulde be doon to any prince, what soo evyr he bee.’34 The second account is rather more 
moderate, and can be found in the Scotichronicon.35 Bower states that ‘the lord king in council 
appointed certain councillors (powerful barons and knights) under oath to control and 
advise Sir David Stewart duke of Rothesay…because it appeared to the king and council 
that he engaged too often in unruly games and trivial sports’ but that Rothesay ‘hoped to 
free himself and, spurning his council of honourable men, gave himself up wholly once 
more to his previous frivolity’.36 According to Bower, Robert III ordered Albany to arrest 
Rothesay, so that ‘after punishment by the rod of discipline, he should know himself 
better.’37 The chronicle then states that Rothesay was arrested by the king’s messengers, and 
removed to Falkland by Albany, before adding that ‘after languishing with dysentery or (as 
some will have it) with hunger, he died’.38 
As Boardman argues, the fact that these two independent accounts share many of the same 
details suggests that the portrayal of Rothesay as a ‘moral degenerate’ was ‘widely 
                                                          
30 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, p. 244. 
31 Connolly, ‘Dethe of the Kynge of Scotis’. 
32 Ibid., p. 49. 
33 Ibid., p. 49. 
34 Ibid., p. 49. 
35 Chron. Bower, viii, pp. 37-41.  
36 Ibid., p. 39. 
37 Ibid., p. 39. 
38 Ibid., p. 39. 
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circulated’ within Scotland.39 Given that he died at the hands of two powerful rivals the fact 
that the account became common knowledge should, in itself, raise questions as to its 
veracity. As lieutenant and heir to the throne Rothesay can hardly be said to have taken 
royal governance upon himself unlawfully, and even the Dethe suggests that his fate was 
unduly harsh regardless. The element of the account that was verifiable by contemporaries, 
that Rothesay dispensed with the advice of his council, was enhanced with tales of his 
depravity in an attempt to posthumously tarnish his reputation, and to provide a reason for 
his ill treatment. This moulding of the narrative began far earlier than 1440, as is shown by 
the results of a parliamentary inquest into Rothesay’s death in 1402: 
Whereas recently [Albany and Douglas] caused our very beloved firstborn son the 
late David, duke of Rothesay … to be captured and personally arrested, and … to be 
detained in keeping at Falkland, where, by divine providence and not otherwise, it is 
discerned that he departed from this life; they … set out in our presence the very 
causes that moved them to this action, which, as they asserted, constrained them [to 
act] for the public good40 which we considered should not be imputed as a crime to 
the present persons … we consider as excused the aforementioned [Albany and 
Douglas] and anyone who took part in this affair with them … and in our said 
council we openly and publicly…declare, pronounce, and by this definitive sentence 
judge them and each of them to be innocent … Wherefore we strictly order and 
command all and singular our subjects, of whatever standing or condition they be, 
that they do not slander the said [Albany and Douglas] and their participants, 
accomplices or adherents in this deed, as aforesaid, by word or action, nor murmur 
against them in any way whereby their good reputation is hurt or any prejudice is 
generated, under all penalty which may be applicable hereafter in any way by 
law…41  
It is nowhere stated that Rothesay was dissolute, and yet it is clear that the actions of Albany 
and Douglas were deemed to be reasonable, that it was agreed they acted for the public 
good and that Rothesay deserved his fate. This inquest was certainly performing the same 
function as the declaration of 1452, which was to ensure that the perpetrators gained control 
of common knowledge about their crime, and the fact that it was the king’s words – 
however weak he was in practice – would have given the verdict a weight which would 
have been difficult to counterbalance. Just as in the later document, the concern with rumour 
and reputation is articulated explicitly. Moral degeneracy on its own was not reason enough 
                                                          
39 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, p. 242. A third, and very brief, French account does not mention the 
duke’s character at all, suggesting only that a ‘major dispute’ arose between Rothesay and his father, 
and that Albany ‘exceeded his instructions’ in putting the duke to death. It nevertheless indicates 
interest in the incident beyond Scotland. ‘La Vraie Cronique d’Escoce’, in D. Embree, E. D. Kennedy 
and K. Daly (eds), Short Scottish Prose Chronicles (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 107-8. 
40 pro publica utilitate. 
41 RPS 1402/5/1. Boardman characterises this inquest as ‘Albany and Douglas propaganda’, Early 
Stewart Kings, p. 243. 
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to imprison and starve the heir to the throne, and had it been this would undoubtedly have 
found its way into the public justification of the action. Rumours of Rothesay’s depravity 
instead served to provide an alternative narrative, and given the reach of Albany’s power 
after 1406, when he became governor of Scotland, it was unlikely to be challenged. As 
Boardman argues, the story also provided a rather convincing verification of the assertion, 
common within political advice, that a vicious prince inevitably brought ruin upon himself 
and his kingdom, which likely did nothing to hinder its circulation.42 
In 1482 James III mustered the royal host at Lauder Bridge to await the arrival of an English 
force led by the duke of Gloucester and the king’s brother Alexander, duke of Albany.43 
Instead of engaging in battle, however, the king was seized by a group of rebel noblemen 
including the earl of Angus and Andrew Stewart, the bishop-elect of Moray, who was also 
one of the king’s three half-uncles. Albany’s subsequent attempt to act as lieutenant for his 
brother had failed by early 1483, and the duke and the king were forced to make peace. This 
took the form of an indenture, dated 1483.44 It is a long document and provides ample 
evidence of the breakdown of the personal relationship between the two men. Two excerpts 
demonstrate both the extent of the animosity and the concern of the king to ensure that the 
reconciliation did nothing to harm his reputation: 
becaus ther is sclandir and murmir rising in the cuntre that the said noble and michty 
prince the duc of Albany wes posonit [poisoned] in oure soverane lordis presens and 
palace the said Alexander sall in plane parliament be his letter and sele declare and 
mak manifest the verite that he was never posonit, nor his deid be na maner of way 
imaginit, be oure said soverane lord nor be nane uthir persone or personis be 
counsaile command wit or consent of his hienez…45 
because the duc of Albany forsaid has arestit and takin Alexander Heume and 
certane of hys emes [uncles] and kynnysmen and kepis thame in ward be 
informacioune maid that thai suld have tane or slayne hym at the command of oure 
soverane lord, the quhilk his hienes has declarit untrew, the duc of Albany tharfor sal 
delyverit and put thame to fredome within xxxj dais…46 
Whether or not the king had in fact made two separate attempts upon his brother’s life it 
was necessary to prevent the circulation of any slanderous rumours to that effect, by 
ensuring that Albany agreed to appear in parliament and confirm the terms of the indenture. 
Albany’s transgressions are also rehearsed within the document. As in 1452, the importance 
                                                          
42 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, pp. 242-43. 
43 For these events, which are far from clear, see Macdougall, James III, pp. 187-202. 
44 NRS SP13/19, printed in APS, xii, pp. 31-33. Discussed above, p. 99. 
45 APS, xii, p. 32. 
46 Ibid., p. 32. 
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to the king of ensuring that magnates could not make bonds in contravention of royal 
authority is clear: 
[Albany] maid and causit to be maid certane unlauchfull and treasonable ligis and 
bandis contractis and appoyntmentis with the king of ingland and also with uthir 
persons baith within the realme of ingland and scotland contrar to oure souerane lord 
his realme and lieges in breking of his allegiance. He sal tharfore now…renunce 
discharge and gif oure forevir al the ligis and bandis forsaid and mak aith and faith 
nevir to make siclike in tyme tocum…47 
In the end Albany declined to appear in parliament, and was finally forfeited by the estates 
in July 1483.48 
All three incidents clearly show that the maintenance of reputation, and by extension 
credibility,  was absolutely central to each of these disputes. If slander or murmuring about 
the party in question was known to be occurring within the kingdom steps had to be taken 
to counteract it. This usually took the form of exoneration in parliament, from where the 
results of the ‘debate’ could become common knowledge, and formed a rebuttal to any 
complaint made by ritual protest, bill casting and even possibly diffidatio, using urban 
political space in order to generate common knowledge of the counter-narrative. It is 
noteworthy that in 1402 and in 1452 the perpetrator of the violence in both instances was 
able to gain control of common knowledge after the event. Perhaps because the kingdom 
was so divided in 1482, and both parties were still very much alive, a genuine compromise, 
rather than a ‘whitewash’, was required in order to resolve the dispute. Unfortunately, this 
resolution was to be fairly short-lived. 
 
Evil Counsel, the Common Good and the Crown: 1488-89 
In 1488 James III was killed in battle by a rebel army led by his eldest son James, duke of 
Rothesay.49 As Macdougall so effectively demonstrated, the circumstances of the 1488 
rebellion, and the later appointment of the duke of Albany’s son to the governorship of 
Scotland, served to encourage a highly negative and much embellished narrative of James 
III’s reign by sixteenth-century chroniclers.50 Central to this legend is a group of ‘lowborn 
                                                          
47 APS, xii, p. 32. 
48 RPS 1483/6/5-13. 
49 On the battle see Macdougall, James III, pp. 319-51 and James IV, pp. 1-44. 
50 N. Macdougall, ‘The Sources: A Reappraisal of the Legend’, in Brown (ed.), Scottish Society, pp. 10-
32. 
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favourites’ who influenced the king to the detriment of his ‘natural’ counsellors. The trope of 
the ‘wicked advisers’ was used repeatedly in late medieval political culture to justify actions 
against kings, and many elements of these later legends have now been thoroughly 
debunked.51 As argued in previous chapters, the reforms to civil justice during James III’s 
reign meant that crown administrators gained considerably more power and influence than 
had been the case before and it was likely this, along with the king’s willingness to promote 
and support Archbishop Scheves, which allowed the trope of the ‘lowborn favourites’ to be 
so successfully applied to his reign. In fact Andrew Stewart, having been elected bishop of 
Moray in April 1482 and having gained the keepership of the Privy Seal thereby, used the 
Lauder rebellion to force the king to provide him to the archbishopric of St Andrews in place 
of Scheves, who was made to resign.52 Stewart’s ambitions were thwarted by the failure of 
the rebellion, and Scheves was restored to the archbishopric by January 1483, after Albany 
explicitly promised to desist from any ‘vexacioun or distrublance’ of the archbishop’s person 
or benefice.53  
The first parliament of James IV’s reign, in October 1488, was carefully staged in order to 
bring to life the narrative of the evil counsellors which survived into the twentieth century. 
No matter how unpopular James III had been his killing amounted to regicide. As with the 
examples in 1402 and 1452, however, the new regime had to ensure that its actions were 
commonly acknowledged as being legitimate. One way to do this was to attack the late 
king’s supporters. John Ramsay, lord Bothwell became one of the main scapegoats, having 
held a number of administrative positions within James III’s government throughout the last 
years of the reign.54 He was forfeited in absentia, for a variety of misdeeds, including 
conspiring with the earl of Buchan but also 
for treasonably leading astray and misleading the late James king of Scots, our 
deceased prince, against the common good, the public interest and our realm,55 
causing him to oppress his prelates, barons, burgesses and lieges by common selling 
and buying of justice to their ultimate ruin, by the force of which thing foreign 
merchants coming to our kingdom were utterly ruined and plundered … [and for] 
                                                          
51 Macdougall, ‘The Sources’. See also N. Macdougall, ‘“It is I, the Earle of Mar”: In Search of Thomas 
Cochrane’, in R. Mason and N. Macdougall (eds), People and Power in Scotland: Essays in Honour of T. C. 
Smout (Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 28-49. On the phenomenon of the lowborn favourites see Rosenthal, 
‘The King's “Wicked Advisers”’, pp. 595-618, and Watts, Making of Polities, pp. 5, 147. 
52 Scottish Formularies, ed. Duncan, pp. 237, 238, 241, 242; Macdougall, James III, pp. 210-11. 
53 APS, xii, p. 33; Macdougall, James III, p. 211. 
54 For Ramsay’s career see Macdougall, James III, pp. 298-301. For his forfeiture, Macdougall, James IV, 
p. 59. 
55 contra commune bonum, rem publicam et regni nostri 
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causing our said late father to break various agreements and concords promised to 
us, at that time the prince, subscribed with our late father's sign manual, for the 
common peace and tranquillity of the realm, and to repudiate those things which 
were at various times promised, and [which] were broken…[and for] advising our 
aforesaid late father to go forth from Edinburgh Castle with arms and an abundance 
of men, after diverse agreements made by him at Blackness and elsewhere were 
broken, in order to attack us, his son, at that time the prince, at Stirling…56 
This is the trope of the evil counsellor in action, and the extent to which it was consciously 
used to delegitimise James III’s government can be inferred from the fact that Ramsay was 
pardoned a few years later.57 In a direct, public and symbolic substitution, Patrick Hepburn, 
lord Hailes was elevated to Bothwell in place of Ramsay, which was newly created as an 
earldom. The rhetoric leaves no room for doubt that the new king would be taking advice 
from men whose rank befitted the honour: 
our same supreme lord the king in the same parliament, in the presence of the three 
estates, and with their consent, approval and counsel - his royal majesty recognising 
that, by divine will, he has by right of inheritance taken on the loftiest and pre-
eminent [duties] of the realm, and therefore accepts that he should exalt the noble 
men who were commonly accustomed to be of the first rank for their honour and the 
dignity of the state, and to raise them to higher dignities, so that his other subjects, 
imitating their exemplary virtue, may prepare themselves for like things, and by 
[their] service may reap the reward - therefore his sacred royal majesty, wishing 
[those] royal qualities, the virtues of royal munificence, liberality and nobility, to 
shine out to [all] men - has made and erected the lordship of Bothwell into a free 
earldom…58 
This is certainly intended to draw as stark a contrast as possible between the new king and 
his father while also emphasising his ‘right of inheritance’, but it is also designed to bestow 
upon James IV’s supporters the attributes associated with good governance, restoring them 
to their ‘accustomed’ place, if not even higher. As was argued in the previous chapter, the 
Hepburn family took advantage of the crisis of 1488 to bring the chancery and exchequer 
much more closely within the purview of the royal council, and in particular under the 
Privy Seal, held by John Hepburn. This rearrangement of the administration was facilitated 
in no small part by the argument above, that James IV was now only prepared to ‘exalt’ his 
natural counsellors, the true nobility, who would set a shining example for others in the 
realm. The implication, of course, was that James III did the opposite, and that this led to his 
ruin. Small wonder that James IV chose to be crowned by Bishop Blacader of Glasgow in 
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place of Archbishop Scheves.59 This conscious and public elevation of king and courtiers 
would tend to support the argument, made in the previous chapter, that the Scottish crown 
had undergone something of an ideological transformation by the time John Ireland 
presented his Meroure of Wyssdome to James IV in 1490.  
The document which did most to discredit James III is known as the Articles of Aberdeen. 
Signed by the late king, these articles amounted to terms agreed by the opposing forces in 
advance of the battle of Sauchieburn, and which James III promptly broke very shortly after 
making them by riding south with his army.60 The original does not survive, but lord Glamis 
appears to have had possession of a copy, and stepped forward at the start of the inquiry 
into the battle, held on the eleventh day of the parliament. He had a personal interest in 
doing so, as he had been one of those who had refused to take part in the battle after the 
articles were signed, and he presumably wished this to be publicly acknowledged. The 
parliament record duly states that 
the erle of Huntlie, the erle of Erole, the Erle Marschell, the said Lord Glammys and 
utheris diverse baronis and utheris the kingis trew liegis left him [James III] and his 
dissaitful and perverst counsale and anherdit [adhered] to oure soverane lord that 
now is and his trew opynyoune for the commone gud of the realme.61 
It was then agreed that ‘the saidis articlis wes diverse tymes grantit to and brokyne be the 
perverst counsale of diverse persouns’, that ‘the slauchteris committ and done in the feild of 
[Stirling], quhar oure soverane lordis faider happinnit to be slane…wes aluterly [entirely] in 
thar defalt and colourit dyssate [deceit] done be him and his perverst counsale’, and that 
James IV and his ‘trew lordis and barouns’ were ‘innocent, quhyt and fre of the saidis 
slauchteris feilde and all persute [pursuit] of the occasioune and cause of the samyne’.62 
Several statutes which followed again emphasised the consultative nature of James IV’s 
government, while enacting some deeply divisive measures. One act, for example, stated 
that 
oure soverane lord, movit of piete, withe the counsall of his lordis, has avisit that all 
the gudis movabill belanging to the pure unlandit folkis be restorit and deliverit 
agane. And be cause thar wes diverse one his opinyeone reft be the persounis of the 
uthir opynyone, that tharfor his hienes gef command to tak of the gret men being in 
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his contrar, sic as lordis of parliament and baronis, that thay gudis sene they wer 
takyne in sic tyme of trubile be nocht restorit.63 
The fiction of the ‘perverst counsale’, therefore, was not used simply to tarnish James III’s 
reputation, although this was clearly essential, but to demarcate James IV’s supporters from 
his enemies. Those who stood against him had aided the downfall of his father through their 
wicked advice, and were therefore guilty of treason and could be punished appropriately. A 
second act specified that all officers who stood against the king in battle, ‘contrar the 
commone gud of the realme and distruccioune of the sammyne’, were to  be ‘secludit and 
suspendit fra the saidis officis for the space of thre yeris nixt to cum’.64 This included 
‘wardanis, justicis, schirreffis, stewartis, bailyeis, lieutenandis and all uthire officiaris 
quhilkis has the samyne in heritage’.65 In a fairly transparent piece of manoeuvring both the 
death of James III and the destruction of the realm were blamed upon those who had 
supported him against the rebels, allowing the offices to be dispensed as patronage to the 
adherents of the new king.66 Instead of the fiction of evil counsel, most appropriate to those 
who would have been advising the king personally, this act was framed in terms of loyalty 
to the realm, an egregious and blatant misuse of the concept. 
Presumably the fiction of ‘perverst counsale’ would also have been intended to stifle any 
accusations of regicide, or at least of partisanship, which might have been levelled by men 
such as Archbishop Scheves, Secretary Whitelaw and Bishop Elphinstone - all counsellors of 
James III and all present in parliament.67 Macdougall argues that this parliament was largely 
controlled by the Hepburn family, as James IV’s supporters, and suggests that ‘either 
because they wished to lay the ghost of the late king once and for all, or because it was 
forced on them, the Hepburn regime allowed the reasons for the late king’s demise to be 
debated by the entire parliament on its final day.’68 In fact, they could hardly do otherwise. 
Parliament was the forum in which common knowledge of the outcome of the battle was 
decided, and from which that knowledge was disseminated. As has been shown, James II 
and James III each understandably wished to mark the beginning of his personal rule by 
making strong statements of royal authority within parliament, using the language of the 
common good and invoking justice for the ‘poor lieges’ in order to legitimise them. James 
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IV’s first priority was rather different; he had to square the circle of asserting legitimate 
royal authority for the good of the whole realm, while being deeply opposed by a great 
many of the subjects within it. If the new regime wished to claim the authority which 
belonged to the crown they had to demonstrate publicly that their actions were done for the 
benefit of all, hence the rhetoric of the common good and public interest of the realm. This 
rhetoric was not infinitely elastic, however, and any regime which made such claims while 
failing to take any parallel practical measures would soon find that the rhetoric became 
wholly ineffective, or even that it could be appropriated by other groups. This is precisely 
what happened in 1489. As Steve Boardman has shown, the victory at Sauchieburn was used 
by the new government to ‘ruthlessly undermine’ political rivals and to validate acts of 
‘political spite’ through the machinery of royal government.69 In particular, long-running 
feuds, which contributed significantly to the tensions of James III’s reign, were played out 
upon a far larger stage than would otherwise have been the case, and while that king’s 
supporters were punished, the new government shielded themselves and their allies from 
any repercussions.70 In addition, James III had left large amounts of money with his 
supporters, in the form of treasure, before going into battle, and even brought £4000 in gold 
onto the field itself.71 This was gradually handed in, under duress, by those who had 
possession of it; according to the Treasurer’s Accounts £24,000 was eventually recouped.72 
The attempts by the victors to reclaim it would turn out to be highly contentious, however, 
and to increase the feeling of injustice even further. Under such circumstances it is hardly a 
surprise that formal protests should have occurred, and this took the form of two linked 
rebellions against James IV’s government, in the north east and south west of Scotland.  
The exact sequence of events leading up to the 1489 rebellions is difficult to ascertain.73 That 
James IV’s regime had chosen to settle old scores using the resources of the crown caused 
deep divisions within the realm, and made good governance almost impossible. During 
April 1489 a messenger was sent to the north-east, with letters regarding the raising of a 
tax.74 According to George Buchanan’s sixteenth-century history, this imposition was too 
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much for Alexander, lord Forbes, who had been a committed supporter of James III, and 
who took to the streets of Aberdeen to protest: 
Alexander Forbes, chief of a noble family, carried [James III’s] shirt upon a spear (all 
over bloody and torn, with the marks of the wounds he received), through Aberdeen, 
and all the chief towns of the adjacent country; and, as if it had been by publick 
proclamation, he excited all men, by the voice of an herauld, to rise in arms to avenge 
so nefarious a fact [the slaying of the king in battle].75 
No contemporary account of this protest exists but given the parallels with events in the 
west of Scotland, discussed below, and the supporting documentation for each rebellion it is 
worth including Buchanan’s account here. Forbes’s actions, if such they were, constitute a 
conscious use of the public domain in order to generate common knowledge of his dissent. 
The parallels with the action of the ninth earl of Douglas are clear; Forbes, denied the 
opportunity to influence proceedings legitimately, took to the streets of the burgh as an 
alternative method of making his point. The repetition of the protest in ‘all the adjacent 
towns’ suggests that he wished knowledge of his actions to become as widespread as 
possible, in order to gain support. Macdougall notes the proximity of the protest to Easter, 
suggesting that Forbes was deliberately making a reference to Christ’s Passion, and that a 
poem by Robert Henryson, entitled ‘The Bludy Serk’, which makes the same reference, may 
have been inspired by the protest itself.76 In September of that year, a list of ‘artikilis and 
opinionis’ relating to the demands of the rebels were copied into the Aberdeen burgh 
council register. It contains four demands in relation to the governance of the realm: 
In the first, quhar our soverane lorde was slayne, and nay punicion maide tharfor 
apone the treasonabile vile personis that putt thair handis violentlie on his maist 
nobile persoune, quhais saule God assolze, to be for punicioun of thay tresonabile 
personis committaris of the saide slauchter.  
Secundly, for the reformacione of the misgoverance of our souerane lordis tresour 
and disposition of his heritage, menesand [diminishing] his auctorite and croune, and 
als for the remeide and souerte of our soverane lordis maist nobile persone, and of 
our lordis his brether, and inlikwase his tresour, strincates, and artalzery, to be put in 
souer and comptabile mennys handis, to the utilite and profit of our souerane lord 
and his successouris, be the avise and consal of the thre estatis.  
Asua, that all ransomis tane be ony maner of mane of ony of the kingis lieges, 
spirituale or temporale, be restorit and gevin agane.  
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And asua that his lawis and justice be ministerit throu his realme to all his lieges 
equaly, according to the plesance of Gode, commone profit of the realme and lieges, 
and grantit thar commone sele thairapone.77 
 
Although the authors of the ‘artikilis and opinionis’ are anonymous, they constitute a clear 
and robust statement of support by the burgesses of Aberdeen for the northern rebels. The 
demands are articulated in terms of the defence of the king, crown and realm against the 
‘treasonabile personis’, who killed the rightful king and have yet to be brought to justice. 
They sought to restore balance in the kingdom by taking the royal treasure out of the hands 
of the traitors and allowing parliament to oversee its use, returning ransoms paid by James 
III’s supporters, and ensuring justice was done equally throughout the realm.  
By 23 April another insurrection had begun, in the west.78 This was led by Robert, lord Lyle 
and John Stewart, earl of Lennox who, up until then, had been supporters of James IV, and 
had been ‘blatantly abusing’ their shrieval jurisdiction to attack those who had supported 
James III.79 Macdougall argues that the new government had to be seen to be able to respond 
to the predations of these men, or risk rebellion on a much larger scale.80 According to 
Bishop Leslie’s history, written in 1561: 
the Erle of Lennox and Lord Lylle, with utheris thair assistaris, nochtwithstanding 
that thay had bene with [James IV] at the slauchter of his fader, mofeit throch invy 
that the King wes mare governit be utheris of the faction nor be thame, convenit ane 
greit company, and raisit the kingis bludy sark for thair baner; and command 
fordward to Striveling to invaid the King and his company, wer ourthrawin at the 
moss…81 
Macdougall suggests that this use of the ‘bludy sark’ as a banner was due either to  the 
‘early collusion’ of the two groups, or to the western rebels adopting the tactics of the 
northern group in order to ‘lend respectability’ to their cause.82 It is, of course, possible that 
only one account is accurate and the other is mistaken, but by the autumn the two sets of 
rebels were working together. A second document, known as the Lennox Apologia, was sent 
to James IV by the western rebels, after their defeat at the battle of Gartloaning (which Leslie 
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calls ‘the moss’) in October 1489.83 This appears to be a much-expanded version of the 
Aberdeen demands, and although it is not clear which set of articles was formulated first, 
Boardman argues convincingly that the earlier Aberdeen articles had ‘formed the basis of a 
call to rebellion against the government’, while the Lennox Apologia was being presented 
‘as a petition of complaint directly to the King and (it was envisaged) his three estates in 
parliament’.84 According to Boardman ‘convincing, specific reasons’ for the western 
rebellion remain to be found, but it was composed of members of the new regime who were 
either dissatisfied with their rewards or ‘alarmed by the behaviour of certain of their former 
allies’.85 Macdougall suggests that the Lennox Apologia is, at one level, ‘simply the 
complaint of a faction excluded from real power against those who had it’, but that the 
charges that it makes are also ‘broadly justified’.86 Notwithstanding the fact that the four 
articles may not have been the invention of the western rebels themselves, it is surely at least 
possible that they articulate the true reasons for the rebellion. The actions of James IV’s 
government openly contradicted the accepted norms of good rule, and the rebels were 
therefore well within their rights to bring this to the attention of their new king. There is a 
world of difference between the structured resistance to and modification of royal policy 
possible by a large group within a well-attended parliament, and the calculated use of the 
full powers of the crown to exploit those outwith the king’s inner circle for personal gain. 
Just as the king ultimately had the right to act upon his own wishes, the nobility had the 
right to be consulted by him and to advise upon those actions.87 Completely excluding 
certain groups from power in such a way rendered the actions of the new regime 
illegitimate, in practice as well as in theory, and the vocabulary and concepts of good 
governance provided the means by which such abuses could be rectified. 
As in Aberdeen, the rebels articulate these problems very clearly indeed. At the centre of 
their grievances is the matter of who killed James III. The verdict of the 1488 inquest, that the 
king ‘happenit to be slane’ was wholly unsatisfactory, particularly as the accusations of 
treason by the new regime were being simultaneously levied against those men who 
supposedly led James III astray with their counsel and those who were responsible for his 
death. According to the Lennox Apologia, the reason that James III’s killers were still at 
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large was due to the influence of ‘parciall personis’, who worked to the ‘perpetuall 
defamacioune’ of James IV and his realm.88 Moreover, it asserts that a group of ‘weill avisit 
lordis’, who signed an agreement before the battle of Sauchieburn promising not to harm the 
king, ought to be able to be ‘purgit of the said maist cruell slachter’, that is, publicly 
exonerated.89 Once justice had been done in this way, all men would ‘tak exemple’ from the 
treasonable killers ‘nocht to commyt sic hewy crymes, or to put violent handis on ony 
Cristyn prince’.90 This is clearly an attempt to cast the rebels in the role of defenders of the 
crown, to restore their tarnished reputations and to remove the ability of the new regime to 
use the death of the king to their advantage. Implicit within the ‘instructionis’ is the 
suggestion that as long as justice was not done the new regime was tacitly condoning James 
III’s slaughter. The matter of the king’s death would continue to be an embarrassment, and 
an act of 1492 went as far as offering a reward of 100 merks worth of land to anyone who 
could ‘schew to the king and mak it suthfastly knawin of veray verite quhat persone or 
persounis wer the slaaris of his faider withe thare handis’.91 This was done ‘for the eschewin 
and cessing of the hevy murmour and voce of the peple of the ded and slauchter of 
umquhile oure soverane lordis faider’.92 
The western rebels were very careful to make a clear distinction between the men around 
James IV who were ‘parciall personis’ and those who were ‘trew, weill avisit lordis’, and 
Scheves, whom the former had ‘schapin [planned] now of late without tytill or colour of 
richt to depryve and distroy’ is cited as one of the latter.93 Perhaps most importantly of all, 
the former are named.94 In sharp contrast to 1488 the disaffected are not employing the trope 
of the wicked advisers in order to justify action against the king. Instead, the rebels are 
stating a legitimate grievance against a group of individuals who have ‘greppit and applyit 
to thaim and to thair assistaris the haile autorite and strinthts of this realme’, for their 
‘singular availe and profite’.95 This was demonstrably true, and must have been common 
knowledge at the time. In order to address this problem, the rebels frame the articles with 
references to the good of the king and of the realm itself, emphasising that they are not 
making a challenge to royal authority, but attempting to redress a wrong. Key to this, as in 
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Aberdeen, is their insistence upon involving parliament. The estates are to oversee the 
administration of the royal treasure, and to advise upon the admission of the proposed 
articles. Most importantly, the rebels articulate a willingness to be judged by the king and 
estates ‘except the parciall personis forsaidis’, if they were thought to have done anything 
‘contrar to his Hienes and the common profite of his realme’.96 The impression given is of 
men confident that right is on their side. 
The integrity of the realm was put forward as the central concern of the rebels. The ‘parciall 
personis’ represent ‘hevy and greit danger and distruction apparand to his Heines and 
realme’, while the rebels have at heart ‘the honour and weilfair of his croune and realme’.97 
The ‘trew baronis’ have been ‘disherist and destroyed… under colour of our soverane Lordis 
autoritie’ by these men, who wish to ‘ring [reign] in this puyr realme, to the uter 
distructioun of the samyn’.98 It is very easy to see such assertions as a conventional framing 
device for the promotion of personal interests; this is exactly the kind of rhetoric which 
would be used if the rebels were concerned solely with manoeuvring their way back into a 
position of influence. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the desire of Lennox 
and Lyle to regain their position, however self-interested, was incompatible with a sincere 
desire to avert the destruction of the realm. As discussed in chapter three the personal 
interests of the nobility were inextricably linked to the governance of the kingdom, and this 
was dramatically underlined in 1489 when the distribution of authority within it became 
skewed to the point of rebellion. The actions of the government after Sauchieburn could 
hardly have been more destabilising, and the way to restore order was to ensure that 
authority was redistributed as fairly as possible. In fact this is eventually what happened. By 
early 1490, although the ‘parciall personis’ were not removed, both Lyle and Lennox were 
pardoned and brought into the government, while many other changes of personnel at court 
meant that further rebellion was averted.99 
The final paragraph of the Lennox Apologia is also instructive with regard to the importance 
of the public domain for such protests. The rebels state that if the ‘parciall personis’ contrive 
to prevent the articles being accepted by the king ‘we man mak thir articils to be schawin to 
al Cristin Princis, sua that our innocence may be understande and seyne, and the manifest 
iniuris and wrangis…be publist and maid knawin throw al the warld’. This certainly has 
                                                          
96 Fraser, Lennox, ii, pp. 129-30. 
97 Ibid., p. 130. 
98 Ibid., p. 130. 
99 Macdougall, James IV, p. 82; above, p. 118-19. 
160 
 
similarities to the arguments employed in parliament in 1473 to prevent James III from 
going on campaign, albeit they are rather different in tone, and is yet again suggestive of the 
importance placed by those in authority upon one’s reputation abroad. It also speaks to the 
capacity of the public domain to potentially limit the worst excesses of individuals, by 
forcing them to self-regulate through the threat of social censure. If the arguments within the 
Lennox Apologia were insufficient to prompt action, the threat of condemnation abroad 
could be brought to bear against those who flouted the norms of good governance. It is 
perhaps this, more than anything, which suggests that the rhetoric of the defence of the 
realm was, in this case, fairly closely aligned with the reality.  
 
Conclusion 
From the evidence presented above it is clear that the concepts relating to good governance 
– justice, the common profit, the public good and the crown itself – could be put to use in a 
wide variety of circumstances in order to legitimise political actions; indeed they formed an 
integral part of the process by which political authority was negotiated and contested. This 
process was, by necessity, a public one. Common knowledge of the personal credibility of 
the participants informed judgments made by others upon the claims being put forward, 
and such knowledge therefore had to be established within the public domain. There were 
different ways of doing this. Sanction by parliament was the most effective, but this was in 
practice only open to those with royal or quasi-royal authority, such as James II in 1452, the 
duke of Albany in 1402 or James IV’s regime in 1488, who could relatively easily construe 
their personal actions as being for the good of the realm. For those unable to claim 
parliamentary authority carefully-staged public protests were most effective. Whether 
protesting against the actions of the king, as in 1452, or acting in defence of the crown, as in 
1489, these demonstrations were heavy with symbolism, and used the same rhetoric of good 
governance and personal credibility, or lack thereof, in order to achieve their ends. 
It is significant that such rhetoric was the means by which authority was critiqued as well as 
asserted. The common good was not simply a phrase which could be inserted into political 
negotiations in order to supply a veneer of sincerity. Instead, it represented the ideal of 
medieval governance. Rulers, or perhaps more often their counsellors, could be held to this 
standard if necessary. It was certainly possible for a faction with enough power to use such 
rhetoric to justify actions which benefited only themselves, but it is telling that in such 
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situations use of the common good was considered, if anything, even more important. The 
need to act for the common good, as with the need to maintain a good reputation, ensured 
that even during the most severe political crises the rules, principles and values enumerated 
so extensively within the mirrors for princes were acknowledged by all. 
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Conclusions: The Public Domain in Early Renaissance Scotland 
 
The clearest conclusion to emerge from this work is the importance of the public domain for 
the exercise of political authority. Rituals such as the swearing of oaths and the proclamation 
of decisions were not simply functional but symbolic, allowing common knowledge of the 
actions to be generated and disseminated. Such rituals took place as part of urban conciliar 
government, whether in burgh or guild, as part of local courts and aristocratic councils and 
as part of the exercise of royal and parliamentary authority. Their correct enactment was 
closely tied to contemporary ideas of good governance which, by necessity, relied upon 
people understanding the decisions which had been made. Only once such knowledge had 
been generated could people be held accountable for any transgressions, and penalties 
which involved a change in the status of the wrongdoer, such as horning or forfeiture, were 
enacted publicly in order to apprise people of the new circumstances. There was also a 
discursive element to the public domain which structured the way authority was 
legitimised, and reputation was an important element of this. That which was commonly 
known about others decided their worthiness to participate in politics, and this was true at 
all levels. Even the king was forced to defend his reputation should the occasion arise. 
Common knowledge of a person’s character and previous actions was integral to the 
procedures of local courts, and was closely related to chivalric ideas of honour and renown. 
Discourses of community, counsel and the common profit operated within the public 
domain. In order to make a successful claim to be acting in the interests of all it was 
necessary to be able to demonstrate this claim over time. The closer an individual or group 
was to embodying the realm the easier this was to achieve, so that kings, lieutenants, those 
who governed during royal minorities and the very closest counsellors of the king had an 
advantage over other individuals in attempting to do this. Burgh councils could very easily 
construe themselves as the whole community in order to legitimise their decisions, because 
burghs were simultaneously a physical space, a group of people and a legal entity. While 
this was also true of the realm as a whole the interests of all members were far less closely 
aligned than in the towns, and the rhetoric of the common profit was most effective when 
positioned against an external entity. This was fairly straightforward in relation to the 
burghs; explicit references to community are consequently found very infrequently in 
relation to the realm. It would be interesting to make a study of this language in diplomatic 
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sources, where Scotland would be discussed in relation to other polities. Rather than acting 
to create a shared identity, therefore, the language of the common profit acted to remind 
elites that their personal interests had to align with the good of the realm and that loyalty to 
the crown was expected from all.  
Although the three estates certainly had the power to limit the actions of the king this was 
not the purpose of parliament. The rhetoric of the common profit could be harnessed in 
support of royal proposals or in situations where such proposals were being modified by the 
estates, and was equally effective for each. This provided a framework within which 
political authority could be asserted and contested, placing an upper limit upon the ability 
of individuals to act without gaining consensus. In periods of crisis this consensus was often 
gained after the fact, underlining its importance still further. The oaths and customary 
practices which structured both bonding and guilds also acted to promote harmony, 
framing the extreme competition which characterised both milieux. Their use in these 
contexts suggests that placing communitarian ideas of friendship and brotherhood in a 
separate category to aristocratic ideas of service and loyalty may be rather misleading. 
Bonding also relied upon the public domain, in that the agreements which settled feuds had 
to become common knowledge in order to be effective, and this knowledge was used in both 
crown courts and franchisal courts. These courts were so similar in terms of procedure, 
personnel and jurisdiction that to characterise them as public and private respectively 
creates an unhelpful and artificial distinction.  
While the public domain has taken centre stage in this work secrecy also played an 
important part in governance, particularly in the structuring of political counsel. Outside 
parliament the king was free to consult with whomever he chose, and was advised to do so 
with each man separately in order to receive the best counsel. Good advice was as valuable 
to the nobility as it was to the king, and the oaths taken in parliament and those found 
within bonds all emphasise the importance of keeping counsel secret. This secrecy could be 
problematic, however, creating a space within which the repertoire of the evil counsellors 
could be activated, given the right political circumstances. These arose during the reign of 
James III, when the king altered the system of courts in a way which granted greater 
authority to the Lords of Council, giving litigants a means of redress when their local judges 
engaged in corrupt practices. This redress was not always easily achieved, particularly when 
the judge in question was a politically powerful figure such as the duke of Albany or the earl 
of Angus. It is possible that resistance to these reforms prompted James III to restructure his 
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‘daily’ council also, by promoting William Scheves and allowing him to direct a significant 
proportion of crown business, a move which contributed to the Lauder rebellion of 1482. 
The changes to the structures of royal governance throughout this period, from the Act of 
Annexation in 1455 to the reorganisation of the King’s Council in 1488-92, co-incide with 
what appears to be an increase in the employment of ideas of public authority by the crown. 
Tracing this discourse throughout the reigns of James IV and James V would shed more 
light upon this question. It would certainly seem to be the case that the resistance faced by 
James III throughout his reign was in part due to the unpopularity of his policies, rather 
than simply his deficiencies of personality. 
The later fifteenth century was a period of rapid change in Scotland. This work has focused 
upon the ways in which the principles evident in contemporary literature structured 
political practice as discerned from the records of governance. There is, however, a broader 
narrative which has been implicit in much of the above, and that is the growth of humanism 
in Scotland.1 Roger Mason has highlighted what he terms the ‘laicisation’ of Scottish culture 
in the period between 1460 and 1560, arguing that the spread of literacy, the ‘new learning’ 
of the humanists and the employment of imperial ideology by the crown were inter-linked, 
through the education and legal training of the lay elite.2 It has already been argued here 
that the adoption by the crown of imperial ideas and iconography from 1469 was closely 
related to the growth of the royal demesne and the resultant need to address the problems 
with justice in the localities. The latter was done in part by altering the judicial system and in 
part by centring the royal court in Edinburgh, giving litigants swifter access to a court of 
appeal. Although resistance by certain powerful members of the nobility was one outcome it 
seems likely that the need to conform to the new legislation may have been just as 
significant.3 If the judgement of one’s court could be relatively easily subjected to the 
scrutiny of the Lords of Council, who were able to draw upon a wealth of experience and a 
swiftly-evolving professional infrastructure to assist them in their own judgements, it would 
be little surprise if the landed aristocracy also began to feel a more pressing need, from the 
1470s onwards, to acquire a greater working knowledge of the law.  
                                                          
1 On humanism in Scotland see, for example, R. Mason, ‘Regnum et Imperium: Humanism and the 
Political Culture of Early Renaissance Scotland’, in Mason (ed.), Kingship and the Commonweal, pp. 104-
138; J. Durkan, ‘The Beginnings of Humanism in Scotland’, IR, 4 (1953), pp. 5-24; J. MacQueen, ‘Some 
Aspects of the Early Renaissance in Scotland’, Forum for Modern Language Studies, 3 (1967), pp. 201-22; 
J. MacQueen (ed.), Humanism in Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990); Houwen, MacDonald and 
Mapstone (eds), A Palace in the Wild. 
2 Mason, ‘Regnum et Imperium’, pp. 106-8. 
3 Ibid., p. 114. 
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Mason has also identified a shift in political vocabulary, which took hold in the 1530s and 
1540s, from the ‘common profit’ and cognates to the ‘commonweal’, the latter of which he 
characterises as a ‘highly effective rhetorical shorthand both for the community’s sense of 
collective identity and the public responsibilities of its members.’4 Two points from the 
fifteenth-century evidence are interesting to note in relation to this change. The first is that 
‘commonweal’, like communitas regni in the fourteenth century, can be construed as a 
political entity in a way that the ‘common profit’ and cognates cannot. ‘Commonweal’ can 
denote a physical space – the kingdom itself - or the governed as a collective body, giving 
those who wielded it the flexibility to deploy it in various different ways.5 That both terms 
should surface during periods of intense political turmoil is perhaps worthy of note, 
suggesting that concepts with this attribute are particularly useful in such situations. As 
each of these periods falls outwith the scope of this thesis, however, no further comment will 
be offered here. Instead it is suggested that the various phrases related to the bonum 
commune found within later fifteenth-century political discourse were performing a function 
other than creating, strengthening and reflecting collective identity. They should therefore 
not be seen as less fully-formed or less sophisticated than their earlier or later counterparts 
but rather as fulfilling a different requirement, that of encouraging harmony and consensus 
between members of the group, whether successfully or otherwise. It may also be significant 
that political language which promoted the realm as a corporate entity fell out of favour 
during the period when the Conciliarist agenda was posing a challenge to monarchical 
authority across Europe. The second point relates to the public domain itself. Further work 
is needed, but given its importance for the exercise of authority in the fifteenth century it 
seems reasonable to suggest that the public domain, where political institutions, processes, 
principles and personnel interacted, had an important role in promoting the civic ideals so 
central to humanist thinking. That these ideals were often couched in terms of public duty 
suggests that this is an area ripe for further exploration. 
 
Poetry and Political Commentary 
                                                          
4 Mason, ‘Chivalry and Citizenship’, pp. 91-92. 
5 For a discussion of this flexibility see R. Mason, ‘Kingship and the Commonweal: Political Thought 
and Ideology in Reformation Scotland’, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1983), 
pp. 67-72. 
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Political change, growing lay literacy and humanist influences converged in the later 
fifteenth century to allow one further use of the public domain; as a discursive space in 
which comment could be made upon contemporary governance. Further investigation of 
this space is rendered problematic by the absence of sources which might shed light upon 
how political authority was experienced, and how people responded to it. Chronicles, 
sermons, petitions and court records tend to be where such evidence is found, and all are 
extremely scarce for this period. Nevertheless, a notable feature of the later fifteenth century 
is an increase in political poetry. An early example is provided by the Buke of the Howlat, 
written in the late 1440s by Richard Holland, secretary to Archibald Douglas, earl of Moray 
and brother to the eighth and ninth earls of Douglas.6 Many other works are thought to date 
from later in the century. These include: Lancelot of the Laik, an anonymous romance which 
includes a lengthy piece of advice to Arthur and which survives in a single copy dated c. 
1489-90; Robert Henryson’s Moral Fables, written in the Aesopic tradition in the 1480s; The 
Thre Prestis of Peblis, another anonymous work which has the theme of good counsel at its 
heart; ‘The Harp’, an advice work which has been recently related to the reign of James III 
and Blind Hary’s epic The Wallace, written in the 1470s.7 
The public performance of fifteenth-century poetry has not been a notable feature of literary 
scholarship to date. This is, again, because many of the works survive only in a very few 
manuscripts, and are often later copies, so that questions relating to their audience, reception 
and transmission are exceedingly difficult to grapple with.8 That plays and games were 
performed publicly as part of festivals is well known. The earliest exempla of the ‘Christis 
Kirk’ tradition date from the later fifteenth century, and testify both to the colour and 
excitement of such festivals and to the familiarity of the experience to those who enjoyed the 
poetry.9 These poems gently satirised widespread folk festivities and remained popular for 
over five hundred years.10 Anna Mill’s study of such ‘plays’ notes the popularity of these 
festivities, along with minstrelsy and what she terms ‘municipal plays’, the earliest reference 
                                                          
6 Holland, The Howlat; Brown, ‘Rejoice to Hear of Douglas’, p. 164. 
7 Lancelot of the Laik, ed. M. M. Gray (Edinburgh, 1912); The Poems of Henryson, ed. Fox, pp. 3-110; The 
Thre Prestis of Peblis, ed. T. D. Robb; Chron. Pluscarden, i, pp. 392-400; Blind Harry, The Wallace, ed. 
McKim. On the dating of Lancelot of the Laik see Mapstone, ‘Advice to Princes’, p. 145. On the dating of 
Henryson’s Fables see Lyall, ‘Politics and Poetry’, p. 6.  
8 The editions above should be consulted for the manuscript context of each poem. Many important 
works of Older Scots literature can be found in The Asloan Manuscript, ed. W. A. Craigie (2 vols.) 
(Edinburgh, 1923-25); The Bannatyne Manuscript, ed. W. T. Ritchie (4 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1928-34); Ratis 
Raving and Other Early Scots Poems on Morals, ed. R. Girvan (Edinburgh, 1939). 
9 The Christis Kirk Tradition: Scots Poems of Folk Festivity, ed. A. H. MacLaine (Glasgow, 1996), pp. v-viii. 
10 The Christis Kirk Tradition, ed. MacLaine, p. vi.  
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to which can be found in the Aberdeen council records in 1440, where a Corpus Christi 
Passion play is mentioned.11 The Aberdeen craft guilds also engaged in pageantry at 
Candlemas which, Mill argues, comprised ‘a preliminary riding or procession with a 
dramatic ceremony in the church’.12 Such festivities were also an important component of 
the May game, which provided another popular occasion for processions, pageantry, 
dancing and the traditional mock king, often known as the Abbot of Unreason, or in 
Aberdeen the Abbot of Bon Accord.13 That such games could cross the line into actual 
disorder is suggested by an entry in that burgh’s council register, from 1445, which states 
that ‘for letting and stanching of diverse enormyteis done in tyme bygane be the abbotis of 
this burgh, callit of bone acorde, that in time to cum [the council] will give na fies to na sic 
abbotis’.14   
These events are one part of what John McGavin describes as the ‘realm of social 
performativity’, in which witnesses play a crucial role in affecting the creation of ‘communal 
memory’.15 He calls the ‘stage’ upon which such performances occur the public scene, and 
makes some interesting arguments, from sixteenth-century examples, about the ability of 
people to manipulate the ‘parts’ that they were expected to play during a variety of public 
occasions, such as trials, by subverting the expectations of their audience.16 While there is no 
evidence that political poetry was directly connected to this public scene several points can 
be made. There was a thriving culture of public festivals which encompassed both 
merrymaking and political display and these were an integral part of life in the burghs 
which, as has been argued, were also important spaces for the generation of common 
knowledge regarding the exercise of political authority. McGavin’s public scene and the 
public domain argued for here are clearly two sides of the same coin. Also, there could be a 
subversive element to such occasions. The May game in particular encouraged this, with its 
                                                          
11 ACA CA/1/1/4, p. 203; Abdn Guild Recs, p. 104; A. Mill, Mediaeval Plays in Scotland (Edinburgh and 
London, 1927), pp. 61, 115. 
12 Mill, Mediaeval Plays, p. 67. The register for 1442 lists the contribution each craft was expected to 
make to the Candlemas celebrations, ACA CA/1/1/5/ii, p. 66;  Abdn Guild Recs, p. 68. 
13 Mill, Mediaeval Plays, pp. 19-35. 
14 ACA CA/1/1/5/ii, p. 701; Abdn Guild Recs, p. 99. 
15 McGavin, Theatricality and Narrative, pp. 15-16. There is an emerging scholarly interest in collective 
memory. See, for example, J. Fentress and C. Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford, 1992), particularly the 
chapter on ‘Medieval Memories’, pp. 144-72;   Z. Evietar, Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social 
Shape of the Past (Chicago, 2003); J. Haemers, ‘Social Memory and Rebellion in Fifteenth-Century 
Ghent’, Social History, 36 (2011), pp. 443-63. 
16 A particularly good example given is that of Sandie Furrour’s ability to manipulate his 
interrogation for heresy, as described by John Knox. McGavin, Theatricality and Narrative, pp. 20-24. 
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traditional inversion of status personified by the mock king.17 In addition, while the 
medieval evidence is insufficient to investigate many specific cases, such as those outlined 
by McGavin, it seems certain that people in the fifteenth century would have been just as 
well able to subvert performative expectations in a variety of settings as they were in the 
sixteenth. This, after all, is precisely what happened at the market cross in Stirling in 1452. 
This is important because while dating and authorship remain problematic, Sally Mapstone 
has convincingly argued that very little of the extant political poetry of the later fifteenth 
century emanated from the royal court.18 She suggests that a reading public existed, that 
levels of lay literacy have been underestimated and that patrons in this period were more 
likely to be either clerics or members of the nobility than the crown.19 She further notes that 
two of the most important writers of James III’s reign, Blind Hary and Robert Henryson, 
were ‘definitely composing outside the king’s court’, and that other fifteenth-century works 
– Lancelot of the Laik and The Thre Prestis of Peblis included – were written for a ‘literate 
audience’ which was ‘quite removed from the royal court’.20 This suggests that poetry could 
well have had a role within the same local political cultures in which the legitimisation of 
authority, political festivities and acts of protest all took place. Joyce Coleman has argued for 
a greater focus upon medieval aurality, or public reading.21 She suggests that the traditional 
division between orality and literacy - where unsophisticated, public recitation from 
memory gives way to private reading and contemplation by a newly-literate elite – is far too 
stark, and that people gathered in groups to read aloud and be read to throughout the 
middle ages.22 Burns makes the same argument, in relation to Ireland’s Meroure of Wyssdome, 
which he characterises as a work of ‘popular theology’.23 While Burns acknowledges that 
Ireland’s reading public would be ‘restricted’, he nevertheless suggests that it wouldn’t be 
limited to the literate class, citing examples where Ireland clearly assumes that his work 
would be read aloud.24 The households of the nobility would seem the most likely places to 
find both the levels of literacy and of wealth necessary for purchasing books and reading 
them aloud, and yet wealthy burgesses would surely have been able to enjoy the same 
                                                          
17 Mill, Mediaeval Plays, p. 16. 
18 Mapstone, ‘Was there a Court Literature?’, pp. 410-22. Cf. R. J. Lyall, ‘The Court as a Cultural 
Centre’, History Today, 34 (1984), pp. 27-33, which takes a different view. 
19 Mapstone, ‘Was there a Court Literature?’, pp. 414-17. 
20 Ibid., pp. 419-20. 
21 J. Coleman, ‘Interactive Parchment: The Theory and Practice of Medieval English Aurality’, The 
Yearbook of English Studies, 25 (1995), pp. 63-79. See also Coleman, Public Reading and the Reading Public. 
22 Coleman, ‘Interactive Parchment’, p. 64 and passim. 
23 Burns, ‘John Ireland and “The Meroure”’, p. 90. 
24 Ibid., p. 90, n. 111. 
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pastime, if they so chose. Michael Brown has recently highlighted the literate lay audience in 
Fife for whom copies of Barbour’s Bruce were made in 1488 and 1489, arguing that such 
activity must be seen in relation to the public activities of the men concerned and to the 
political upheaval of the period.25 Given the interest in political literature in that period, as 
evidenced by either the writing or copying of many of the works under discussion in this 
thesis, such questions would likely bear interesting fruit if applied more broadly. As 
concerns political poetry, the little evidence on audience and reception as can be gleaned 
from the extant manuscripts can be supplemented by placing the works within the public 
domain. 
In the 1970s a debate arose concerning the extent to which the poetry of the later fifteenth 
century could be shown to contain references to contemporary political events. Ranald 
Nicholson argued that within Robert Henryson’s Moral Fables could be found topical 
allusions, suggesting that the fable of the Lion and the Mouse offered a ‘precise allegory’ of 
the Lauder rebellion of 1482.26 His reasoning was rejected by literary scholars R. J. Lyall and 
Steven McKenna on the basis of two observations: firstly, that Nicholson gained his 
understanding of the events in question from sixteenth-century chronicles, which were 
written for their own purposes and could not, therefore, provide a reliable or detailed source 
of information, and secondly, that Henryson’s intention in writing the Fables was to address 
‘man’s place in the universe’ so that in drawing upon his political milieu he turned the local 
and particular into ‘universal moral themes’, rather than the other way around.27 While 
these criticisms were justified, historical scholarship on the fifteenth century has advanced 
considerably since this debate was conducted, providing greater insight into the politics of 
the period. 
As has been shown, Scottish political culture underwent significant changes in the later 
fifteenth century in the restructuring of the nobility, the strengthening of royal authority and 
the reconfiguration of the system of courts, and it is certainly possible that the proliferation 
of political poetry was connected to this process. As John MacQueen argued as long ago as 
1967, it might be expected that the adoption of humanist thinking would ‘find a natural 
                                                          
25 M. Brown, ‘Barbour's Bruce in the 1480s: Literature and Locality’, in S. Boardman and S. Foran (eds), 
Barbour's Bruce and its Cultural Contexts (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 213-32. 
26 R. Nicholson, Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974), p. 509. See also p. 500 and p. 520. 
27 Lyall, ‘Politics and Poetry’, p. 6; S. R. McKenna, ‘Legends of James III and the Problem of 
Henryson’s Topicality’, SLJ, 17 (1990), pp. 5-20, at p. 14. R. L. Kindrick, ‘Politics and Poetry at the 
Court of James III’, SSL, 19 (1984), pp. 40-55, takes a view more sympathetic to Nicholson.  
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literary expression in social and political satire’.28 Satire relies upon a shared understanding 
of politics for its effectiveness, and it has been argued so far that such an understanding was 
essential for politics to operate at all. The discursive space in which reputations were 
constructed and modified, and which allowed charges such as ‘common theft’ to exist, was 
also appropriable by the disaffected for the purposes of commentary in much the same way 
that public spaces could be appropriated for protest.29 While it is therefore unwise to read 
direct allegories of specific events into works which cannot be dated with great accuracy, 
such poems ought not to be distanced too much from their political context either. Lyall’s 
argument rests in part on his categorisation of many fifteenth-century authors as ‘court 
poets’ who wished to offer conventional advice to the monarch and contribute to ‘long-
standing medieval literary and philosophical traditions’ in the process.30 If much of this 
poetry was not in fact part of the courtly milieu its articulation of universal themes may be 
viewed rather differently; it is possible that the writers had genuine concerns which they 
actively wished to make public, however universal these may have been. Like the protesters 
and rebels in chapter five, who chose to generate common knowledge about abuses of 
authority through public performances in the burghs, the poets were able to draw upon the 
same vocabulary of good governance in order to offer a critique of contemporary kingship, 
counsel and justice. The importance of such poems surely lies not in the information they 
can provide about the events to which they may or may not have referred, but in the fact 
that they were written at all.  
It is unfortunately almost impossible to investigate any further from surviving evidence the 
effect that political poetry may have had upon its audience. It is, however, worth citing a 
brief example from Henryson’s work in order to illustrate the type of material to which this 
argument refers. Henryson lived in Dunfermline where, as has been noted, both the abbey 
and the guild exercised political authority, providing opportunities for public festivities, 
ceremonies and rituals, and encouraging the copying and, presumably, the reading of (and 
listening to) literature.31 Henryson is thought to have been both a schoolmaster and a notary 
                                                          
28 MacQueen, ‘Some Aspects of the Early Renaissance’, p. 202. 
29 There is an extensive literature covering the relationship between political protest and commentary 
in medieval Europe. See J. Dumolyn et al. (eds), The Voices of the People in Late Medieval Europe: 
Communication and Popular Politics (Turnhout, 2014); J. Watts, ‘Polemic and Politics in the 1450s’, in M. 
Kekewich (ed.), The Politics of Fifteenth-Century England: John Vale's Book (Stroud, 1995), pp. 3-42; J. 
Haemers. For the Common Good: State Power and Urban Revolts in the Reign of Mary of Burgundy, (1477-
1482) (Turnhout, 2009). 
30 Lyall, ‘The Court as a Cultural Centre’, pp. 27-33; ‘Politics and Poetry’, pp. 5, 25. 
31 See above, p. 64. 
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public, and from his work it is clear that he had some legal training, or at least a close 
familiarity with the workings of the legal system.32 He would therefore have been a 
prominent local figure. His Fables are certainly informed by his knowledge of the law. In 
particular, the Tale of the Sheep and the Dog demonstrates a strong command of the ars notaria, 
and Fox suggests that his intention was to mount a ‘general attack on contemporary 
justice’.33 The moralitas offered at the end of the poem bears this out. The Sheep has been 
denied justice by a rigged court, and is lamenting his misfortune. Addressing God directly, 
he cries: 
Se how this cursit syn of covetice 
Exylit hes baith lufe, lawtie and law 
Now few or nane will execute justice 
In falt of quhome the pure man is overthraw 
The veritie, suppois the jugis knaw 
Thay ar so blindit with affectioun [partiality] 
But dreid, for meid [bribes], thay thoill the richt go doun.34 
 
Henryson is not here referring to a particular court, case or judge, but to the state of justice 
in the realm, which he knew to be deficient. There would be little point in choosing for a 
moral exemplar a situation which would be familiar only to a few people in Dunfermline. 
Henryson is able to address universal themes because his subject matter resonates widely, 
and his audience can identify with the Sheep because they understand his experience in 
court. This clearly connects with the rhetoric around justice for the ‘poor commons’ 
embedded in the acts of parliament discussed above. Henryson was writing during the 
period in which James III’s reforms to civil justice were being enacted and assimilated, and it 
is surely not stretching the evidence too far to suggest that the two are related. If the 
experience of William Sinclair of Herdmanstone, who found himself at the mercy of the earl 
of Angus, was representative of the ways in which powerful judges ordinary could 
manipulate verdicts it is no surprise either that people would have wished to draw attention 
to such abuses or that the king would have wished to intervene in order to address them.35 
While it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which any particular piece of poetry itself 
became common knowledge, therefore, situating it within the public domain allows for the 
possibility that it would have been performed and discussed. Growing literacy, medieval 
                                                          
32 On Henryson’s life see The Poems of Henryson, ed. Fox, pp. xiii-xxv. 
33 The Poems of Henryson, ed. Fox, p. 252. The Fable can be found at pp. 47-54. On Henryson’s use of 
the ars notaria see R. L. Kindrick, Robert Henryson and the Medieval Arts of Rhetoric (New York, 1993), 
pp. 169-75. 
34 The Poems of Henryson, ed. Fox, p. 53. 
35 Above, pp. 88, 101. 
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aurality and political change all converged in the later fifteenth century to produce a set of 
circumstances in which poetry, and indeed other forms of literature, could potentially 
contribute to common knowledge of contemporary politics.  
It is possible to take the argument further in certain cases. Brown has argued that the Buke of 
the Howlat may have been intended as ‘propaganda which spread impressions of the power 
and prestige of the [Douglas] family well beyond the confines of Moray’s household’, while 
it has also been suggested that Blind Hary’s Wallace contains a thinly-veiled criticism of 
James III’s English alliance, pursued in the first half of the 1470s.36 It has also recently been 
argued that ‘The Harp’ is in fact a satire of James III’s reign.37 Written in the troubled 
political milieu of the 1470s, and finding a newly receptive audience in 1488, the poem 
subverts the conventional tropes of advice which had been so stridently offered to the 
defeated king, for the amusement of the new regime. It references Angus’s misadventures, 
including the Herdmanstone case and his debt to Thomas Fotheringham, collected under the 
1469 legislation, as well as the late king’s dispute with Albany over Cranshaws.38 The 
implication is that regardless of James III’s reforms to civil justice, his enemies managed to 
have the last laugh.  
Lyall has warned against the ‘circular argument’ that because James III was a bad king all 
political poetry must be critiquing events during his reign, further supporting the idea that 
he was a bad king.39 This is important to bear in mind, and yet the later fifteenth century was 
a period of rapid growth for the crown. James III claimed heightened royal authority though 
ideas of imperial kingship, and by James IV’s reign the crown was being positioned as a 
public entity in a way that had not occurred before. Neither Hary’s Wallace or ‘The Harp’ are 
allegorical, instead offering satire and political criticism. Given the opportunity which the 
public domain provided for the governed to modify common knowledge about political 
authority, and given that newly-literate laymen were being taught to take an interest in 
matters of law and governance, it would perhaps be stranger if such commentary had not 
begun to flourish. The greater the number of people who experienced crown governance 
directly, the greater the number who would have had first-hand experience of its 
                                                          
36 Brown, ‘Rejoice to Hear of Douglas’, p. 164; M. McDiarmid, ‘The Date of The “Wallace”’, SHR, 34 
(1955), pp. 26-31, at p. 31. 
37 Hawes, ‘Perverst Counsale?’, forthcoming. 
38 See above, pp. 101, 128, 117. 
39 Lyall, ‘Politics and Poetry’, p. 25. 
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inadequacies. It is certainly possible that knowledge of these deficiencies may have been 
turned into verse and publicly performed for the purposes of entertainment. 
 
 
The Exercise of Authority 
 
To conclude it may be helpful to state some broader points in relation to the historiography 
with which this work began. The removal of the political community, the introduction of the 
public domain and the substitution of the personal for the private as advocated here may 
appear to amount to a significant shift away from the current model. Yet this is only partly 
the case. The co-operation detected by Grant and Wormald is very much still in evidence, 
but has been relocated from the level of day-to-day politics to that of political principle. It 
was the shared values, structures and assumptions, until now granted limited attention in 
the historiography, which allowed the kingdom to function successfully as a political unit. 
Likewise, the conflict for which Brown, Boardman and Tanner have argued remains an 
integral part of political life, but not simply as a competition for resources in which strength 
of personality decided the outcome. Instead, disputes between kings, lords and men were 
both framed and legitimised using discourses of counsel and the common good, a 
knowledge of individual reputations, and an understanding of the law. It is this insight 
which will allow the burghs to be more fully integrated into the political history of the 
period, as they operated on exactly the same principles. 
 
This model necessarily questions the current emphasis upon the exercise of authority for its 
own sake, and instead asks why it may have been considered important that authority was 
asserted, and what the most effective means of doing so would have been, in any given set 
of circumstances. It also highlights the problems inherent in focusing discussions of 
authority around points of crisis; arguments which treat James I and James III together, as 
kings who were unsuccessful due to their respective styles of governance, mask the 
significant differences in political culture between the 1430s and the 1480s. Finally, moving 
the focus away from personality and co-operation and onto structures and principles brings 
questions of political agency to the fore. Instead of a static ‘political community’ at the heart 
of fifteenth-century politics this thesis offers an array of political tools, a conceptual space in 
which they were used and an almost limitless number of questions to be asked about what 
people did with them. 
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